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FBIS-EEU-96-035 CONTENTS *21 February 1996*

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

EU: Chairman on 'Strategy' for Former Yugoslavia *[TANJUG]* 1

ALBANIA

Albania: Party Leaders Comment on Kosovo Bomb Blasts *[GAZETA SHQIPTARE 20 Feb]* 2
Albania: Serbian Funding of PS Said 'Propaganda' *[ZERI I POPILLIT 17 Feb]* 2
Albania: PS Will Not Attend Milosevic's Congress *[ZERI I POPULLIT 14 Feb]* 3
Albania: Court Rejects PS Appeal in Brozi Case *[GAZETA SHQIPTARE 15 Feb]* 3
Albania: AD Leaders To Face Genocide Charges *[RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE 17 Feb]* 4

BULGARIA

Bulgaria: DAR To Cooperate With BSP in Elections *[DUMA 15 Feb]* 5
Bulgaria: BSP Stance on Presidential Primaries Viewed *[168 CHASA 17 Feb]* 5
Bulgaria: SDS' Agov Views Presidential Candidates *[KONTINENT 12 Feb]* 6

CZECH REPUBLIC

Czech Republic: Klaus on Taxation, Russian Threats *[Prague Radio]* 8

SLOVAKIA

Slovakia: Sappers Transferred to Eastern Slavonia *[NARODNA OBRODA 17 Feb]* 9
Slovakia: Meciar on 'Power Struggle,' NATO Membership *[Munich FOCUS 19 Feb]* 9
Slovakia: Foreign Ministry Criticizes Kwasniewski on EU *[Bratislava Radio]* 10
Slovakia: Daily Protests 'Interference' by Hungary's Horn *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 17 Feb]* 10
Slovakia: Editorial Calls For Action on Kovac Affair *[NARODNA OBRODA 17 Feb]* 11
Slovakia: FNM Head Urges Caution on Bank Privatization *[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 16 Feb]* 12
Slovakia: Contract With Radio Free Europe Renewed *[NARODNA OBRODA 17 Feb]* 13

HUNGARY

Hungary: Horn Denies 'Government Reshuffle' Rumors *[Budapest Radio]* 14
Hungary: DZVM, UVM Attempt To Coordinate Policies *[Budapest Radio]* 14
Hungary: MDF Leader Outlines Future of Party *[Budapest Radio]* 14
Hungary: MDF's Konya on Reasons for Party 'Crisis' *[NEPSZAVA 16 Feb]* 14
Hungary: Tension in KDNP Over Leadership Election *[Budapest Radio]* 15

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

B-H: Commentary on 'Defused Tension' After Rome Talks *[VECERNJE NOVINE 20 Feb]* 16
B-H: Serb Socialists Applaud Accord, Condemn Karadzic *[Belgrade TV]* 16
B-H: Italian IFOR General on 'Lack of Trust' in Accord *[Rome LA REPUBBLICA 18 Feb]* 17
B-H: Russian IFOR Head: NATO Losing 'Significance' *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 17 Feb]* 17
B-H: Serbs Said Passing Through Russian IFOR Positions *[VECERNJE NOVINE 20 Feb]* 18
B-H: Serb General Says Boycott of IFOR To Continue *[AFP]* 19
B-H: Generals Tolimir, Walker Discuss Implementation *[SRNA]* 19

B-H: 'U.S.-Style Stalinism' Seen in Officers' Arrests *[GLAS SRPSKI 17-18 Feb]* 19
B-H: Izetbegovic on Croat 'Resistance' to Peace Accord *[Sarajevo Radio]* 20
B-H: Koschnick Says Mostar Unification Process Begun *[Sarajevo Radio]* 21
B-H: Mostar Official Stresses 'Very Cool Heads' Needed *[Zagreb TV]* 21
B-H: Rome Accord 'Among Last Chances' for EU in Mostar *[AFP]* 22
B-H: EU's Koschnick 'Optimistic' About Mostar Future *[Vienna DER STANDARD 20 Feb]* 22
B-H: MBO Accuses Leaders of 'Capitulation' Over Mostar *[Sarajevo Radio]* 23
B-H: Mostar Joint Police Patrols Commence 20 Feb *[Zagreb Radio]* 23
B-H: Croats Urge Muslim-Croat Division Within Federation *[Mostar Radio]* 23
B-H: Croatia's HDZ Policy Seen at Work in Herzegovina *[DNEVNI AVAZ 14 Feb]* 24
B-H: Background to Recent Mostar Events Examined *[SLOBODNA BOSNA 12 Jan]* 25
B-H: Croats Refuse To Allow Muslim Return to Busovaca *[TANJUG]* 27
B-H: Factions 'Still Arguing' Over Territory Exchanges *[AFP]* 28
B-H: Serbs Fleeing Sarajevo, Seeking Shelter in Bratunac *[TANJUG]* 28
B-H: Serbs Being Allowed To Leave Sarajevo 'Unimpeded' *[SRNA]* 28
B-H: Leaders 'Intimidating' Serbs Into Sarajevo Exodus *[AFP]* 28
B-H: Official Denies Sarajevo Serbs Forced To Leave *[SRNA]* 29
B-H: Serb Exodus From Sarajevo Continues Despite Snow *[AFP]* 30
B-H: Serb FM Protests 'Anti-Serb Propaganda' *[SRNA]* 30
B-H: SDS Leader Defends Karadzic, Mladic *[SRNA]* 31
B-H: OSCE Chairman Says Election Timetable 'Tight' *[AFP]* 31
B-H: Weekly Claims Izetbegovic Visited 'Camps' *[INTERVJU 2 Feb]* 32
B-H: EU Warns Cash 'Crisis' Threatening Peace Accord *[AFP]* 34

CROATIA

Croatia: UNTAES Head on Reconstruction of Srem-Baranja *[TANJUG]* 35
Croatia: E. Slavonia Commander Discusses Security *[Zagreb TV]* 35
Croatia: TANJUG Reports Tudjman's Return to Zagreb 36
Croatia: Opposition Leaders Reject Tudjman Accusations *[Zagreb TV]* 36

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

FYROM: PDP Leader Says Ethnic 'Gap' Deepens *[PULS 16 Feb]* 37

POLAND

Poland: NATO Secretary General on Expansion, Russia *[WPROST 18 Feb]* 43
Poland: Rosati: German Stand on NATO Expansion Unchanged *[PAP]* 44
Poland: Presidential Aide on Foreign Policies *[POLSKA ZBROJNA 16 Feb]* 44
Poland: Prime Minister Cimoszewicz Interviewed *[TRYBUNA 17-18 Feb]* 46
Poland: Cimoszewicz 'Ready To Reveal' Moscow Loan Papers *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 19 Feb]* 49
Poland: Cimoszewicz To Talk to Rosati About Oleksy Remark *[Warsaw Radio]* 50
Poland: Sejm Commission Member Bugaj on Oleksy Case *[DZIENNIK BALTYCKI 6 Feb]* 50
Poland: Sejm Speaker Zych Interviewed on Vetting Law *[GLOS WIELKOPOLSKI 6 Feb]* 51
Poland: SdRP Leaders Respond to 'Open Letter' *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 7 Feb]* 52
Poland: Opposition Signs Declaration on Education Reform *[Warsaw Radio]* 53
Poland: Solidarity Expert Says NFI's Can Launder Money *[SZTANDAR 14 Feb]* 54
Poland: Deputy Defense Minister on Finances *[POLSKA ZBROJNA 9 Feb]* 54
Poland: Defense Minister: GS Needs To Be Cut *[SZTANDAR 15 Feb]* 56
Poland: Wilecki on Troops for Bosnia, Changes in Army *[TRYBUNA 20 Feb]* 56
Poland: Air Defense Forces Receive 10 New MiG-29's *[PAP]* 57
Poland: Air Force To Buy Irydas After Modernization *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 20 Feb]* 57
Poland: New Law on Defense Minister Post Viewed *[POLSKA ZBROJNA 14 Feb]* 57

ROMANIA

Romania: Goals of New Political Alliance Discussed *[AZI 5 Feb, etc.]* 59

Romania: PD's Roman Offers 'New Political Structure' *[AZI 13 Feb]* 59
Romania: Rusu Reelected PL'93 Executive President *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 12 Feb]* 60

SLOVENIA

Slovenia: NATO's MacKenzie Ends Official Visit *[Ljubljana Radio]* 61
Slovenia: Austrian Investment in Retail Trade Detailed *[DELO 29 Jan]* 61
Slovenia: Kacin on New Army Training Method *[DELO 16 Feb]* 62

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

FRY: Milosevic, UK's Bonsor Discuss Issues *[TANJUG]* 63
FRY: UK Minister Comments on Meeting With Milosevic *[TANJUG]* 63
FRY: Kontic Receives Britain's Nicholas Bonsor *[TANJUG]* 63
FRY: Milutinovic Receives New Russian Envoy *[TANJUG]* 64
FRY: Normalized Ties with IMF, World Bank Requested *[TANJUG]* 64
FRY: Belgrade, Vatican Open Full Diplomatic Relations *[TANJUG]* 64
FRY: Serb Republic Refugees Should Return to Homes *[TANJUG]* 64
FRY: Belgrade, Kosovo Entering New Phase *[SRPSKA REC 29 Jan]* 65
FRY: Military Industry Development Strategy Required *[TANJUG]* 68

Serbia

Serbia: Milosevic Said To Favor Cooperating With Hague *[AFP]* 68
Serbia: Seselj on War Crimes Charges, Milosevic *[NASA BORBA 16 Feb]* 68
Serbia: Pale Serbs Said To Benefit From Rome Summit *[DNEVNIK 20 Feb]* 69

Kosovo

Kosovo: LDK's Agani on Germany as 'Greatest Support' *[KOSOVA DAILY REPORT]* 70
Kosovo: Liberation Movement Statement on Bombings *[RILINDJA 20 Feb]* 71

Vojvodina

Vojvodina: Manifesto Calls For Autonomy *[NIN 5 Jan]* 71

EU: Chairman on 'Strategy' for Former Yugoslavia

LD2002190796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1519 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 20 (TANJUG)—Italian Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli told the Belgrade monthly INTERNATIONAL POLITICS that the priority job of the European Union was to work out a strategy for the former Yugoslavia in the period after the war.

Agnelli, who is also the EU chairman, said the goal would be to ensure a definite calming down and the political, economic and human recovery of the region.

In an interview that appeared in the latest issue of the Belgrade political monthly, Agnelli said that 'the decisive contribution of Belgrade to a peaceful solution, especially from the moment when it took over last September the role of negotiator for the Bosnian Serbs. [no end quotation mark as received]

Undoubtedly it was a turning point in the solution of the crisis, which led to the signing of the peace agreement in Paris, Susanna Agnelli said.

The Italian foreign minister assessed that the military component of the Paris agreement on peace in Bosnia was implemented as scheduled, and pointed to the need to secure a 'greater degree of coordination between all those contributing to stabilizing peace'.

Announcing the gradual return of Italian-Yugoslav relations to 'traditional ties from the period before the crisis' in the former Yugoslavia, Agnelli said there were wide possibilities in the economic field, first of all in infrastructure, and in medium and small businesses.

Albania: Party Leaders Comment on Kosovo Bomb Blasts

AU2002164296 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 20 Feb 96 p 3

[Unattributed interviews with Tritan Shehu, general secretary of the Democratic Party; Sabit Brokaj, Socialist Party deputy; Sabri Godo, chairman of the Republican Party; and Paskal Milo of the Social Democratic Party, in Tirana on 19 February: "Bombs in Kosova: Albanian Politicians Concerned"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—Albanian politicians have been shocked by the recent bomb blasts in Prishtina and Peje [Pec]. Political party leaders commented yesterday on the reasons bombs had been planted in these Kosovar cities. It seems that they all unite in "blaming" the overindulgent policies pursued by Ibrahim Rugova, Kosova's current president.

After the bomb blasts, Tirana politicians "offer" more vigorous political action as a solution. This is what they have told GAZETA SHQIPTARE:

Tritan Shehu (Democratic Party)

I do not know whether it is true that bombs were planted in some cities of Kosova, but, if it is, I say that this was a provocation by Serbian chauvinists to justify their violence and to spoil the very positive reputation that the democratic forces in Kosova have acquired internationally. I am sure that acts of this kind will never destroy this reputation.

Sabit Brokaj (Socialist Party)

For years now, the people have been peacefully seeking to achieve their goals without conflict, weapons, or violence. This time, planting bombs marks the end of their hopes that their problems may be solved through talks alone. Planting bombs in some Kosovar cities, alas, shows the lack of a reasonable policy on the part of Rugova, who sees his own peaceful path as a passive form of Gandhism, not an active expression of the protest of the entire people for their rights.

Sabri Godo (Republican Party)

On one hand, planting bombs in Kosova might be a device of the extremist Serbian parties, intended to accuse the Albanian people of terrorism to serve as an excuse for their direct forms of military repression and to start an operation of ethnic cleansing like the one that the Serbs tried to organize in Bosnia. Another explanation, if this act was committed by Albanians, is that we are dealing with irresponsible people and terrorists, who are trying to make their mark at the very time when it seems that the United States, Germany, France, and other states are inclined to support Albania in advancing toward a fair settlement in Kosova. However, Kosova must help itself by means of energetic political action, which I would say has been lacking.

Paskal Milo (Social Democratic Party)

What took place in Prishtina was no doubt an act of desperate terrorism, which has nothing to do with the aims of the Albanian people in Kosova and the path that they have taken toward the realization of their full human rights. However, I would consider it as an act, isolated from its context, that expresses powerful popular feelings and may be an ominous sign for all political forces in Kosova and Albania, and indeed in Serbia and internationally, that the issue of Kosova cannot be neglected, but demands urgent treatment and as fair a settlement as possible.

Albania: Serbian Funding of PS Said 'Propaganda'

AU2002123696 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 17 Feb 96 p 1

[Editorial: "'Serbian Finance': An Antinational Scenario"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There is no end to the insanity of our rulers, who, in their struggle to cling to power by all manner of means, have now played the Serbian card. On the basis of the revelations of a crackpot called Zannoni, the ruling party's press has for some weeks been inflating reports of what it calls secret Serbian finance for the Albanian Socialist Party [PS]. It would not be worth dealing with these hallucinations and fantasies, except for the fact that the official press of Tirana is openly involving itself in the struggle among political forces in Belgrade and calling to its aid first the anti-Albanian Seselj, then Milosevic's UDN [expansion unknown], and then the Serbian ultranationalist Draskovic shows that the dark intrigues of our rulers to the detriment of our national cause and the unity that is so vital for its fair solution are now bearing fruit.

On this occasion, we cannot fail to recall that, throughout the years of the communist dictatorship in Albania, the regime used the Serbian card to strike at its political opponents, from K. Xoxe to M. Shehu. Even today, the scenario is quite simple. According to the trusty Zannoni, the Albanian Socialists have sold themselves to Belgrade for a few million dollars, and they must therefore not come to power in the next elections, because this means selling Albania to Serbia. It means no more and no less than making a reality of the great crime Serbia has dreamed of for 100 years, thanks to the treason of N. Dokle and the staff of KOHA JONE. The naivety of the authors of this scenario is less than childish, and it is a gift to all those who have indeed been working through the years for antinational interests. Superman scenarios are more realistic and less riddled with fantasy. However, what else can one expect from the political struggle on this threshold of the electoral campaign, when the ruling party's propaganda is in the hands of botchers? Spreading such nonsense about the leadership of the country's largest opposition party supposedly falling into Serbia's lap is an attempt to distract attention from the fair question of every Albanian: What are the Democratic Party [PD] and President Berisha doing to fairly solve our national question and for the destiny of Kosova, these two major items in the program which gained votes four years ago? There has virtually not been one centimeter's progress toward a fair solution of these issues during the time of the PD's government.

This is now the time to tender accounts of progress toward this national goal that tests the seriousness of every Albanian political party, and which under the PD has been treated with what might be called at the very least unprecedented dilettantism. Games have been invented about funding and agents, the Serbian nationalist leaders have been cosseted, and charlatans and the gutter press have been brought onto the stage of the political struggle. This is why this scenario will be buried in the shame of those who devised it.

Albania: PS Will Not Attend Milosevic's Congress

AU1902204696 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 14 Feb 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Reply by Socialist Party Spokesman"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Asked by our correspondent about possible attendance at the congress of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS], the spokesman of the Socialist Party of Albania [PS] replied: A newspaper has speculated that the PS will be sending a delegation to the SPS congress, but this report is not true. The PS has received an invitation, but will not be sending any representative to attend the congress. This is because the SPS, as the ruling party, is responsible for the repression against the Albanian population of Kosova and rejects the realistic proposals of the international community for a peaceful solution to the Albanian question. The PS will be holding its second congress on 23 March and the SPS will not figure on the list of those from Europe invited to this event.

Albania: Court Rejects PS Appeal in Brozi Case

AU2002124096 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 15 Feb 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Brozi Chapter Closed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—The "Brozi Chapter" has finally been closed. The final legal confrontation at the Constitutional Court changed nothing in the case of the former Cassation Court chairman. The seven leading judges chaired by Rustem Gjata yesterday rejected the appeal of the Socialist Party [PS] to declare Zef Brozi's dismissal unconstitutional. The three points in the suit were demolished, leaving not a shred of hope that fate of the former supreme court chairman might be reversed, despite the confidence of the Socialists. An assortment of legal articles, paragraphs, and an entire judicial labyrinth were used to oppose the Socialists' request. The explanation was assembled in seven pages, and concluded with the verdict: "The request of the PS parliamentary group to declare anticonstitutional and illegal the decision of the People's Assembly 'On the Dismissal of the Chairman of the Court of Cassation' is rejected. This decision is final and is effective immediately." These were Gjata's final words.

The documents and figures used by the Constitutional Court rejected a request that was perhaps not strictly about law but was more a technical matter, relating to the number of deputies present for the ballot on Brozi's dismissal. According to the Socialist deputies, the voting could not be considered valid because there was not a quorum in the parliamentary chamber. They even claimed that three deputies, Pashko, Imami, and Cani, were counted, although they were not present at the plenary session. However, this argument was also countered by the Constitutional Court. "An examination of the documents shows that 73 deputies were present, including two of the deputies mentioned above. This shows that no less than then 71 deputies were in session at the time of the ballot, i.e., more than one half of the total number, not counting Pashko and Imami," the statement by the Constitutional Court concludes. Four sessions of the highest organ of the judiciary were necessary before the Brozi case could finally be erased from the agenda where it has stood for many months. The court debate between the Socialists and the People's Assembly seems to have done nothing but recall the great commotion that led to the removal of the former chairman of the Court of Cassation. Brozi himself was the first to put a stop to this commotion with his departure for the United States.

Albania: AD Leaders To Face Genocide Charges

AU2002112596 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 17 Feb 96 p 1

[Report by A. Dajti: "Alliance Bosses Accused of Genocide"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sources in the Procurator's Office report that charges have been raised against Neritan Ceka and Arben Imami, two of the leading figures of the Democratic Alliance [AD]. Astrit Qorri, Tanush Frasheri, A. Babolli, and two more former internees have lodged a suit accusing AD leader Ceka and his closest friend and collaborator Imami over the tragic fates they suffered under Hoxha's criminal dictatorship. These honest intellectuals who painfully suffered the horrors of the dictatorship blame Ceka and Imami as direct participants in an inhuman scenario that turned into a tragedy for themselves and their families. We know that Ceka, the most ardent advocate of an alliance with the Socialists and the main support of its incriminated leadership, denounced himself as a close accomplice of President Alia, himself now accused of genocide, at the culminating moment of the democratic movement. He strove by all means to neutralize and destroy the Democratic Party. Imami and some other former collaborators of the state security service, the secret political police, stood close by Ceka in this adventure that put the fate of democracy at such risk. The fact that these two elements have put themselves at the service of the former structures of the dictatorship in the last few years and have striven at all costs to bring the former communists back to power shows that Ceka and Imami have such a dark past that they dare not look ahead. Ceka's close friendship with Imami can only be explained by Balzac's words, "Find out if they have committed a crime together."

Bulgaria: DAR To Cooperate With BSP in Elections

AU2002143896 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 15 Feb 96 p 3

[Interview with Vasil Velinov, DAR leader, by Vesela Doneva; place and date not given: "DAR Could Support BSP's Presidential Candidate"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Doneva] After expelling the Green Party and leaving the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party [BSDP] last summer, the Democratic Alternative for the Republic [DAR] shrunk by half. Only the Civic Alliance for the Republic [GOR] and the Alternative Social Liberal Party [ASP] remained in the political alliance. At the same time, DAR feels twice as strong. What is the reason for the enhanced self-confidence?

[Velinov] One should look back to 1994 and understand why and how DAR was created. It was established two to three months before the elections as a preelection coalition, which combined two parties with a pronounced rightist character, and two with a pronounced leftist character. This spontaneously created coalition missed entering parliament by a little bit. Time will tell whether this was a good thing or a bad thing. However, it appears that certain people had ambitions related to participating in the government through our coalition. [passage omitted]

[Doneva] What is DAR's place in our political space?

[Velinov] DAR's place is categorically linked with our highly responsible national policy. Currently our task is to decode the concept of nationally responsible policy. We set its parameters in the spheres of domestic policy, foreign policy, and social life, within the framework of the country's constitutionally established order. When DAR clearly defines each of those spheres and declares where it wants to go in each of them it would be easier to identify DAR. [passage omitted]

[Doneva] What are your hopes for the presidential elections?

[Velinov] I would put the question differently, namely, what are our goals in the presidential elections? First, to use our budget resources for a parallel census of the sane and crazy people outside the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] and the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS]. Personally, I think that the BSP representative could win the elections. He has a better chance than the representative of the so-called united opposition. However, there will be another team of candidates, who will express more precisely the attitude of those people in Bulgaria who want to march forward toward the country's well-being.

[Doneva] And those will be DAR candidates?

[Velinov] This is one alternative. It is fully possible that in the first or second round DAR would support a figure which maximally represents our understanding of the personality of a nationally responsible figure. This is something ASP already discussed. At a national conference we discussed the issue of the long-range strategic partner. We do not need a partner in order to facilitate our entrance in the government. We need a prudent partner with whom it is possible to talk. The ASP assessment is clear: at present only the BSP is such a partner in Bulgaria. This understanding of ours is based on the development the BSP has undergone in the last six years. Therefore, do not be surprised if, at a later stage of the presidential elections campaign, DAR decides to support the candidacy of a nationally responsible candidate of the BSP.

[Doneva] You mean in the second round?

[Velinov] Perhaps already in the first round.

Bulgaria: BSP Stance on Presidential Primaries Viewed

AU2102112896 Sofia 168 CHASA in Bulgarian 17 Feb 96 p 10

[Article by Kapka Georgieva: "BSP Prudently Keeps Silent Regarding Primaries"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There was a small omission in the meeting between Kostov, Dogan, Savov, and Mozer. Neither Zhan Videnov nor Krasimir Premyanov attended. To discuss the issue of presidential primaries without the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] is like having a wedding without the bride.

No one until today noted the fact that the 100-year-old party is keeping silent regarding the issue of the primaries. Usually, the leftist press denounces even the new hairstyles of the opposition leaders. However, now it is not saying a word regarding one of the most important issues of opposition life, an issue related to electing the next Bulgarian president.

Perhaps there is a secret agreement between the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] and the BSP on out-trumping Zhelev? Perhaps the SDS would lead the People's Union and the Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS] to the primaries trap, while the BSP will keep silent until the trapdoor is shut?

If this really is so, then things appear to be logical. One understands why SDS leader Kostov categorically claims that Zhelev cannot be the SDS candidate, without explaining why. One also understands why Zhan Videnov and George Ganchev [leader of the Bulgarian

Business Bloc] claim in unison that the next president will not be called Zhelyu Zhelev. Against this background the agreement of the three opposition parties regarding the primaries appears pathetic. While saying that they are concerned with "certain technical issues," Mozer, Savov, and Dogan actually do not suspect what lies ahead of them.

Since the concept "opposition primary elections for presidential candidates" does not appear in any law, no mayor of a BSP-controlled municipality has to provide premises for such elections. Where will the opposition parties members vote? In their private apartments? The time when the Podkrepa Labor Confederation numbered 12 members, who could meet in Georgi Spasov's apartment is over.

By the same logic, the municipalities and the state must not finance the presidential primaries of the opposition or even provide any space for the propaganda material and air time on the national and local radio stations, let alone the television. Then how would propaganda be conducted and who will pay for it? Those, rather than "the agreement in principle" are the important issues for the opposition.

Finally, if we assume that the members of the SDS, the DPS, the Democratic Party, and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union somehow scrap up the finances they need for the primaries, prepare several of their big apartments for the election day—or if the weather is good, decided to hold the primaries in the Boyana meadow, the fundamental question remains of who among those who came to vote actually is a member of the opposition, and who is just a joker. Perhaps all supporters of the united opposition should provide their fingerprints? And who will head the service that deals with this issue?

All those pitfalls have been prepared by the anti-Zhelev circle in the SDS. The beauty of the whole thing is that it completely suits the interest of the same circle in the BSP. This is why the 100-year-old party is keeping silent about the primaries, despite the fact that it has many political commentators, who could say something on this subject.

Bulgaria: SDS' Agov Views Presidential Candidates

AU1602145496 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 12 Feb 96 p 2

[Interview with Asen Agov, chairman of the Christian Democratic Alliance and deputy chairman of the National Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces, by Malina Angareva; place and date not given: "Ivan Kostov Declines To Run for President Because He Will Be the Next Prime Minister"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Angareva] Mr. Agov, are you surprised by the Christian Democratic Alliance's [CDA] decision to nominate you as the presidential candidate of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces]?

[Agov] Six weeks ago, this suggestion came to me quite out of the blue. At that time a large group of SDS people persuaded me to offer my candidature. They expounded many arguments that prompted me to make a very difficult personal decision, both for myself and my family, which will suffer many trials in the demanding election campaign.

[Angareva] Are you worried by Aleksandur Yordanov, who will be your opponent in the internal SDS presidential elections?

[Agov] Any competition involves tension, but I am glad that Mr. Yordanov is also a candidate, because the SDS will have a real choice to make. Our political profiles are different. Aleksandur Yordanov is a very experienced man. At the same time, I think that he offers an alternative to the SDS supporters that radically differs from what I offer.

[Angareva] Do you know whether the New Social Democratic Party will nevertheless propose Zhelyu Zhelev as a candidate?

[Agov] I cannot answer on their behalf. Every party is sovereign and independent, and can make its own decision before 20 February, as the SDS National Coordinating Council has recommended.

[Angareva] Mr. Kostov told KONTINENT at the end of last week that the future SDS presidential candidate should be a playboy type, so as to appeal to young people. Do you fit into this category?

[Agov] No, I do not, because I have worked hard all my life, and am working hard now. I believe that my personal philosophy, which was accepted by the CDA National Council, is that in recent years Bulgaria has exhausted the potential of roundtable decisions. Our country needs new policies, a stabilization of the political structures, a clear identification of the various authorities, and, most important, the possibility for the people to make a clear choice. In this respect, my younger age may be a positive factor for imparting a new lease of life.

[Angareva] You accept the formula of a president chosen by the SDS and a vice president selected by the People's Union. Do you prefer a man or a woman to stand at your side in the election campaign?

[Agov] I cannot say. The People's Union will decide this, if it agrees to this formula, which we think is a winning one. In any event, I do not want to impose upon the People's Union. Naturally, there are some politicians who clearly represent democratic values, conform to the emblem of the BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union], and who would help us to achieve a more convincing victory in the very first round.

[Angareva] Is there not a risk of the SDS splitting along the "Zhelev" line?

[Agov] I see no likelihood of this, because all the actions taken by the SDS are unifying ones. The CDA, for example, suggested signing an agreement with the other Christian Democratic parties that are in the SDS or close to it. I simply cannot see any split happening this year in the SDS coalition. Zhelev cannot split the SDS.

[Angareva] What were Ivan Kostov's motives in declining to run for president?

[Agov] Mr. Kostov proposed a strategy that looks beyond the presidential elections. Of course, it presumes that the SDS presidential candidate will win, which would bring about a change in the political scene, a change in the people's vote, and the end of the BSP's rule. Mr. Kostov commenced a successful structural reform in the SDS that must be brought to its conclusion. Then he will be the next prime minister of the SDS government. The coalition cannot permit itself the luxury of beheading its own organization for the sake of a presidential post, as it did in 1990.

[Angareva] It was said that the SDS would nominate a figure from the world of the creative arts for its presidential candidate. Why have you given up this idea?

[Agov] This suggestion was mooted in 1994, following the defeat in the parliamentary elections. However, it is clear now that the presidential candidate must be closely linked with the SDS.

[Angareva] How will the opposition conduct its internal elections?

[Agov] First, we must not permit hostile elements to make their mark, as they will be our downfall. All the political forces must make a clear commitment, confirming their readiness to take part in these elections and accept the results. This is a gentleman's agreement.

[Angareva] However, Mrs. Mozer claims that a public opinion poll would do the job better.

[Agov] If this were true, primary elections would not be held anywhere in the world, but only opinion polls.

Czech Republic: Klaus on Taxation, Russian Threats

LD2002200796 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1715 GMT 20 Feb 96

[Regular weekly interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Bohumir Mazac on 20 February—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Mazac] Prime Minister, the most topical problem of the past few days has been the situation around Poldi steel. Many enterprises in our country are having financial difficulties, among others those in north Moravia, where you visited Tatra Koprivnice. Does the government intend to interfere in these processes in any way?

[Klaus] I would say, above all, that we should not compare individual cases and individual enterprises. The causes of the problems are, as a rule, different, and in the case of Poldi Kladno it is not purely a question of this or that problematic enterprise. In the case of Poldi Kladno, it is rather a question of Mr. Stehlik and the method of managing this enterprise, the method of financing this enterprise, its particular connection with Bohemia AS firm, and so on. I would not even compare it with the Vsetin arms factory, which is a completely different story, or with Tatra Koprivnice. The government is truly the last resort, the last rescue in some special or exceptional cases. Nobody should really rely on the government in this matter. But I repeat: Poldi Kladno is concerned about something other than [words indistinct]. [passage omitted]

[Mazac] The parliament discussed a proposal to cut taxes by 7 percent. The government should submit its own proposal of tax changes. Does this mean that the taxpayer could expect some tax reduction in the foreseeable future?

[Klaus] First, I am telling all taxpayers that one cannot have tax cuts and pension increases, increases in teachers' pay, improvement of the drive against criminality, better environment, and so on. That does not go together. Every taxpayer must give this a thought and decide whether he wants lower taxes, which also means reduction of the expenditure the state is capable of putting into all these sectors, or whether he thinks that at the moment it is better to have enough for the sectors that I mentioned here rather than lower taxes. So I cannot responsibly discuss the question of taxes without the connection with the other aspects of the budget: what I am using the taxes for. This is [illegible] thing.

The government's blueprint for the development of our tax system until the year 2000 has been in existence for a long time now. The proposal put forward is a one-off jump aimed at speeding the existing trend. We consider it incorrect, based on wrong assumptions, and think that the logic behind their proposal and the volume of the proposed change are not right.

The government has not considered the matter so pressing as to submit it to parliament in February, but now we have decided to take this step then, as we have been preparing further tax cuts anyway. To speed up the whole thing a bit, the government will attempt to submit by the end of February its own proposal based on its long-term blueprint. [passage omitted]

[Mazac] In conclusion, let us look abroad. Russia keeps protesting against our entry into NATO. The threat at the end of last week has been the strongest so far—namely, that the Russian army will destroy by force the nuclear bases the Czech Republic would build on its territory after joining NATO. To what extent do we have to fear these strong words?

[Klaus] I do not fear them, and I think I have said it many times. I understand that Russian politicians must use strong words of this type for their public at home, but I do not really attach great significance to them, and I think I am doing the right thing.

Slovakia: Sappers Transferred to Eastern Slavonia

AU2102120096 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 17 Feb 96 p 1

[Article by "NO": "Colonel Rostislav Smehlik: Slovak Battalion Not Being 'Cleared Away' to Eastern Slavonia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The decision to transfer the Slovak sappers' battalion operating on the territory of former Yugoslavia to the area of Eastern Slavonia, where it will continue to serve within the system of UN units, was made by the Government of the Slovak Republic, first and foremost, on the basis of a request from the Americans as well as both hostile parties—that is, the Croats and Serbs. Last, but not least, the fact that a large number of inhabitants of Slovak origin live in this area also played a role. Speaking to journalists in Bratislava yesterday, Rostislav Smehlik, commander of the Slovak sappers' battalion, explained with these words why the Slovak unit has not become part of the multinational IFOR [Implementation Force] forces that started to operate in Bosnia-Herzegovina under NATO's command. At the same time, he clearly rejected speculations that the Slovak battalion is being "cleared away" to Eastern Slavonia. "High-level Western officials, including NATO representatives, have praised our battalion and its work so many times that I do not even want to repeat this," Rostislav Smehlik said.

[On the same day, on page 2, Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak carries a 300-word report by Blazej Panik on Colonel Smehlik's news conference, which quotes the commander on the mine-sweeping and reconstruction and repair work carried out by Slovak soldiers on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Smehlik is also quoted as saying that the transfer of the 593-man Slovak battalion to Eastern Slavonia "will be completed by mid-May."]

Slovakia: Meciar on 'Power Struggle,' NATO Membership

AU2002152796 Munich FOCUS in German 19 Feb 96 p 203

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by Gudrun Dometeit in Bonn; date not given: "The President's Revenge"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Dometeit] The basic treaty with Hungary, which deals with the rights of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, has failed again. How do you want to convince parliament?

[Meciar] The government coalition will support the treaty. We need 76 votes and 81 deputies pledged that they would support it. Yet, we would like the treaty to pass parliament with a great majority. That is the only reason it has not been adopted yet. Still, March is the deadline.

[Dometeit] You have been separated from the Czech Republic for three years. In what respect have you benefited from this separation?

[Meciar] We have overcome the historical trauma, which was straining relations. The relationship is now good. Slovakia was doing worse in all areas before. Today, our economic figures are superior to those of the Czech Republic in some fields: We have a better foreign trade balance, lower inflation, and higher economic growth. The Czech Republic has more foreign investments and higher productivity.

[Dometeit] Would you like to lure foreign investors to the country?

[Meciar] We expect reliability and a high technological level from the investors. In return, we offer tax exemption for three years, free capital transfer, and investment protection. We exert no influence on property conditions and make nobody pay for old burdens.

[Dometeit] Investors tend to link investments also to political stability. Here the power struggle between you and President Kovac is not a good sign.

[Meciar] When the president has certain personal feelings and regards his personal failure as the failure of the system, that is one thing. Slovakia is acting far more responsibly than propaganda wants to make believe. Some parties cannot put up with defeat and blame it on the lack of democracy in Slovakia.

[Dometeit] You have been accused of involvement in last year's abduction of the president's son.

[Meciar] To this day, there is no evidence of an abduction. Witnesses say that Michal Kovac was moving freely in Bratislava at the time of the alleged abduction. He is said to almost have collided with a police car. The case was politicized by his father and presented as an act of revenge by the intelligence service against his person. Yet the intelligence service head assured me that this is not the case. Michal Kovac and his father did not tell the truth on many points.

[Dometeit] How will you solve the conflict?

[Meciar] I do not see it as quite as dramatic. However, the president rejected a compromise. We offered to respect his constitutional rights, if, in return, he were willing to give up his attempts to overthrow the government.

[Dometeit] Your foreign minister recently said that NATO accession was a priority. Why do you want to become a member under all circumstances?

[Meciar] We do not have any enemies and we do not feel threatened, but Europe needs a security system that allows everybody to enjoy the same security. As far as the time is concerned, let me say the following: Accession is not an athletic competition. We must not compete over who will be first. Yet we do not want Russia to be excluded from the security structures.

[Dometeit] Isolation would put Russia under even greater pressure. Chechnya is not an example for sovereign policy.

[Meciar] It is hardly possible to apply democratic and ethical principles when you are dealing with terrorists. Still, it would have been possible to act differently in Pervomayskoye (shooting at rebels and hostages—the editors).

Slovakia: Foreign Ministry Criticizes Kwasniewski on EU

LD2002194496 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has familiarized itself with the repeated statements by the Polish president issued in connection with the ongoing process of European Union [EU] enlargement.

For example, in Budapest, Aleksander Kwasniewski said that the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland could become equal members of the EU at the same time, and Slovakia, in view of its internal political situation, possibly later.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers such statements to be inappropriate because admission to the EU cannot be looked upon as a [illegible]ce. According to the statement, Slovakia does not divide EU association countries or CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Association] members into categories, neither does it publicly talk about the difficulties experienced by our neighbors in the process of transformation.

Slovakia: Daily Protests 'Interference' by Hungary's Horn

AU2002152696 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 17 Feb 96 pp 1-2

[Article by "jef": "Gyula Horn Was Campaigning in the Vatican for Hungarian Bishop in Slovakia; Can Budapest Interfere in the Affairs of an Independent Church Province?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pope John Paul II received Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn for a private audience on 14 February. The Hungarian prime minister quite unprivately raised with the head of the Catholic Church alleged problems faced by the Hungarian minorities in Slovakia, Romania, and Ukraine. During the audience with John Paul II, Gyula Horn even complained that there is not a single Magyar among the bishops and suffragan bishops in Slovakia and urged the Vatican to do something about this, which was allegedly promised to him, according to the Hungarian prime minister's own words.

The Hungarian prime minister apparently forgot once again where exactly the border between Slovakia and Hungary runs, and he also forgot that, on the basis of the Vatican's decision in 1977, Slovakia is an independent church province. However, in applying its concept of systematic pressure on neighboring countries in which there are Hungarian minorities, Budapest does not pay heed to such "trifles." The old-new strategic plan to enforce in Slovakia the establishment of a Hungarian bishopric has been embarked upon, this time by means of the tactics of small, gradual steps—first, a Hungarian bishop (whom the believers of Hungarian nationality supposedly badly need) will be appointed, and, in due course, there will also be the longed-for Hungarian diocese.

Services in Hungarian

As is known, religious services in Hungarian are routinely held in dozens of churches in Slovakia, often at more convenient hours than Slovak services (which are often in the role of an unwanted Cinderella...). According to information from the Slovak Culture Ministry's Church Department, four Slovak high-ranking church dignitaries have such a command of Hungarian that they conduct religious services in it: Archbishop Jan Sokol (he also consecrates churches in that language), Roznava Diocesan Bishop Eduard Kojnok, and suffragan Bishops Vladimir Filo and Dominik Toth, both from the Bratislava-Trnava Archdiocese, whose mastery of the Hungarian language is such that they even deliver sermons in it. Bishop Dominik Hrusovsky and Archbishop Alojz Tkac have a passive knowledge of Hungarian. Hungarian is taught as an obligatory subject at the Theology Faculty in Bratislava and at other seminaries with Hungarian believers.

A large number of religious literature (such as the Catholic weekly REMENY) is published in Hungarian in Slovakia, and religious periodicals and songbooks are being imported from Hungary without any obstructions.

Statement by the Church Department of the Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic

The Church Department of the Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic issued a statement on Gyula Horn's pronouncements, made after his visit to the Vatican. The text of the statement was made available to us by Peter Mulik, Ph.D., director of the department: "We consider the statement by the Hungarian prime minister inappropriate. We believe that the mandate to negotiate on church-political affairs concerning the Hungarian Republic that he received from Hungarian Catholic bishops did not authorize him to assume a stand on the situation in the Slovak Republic or even demand the Holy See's intervention on issues that lie exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Slovak Bishops' Conference.

"Slovak Catholics of Hungarian nationality enjoy optimal conditions for a full-fledged religious life, particularly for religious services and rites in their mother tongue, which frequently are not secured for Catholics of Slovak nationality living in ethnically mixed areas of the Slovak Republic. Hungarian believers, who make up about 11 percent of all Catholics in Slovakia, have a relatively small number of priests (of the 668 students of theology, only 15 are of Hungarian nationality). For this reason, pastoral services in ethnically mixed areas are provided by priests of Slovak nationality, who must use the Hungarian language.

"We believe that the Holy See will assume a rational position on this issue. However, it can be said even now that there exists no precedent in the Catholic Church for a diocese being established on ethnic principles. In the spirit of the Modus Vivendi (agreement between the Vatican and the Czechoslovak Republic concluded in 1927), the state must assume a stand on the appointment of bishops and demand from candidates for this office loyalty toward our state. This is why we reject any attempts to dictate the personnel composition of episcopal offices from abroad."

The above statement, too, confirms that Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn's demand cannot be qualified as anything but unacceptable interference by Budapest in the internal affairs of the Slovak Republic and in affairs falling under the church jurisdiction of the Slovak Bishops' Conference. It is reminiscent of the ill-famed methods of some Hungarian church dignitaries who, still within the framework of pre-1918 Hungary, used to tell Slovak believers that God would understand them only in Hungarian....

Slovakia: Editorial Calls For Action on Kovac Affair

AU2002150296 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 17 Feb 96 p 1

[Commentary by Ivan Horsky]

[FBIS Translated Text] Slowly but surely, the Michal Kovac Jr. affair is becoming not only a domestic political problem for Slovakia, but also an international political burden. The very suspicion that members of the Slovak secret service (SIS) participated in this abduction, with the knowledge of even political quarters, should be alarming to the public. It is in the interest of every secret service to quash [zatlkat] its unlawful actions, cost what it may. This is borne out by cases from the more distant and more recent history all over the world, including the history of the Soviet, U.S., German, British, French, and Czech services. It lies in the nature of these special services to act sometimes autonomously, without politicians' knowledge. Today, however, this happens far less often than previously, thanks to more consistent supervision. The Kovac Jr. affair not only does not help increase the credibility of the state and its representatives, it also does not increase that of SIS. The continuing destabilization and declassification [dekonspiracia] of SIS prevents its security components from meeting the tasks assigned to it by law because, in the atmosphere of mutual distrust and suspicion, fertile soil is created for settling personal accounts, whether assumed or real.

The efforts to obfuscate this problem by diverting attention from it elsewhere, by attempting to link this case of abuse of secret services to other, real or assumed, criminal cases, are, in the final analysis, counterproductive. Therefore, it should be, first and foremost, in the interest of the government to get rid of this unpleasant burden. However, the manner in which the investigation is being conducted does not testify, for the time being, to the political courage to cut this Gordian knot vigorously and energetically. This not only exposes the government to the growing suspicion that it has something to hide, but also opens scope for the opposition to use the whole affair to discredit the government and the entire coalition, which, by changing the law [on SIS], usurped total control over intelligence services.

In democratic states, there exist basically two methods of coping with such a situation. An investigating commission is formed, a parliamentary or an independent one, which identifies in its report more or less accurately the degree of responsibility of representatives of the government or the secret service. And sometimes, if it has a mandate to do so, it also proposes a solution.

The government then has no choice but to adopt measures, including personnel changes. Occasionally it even happened that the only way out was the complete reorganization of these organizations, including a change of name.

More is involved than just general ethics or a matter of political morals. The prestige and, what is more, even the survival of the responsible officials are at stake. In modern history, there has been more than one case of their losing their seats because of secret services' unlawful activities.

[The need for a "political decision" regarding the Kovac Jr. affair is also the subject of a commentary by Ivan Samel entitled "Secret Service Is Ripe for a Political Decision," in Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 19 February on page 3. Samel says, among other things: "Regardless of the outcome of the case, the only way to unravel the knot of relations in which SIS has gotten bogged down, whether or not it wanted to, is a political decision, made in the interest of the full ability of the Slovak secret service to function and for the sake of its credit, on the personnel reconstruction of SIS as well as the establishment of firm legislative control mechanisms that will not depend just on the momentary will of the parliamentary majority. Such a political decision is required by the reputation of this country, and also of those who are responsible for it."]

Slovakia: FNM Head Urges Caution on Bank Privatization

AU2002210796 Bratislava HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Slovak 16 Feb 96 pp 1-2

[Interview with Stefan Gavornik, president of the National Property Fund of the Slovak Republic Presidium, and Milan Rehak, chairman of the National Property Fund of the Slovak Republic Executive Committee, by "ha"-signed correspondent; place and date not given: "Privatization Strategy Under Magnifying Glass"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Members of the National Property Fund [FNM] of the Slovak Republic Presidium held their first meeting in 1996 yesterday. The meeting's agenda included, in addition to information on the state of the FNM's liquidity as of 31 December 1995, proposals for the composition of joint-stock companies' management bodies and cancellation of contracts (Masovy Priemysel [Meat Industry] Prievidza Co. and Slovenske Automobilove Opravovne [Slovak Automobile Repair Plants] Nitra Co.) and "other items." The meeting did not decide on direct sales, however. We therefore asked Stefan Gavornik, president of the FNM of the Slovak Republic Presidium (Association of Workers of Slovakia), and Milan Rehak, chairman of the FNM of the Slovak Republic Executive Committee (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia):

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] The fact that the agenda of the meeting did not include direct sales implies that the privatization of leading banks was not discussed. At which stage is this process?

[Gavornik] In my opinion, the discussion so far has been mostly about when the banks' privatization would be completed, while the substantive aspect of this process, which is undoubtedly desirable, has been discussed less. Banks need to be privatized, but it is still premature to make any statements about it. Coalition talks have not yet taken place, and the FNM Presidium has not discussed this issue, either. It is necessary to invite qualified experts to take part in this discussion, and I am convinced that, in the final analysis, the decision on this matter should be made by parliament, if for no other reason than that of the impact of bank privatization on the economy of the Slovak Republic.

[Rehak] The privatization of leading Slovak financial institutions—VUB [General Credit Bank], IRB [Investment and Development Bank], and Slovenska Poistovna [Slovak Insurance Company] (that is, all of them, with the exception of Slovenska Sporitelna [Slovak Savings Bank])—started with the first wave of coupon privatization. The issue now is to complete the privatization of institutions that are no longer state-owned.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] Information on planned privatization projects is sparse. Do you favor as owners of banks single large companies, consortia of companies, foreign investors, or a combination of the above possibilities?

[Gavornik] If I saw individual projects that have been proposed, I would be able to reply to this question. Each erroneous step in this field has its logical repercussions on the socioeconomic standards, which is why I emphasize responsibility and caution. Large companies have borrowed money from large banks for privatization, and, in certain cases, debtors would thus be privatizing their creditors.

[Rehak] The privatization strategy is in the hands of the government, and specific procedures will be discussed within the framework of individual FNM's of the Slovak Republic structures, down to the submission of a proposal to the FNM Presidium, which will make the final decision. I believe that banks should have decisive shareholders capable of mastering, also professionally, their stake so that the financial sector functions in accordance with international criteria and for the benefit of the economy.

Slovakia: Contract With Radio Free Europe Renewed

AU2002175496 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 17 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by "isa": "Radio Free Europe Has Contract for Another Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Slovenske Telekomunikacie [Slovak Telecommunications] signed a contract on 15 February on the use of transmitters in Slovakia for transmitting the RFE signal for another year. The one-month deadline set by the Slovak Republic Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting [RRTV] for remedial action in RFE broadcasts in the sense of the RRTV objections expired on 14 February. The RRTV objected to noncompliance with the conditions of the license issued to the RFE in the sense of breach of objectivity, balance, and a reassuring tone of broadcasts. In case of RFE's failure to eliminate the shortcomings criticized by the RRTV, it is facing the threat of having its license withdrawn. RFE Director R. Gillette asked independent foreign media experts for an assessment and analysis of the RRTV's resolution. On the basis of these analyses, Gillette planned to submit to the RRTV the RFE's standpoint by 15 February. In view of the results of the analyses being delayed, the RFE's standpoint will be delivered to the RRTV probably early next week, according to M. Neovesky, director of the RFE's Slovak service.

Hungary: Horn Denies 'Government Reshuffle' Rumors

LD2002201296 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1900 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Gyula Horn has personally denied that he is preparing for a government reshuffle. The prime minister flatly denied all rumors about this.

This afternoon, the prime minister consulted Zoltan Gal, speaker of the National Assembly, and Imre Szekeres, head of the parliamentary group of the Hungarian Socialist Party, about the successor to Lajos Bokros, who resigned on Sunday [18 February]. It is not known whether they agreed on any candidates because Imre Szekeres only said the new finance minister had to be professionally competent and must have good political sense. Moreover, it is also important for him to show willingness to cooperate not only with the government but also with the parliamentary group of the senior government party.

Hungary: DZVM, UVM Attempt To Coordinate Policies

LD1902180596 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 19 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Both organizations of the Vojvodina Hungarians consider it to be important to hold talks in Budapest with the parliamentary parties on their recently published autonomy plans. Levente Suekosd reports.

[Suekosd] [Passage omitted] A professional debate was held at the expert talks initiated by Csaba Tabajdi, political state secretary at the Prime Minister's Office and head of the Office of Hungarians Beyond the Border. It has transpired that there are a lot of similar elements in the ideas of the two organizations.

Csaba Tabajdi told "Midday Chronicle" that it was up to the political will of the heads of the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians [DZVM] and the Association of Vojvodina Hungarians [UVM] whether a joint autonomy concept will be drawn up for Hungarians of Vojvodina.

Earlier, the heads of the two organizations said they were willing to coordinate their concepts. However, there has not been a breakthrough at the talks and meetings so far. The DZVM gives priority to long-term political considerations and the UVM to daily interests, short-term goals at talks with the Serbian authorities on the situation of Vojvodina Hungarians.

Prime Minister Gyula Horn has said many times earlier he could only give his backing to and represent a joint autonomy concept.

Hungary: MDF Leader Outlines Future of Party

LD1802234296 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 18 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Politicians, who belong to the trend hallmarked by the names of Lajos Fur and Ivan Szabo within the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], held a meeting in Budapest today.

Executive Chairman Ivan Szabo has phoned our editorial department and said that in our earlier programs on Kossuth Radio we had incorrectly lifted a detail from his speech. Zoltan Hortobagyi reports on what really happened in the cultural center in Koebanya, Budapest district.

[Hortobagyi] The MDF is a nationally committed [nemzeti elkoetelezettsegue] political party with Christian responsibility and built on the traditions of Hungarian national liberalism—this is how I could sum up Ivan Szabo's key points. At the same time, this is Jozsef Antall's legacy. Those who deny any of these elements deny the MDF itself, the executive chairman added.

No cooperation is possible either with political extremists, or with the MSZP-SZDSZ [Hungarian Socialist Party-Alliance of Free Democrats] coalition. Failed politicians, such as Imre Pozsgay cannot be admitted to the party, either.

This is how Ivan Szabo outlined the future of the party, which needs to be reformed at all costs: Hungarian policy in a Hungarian context [magyar koezegben magyar politika], but with a European direction.

Several contributors demanded a united leadership and a united party, because the only way they could launch a successful campaign for power, which has to be dragged away from the present coalition, is by an opposition which has joined forces. [passage omitted]

Hungary: MDF's Konya on Reasons for Party 'Crisis'

AU2002084196 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 16 Feb 96 pp 1, 8

[Correspondent's report on interview with Imre Konya, deputy head of the MDF faction in the National Assembly; place and date not given: "Konya Speaks About Those Responsible for the Crisis"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The deputy chairmen who supervised the relevant areas within the party presidium, rather than Lajos Fur, are the ones responsible for the situation that has emerged within the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], the division of the MDF leadership, the stagnation in the party's popularity, the temporary failure of the tripartite alliance, and the lack of local government and foreign relations. The people in question are Peter Boross, Gyorgy Gemesi, and Csaba Ferencz, Imre Konya told NEPSZABADSAG.

Lajos Fur made a sovereign decision in rejecting the nomination as party chairman at the MDF national meeting.

According to Imre Konya, Fur was motivated by his human and political honesty in this decision, because he thought that he was responsible for the difference of opinions within the MDF leadership and the temporary failure of the tripartite alliance.

However, Lajos Fur cannot be held responsible for this at all, Konya says. Instead, people who opposed the majority decisions are responsible for all this. Despite its high-level parliamentary activity, the popularity of the MDF did not increase. People who, in their published statements, took a stand against the majority decisions are primarily responsible for this. Obviously, if the leaders issue statements that reflect internal conflict or if a former government member, active party chairman, and a former National Committee member also participate in initiatives directed against the majority policy, all this makes the public think that the MDF is a quarreling party. The truth is, however, that very hard and serious work took place, but the opposing statements gave a distorted image to the public.

According to Konya, Lajos Fur took the initiative to create a tripartite alliance. However, the system prevailing in the party leadership conveyed the responsibility of directing and supervising the various areas to the deputy chairmen. Konya pointed out that it was Peter Boross' task to deal with party relations but, contrary to Fur, Boross made fewer initiatives in this area. Instead, he conducted a policy of delays and uncertainty. In addition, he did not show a clear attitude toward [Independent Smallholders' Party chairman Jozsef] Torgyan either. Konya thinks that all this greatly contributed to Gyorgy Schamschula and Peter Balaton's departure toward the national alliance, while Lajos Fur and most National Committee members were engaged in creating a tripartite alliance. Under such circumstances, it is absolutely clear that it is not Lajos Fur who bears responsibility for all this. [passage omitted]

Speaking about the MDF's foreign contacts, Imre Konya told us that the unfortunate fact that the Horn cabinet removed several former MDF diplomats from their positions would have given a great chance for the party's successful foreign activity, but these people have not been sufficiently included in the relevant activity either. [passage omitted]

Asked whether Lezsak's election as MDF chairman would guarantee the continuity of this party's policy, Imre Konya said that, following Fur's decision, the MDF members bear even more responsibility than hitherto in preserving the party unity.

In connection with Sandor Lezsak's statement, according to which the MDF should open up to Imre Pozsgay, Zoltan Biro, and Istvan Csurka, Konya pointed out that he is convinced that the policy aimed at returning to the pre-Antall MDF is unacceptable to today's MDF members. [passage omitted]

Hungary: Tension in KDNP Over Leadership Election

LD1602164696 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 16 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The conflict has sharpened within the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] in the wake of last weekend's election of the party's parliamentary group leader. It is conceivable that the election will have to be repeated. Levente Sukosd reports.

[Sukosd] Most of the party's parliamentary group of deputies have brought about a serious conflict within the KDNP by not waiting to elect the party's parliamentary leader until the branch organizations all replied whether they want party chairman Gyorgy Giczy for this post. The group decided not to wait, despite a request to the contrary by party chairman Gyorgy Giczy.

Giczy said the majority of the KDNP's parliamentary deputies paid no attention to the membership's opinion and thus they breached the basic principles of democracy. He also said that, at the session of the group on Wednesday, he did not accept the nomination because at that time he could not yet know the views of the local branches. However, the circulars received since then make it absolutely clear that the branches want him to be the leader of the party's parliamentary group, he said. [passage omitted]

B-H: Commentary on 'Defused Tension' After Rome Talks

AU2002164996 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (Europe Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 20 Feb 96 p 2

[Commentary by Ada Campara: "The Hot Line"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Presidents Izetbegovic, Tudjman, and Milosevic have again confirmed their commitment to the Dayton provisions. As things stand now, this has averted a serious crisis, perhaps even the breakdown of the peace process. The establishment of a Sarajevo-Belgrade hotline marks the beginning of a new era in Bosnian-Serb relations, which will allow Izetbegovic and Milosevic to participate more directly in the overcoming of dangerous points.

In return, the international superpowers have promised the butcher of Belgrade that they will lift the sanctions. U.S. Admiral Smith was given the role of arbiter. The new signatures on the integration of Sarajevo and Mostar, have — on paper at least — overcome the possibility of new separatist and nationalist games with the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The signatures in Rome ought to mean the complete collapse of the idea of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia, this time with a much more decisive stance on the part of the international community, which has vowed that it will prevent any such intentions.

However, knowing the transparent games of Belgrade and Zagreb, and the still valid agreements from Karadjordjevo [location of meeting between Milosevic and Tudjman to agree on carve-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina], it is hard to believe that the presidents of our neighboring countries will put an end to the games and players engaged in destroying the currently integrated Bosnia-Herzegovina. Namely, it is possible to deduce from everything that was said there that both the Serbian and Croatian presidents still hold their old views. Milosevic went so far as to accuse the other side for the Dayton peace crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, claiming that the Serb Republic had never violated the peace agreement. Tudjman is accusing European circles for the outcome of the Mostar crisis, which in other words means that the Croatian president is again protecting the obstructive elements from Herzeg-Bosnia.

Holbrooke, who seems to have understood all the confusion surrounding the implementation of the peace agreement, has warned that everything is all right on paper, and that we have to move from words to deeds. The most important thing, at least as far as the outbreak of a new war is concerned, is that the tension has been defused and that fresh promises have been extracted from Serbia and Croatia regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina's sovereignty. The papers that Bildt waved in front of a million television viewers inspire optimism, provided, of course, that they do not remain just papers.

B-H: Serb Socialists Applaud Accord, Condemn Karadzic

AU2002210496 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Socialist Party of the Serb Republic welcomes the successful completion of the meeting in Rome and the agreement that has been reached on the contentious issues in the implementation of the peace agreement. The party considers the meeting as a major contribution to strengthening peace and establishing confidence among the parties that had been at war until recently.

We are particularly satisfied with the constructive conduct of Mr. Kasagic, prime minister of the Serb Republic, and stress the role of President Milosevic, whose principled stands again played a decisive role in achieving an agreement.

We are disturbed by the statements and conduct of the president of the Serb Republic [Karadzic] and the chairman of the people's assembly [Krajisnik], who have been presenting completely different stands in public from those that were promoted quite correctly by Prime Minister Kasagic in Rome. Does this imply the negation of the constitution, on whose basis the government and the prime minister are now acting?

We condemn most energetically such behavior that is disturbing our people and putting the citizens of Serb Sarajevo in even greater despair and hopelessness, especially because they are continuing to irritate the international community with such behavior, thereby delaying the lifting of the sanctions on the Serb Republic.

Their stubborn attitude toward the world has only brought suffering and trouble to the people. Therefore, we demand most energetically that this behavior stop in the interest of the people and that all structures of the civilian and military authorities fully cooperate in the implementation of the peace agreement.

War profiteers from both sides of the Drina River will try to prevent the lifting of the sanctions on the Serb Republic, the establishing of economic ties with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the normalization of life, as they are the only ones who have benefiting from the blockade.

Therefore, we appeal to the citizens of the Serb Republic and those who fled to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia not to allow certain individuals to continue manipulating them for the sake of their own interests.

B-H: Italian IFOR General on 'Lack of Trust' in Accord

BR2002150996 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 18 Feb 96 p 6

[Interview with Italian Army General Agostino Predone by unidentified correspondent in Sarajevo; date not given: "Italian Soldiers at Risk — Lack of Trust Among Parties"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo — In the bombed out ruins of the former maternity hospital where, in less than a month, men from the Garibaldi Light Infantry Brigade have worked the miracle of making the structures inhabitable and all the operational and command centers efficient, General Agostino Pedone, commander of Italy's IFOR unit, talks about what has been done, and especially about what we can expect to see in coming months.

[LA REPUBBLICA] General, how do you assess the current situation?

[Pedone] One cannot deny that this is a rather delicate time in view of the upcoming deadlines, especially the deadline of 19 March when the Serb areas will be transferred to Federation control. Indeed, we cannot rule out the possibility of threats by rogue elements operating outside the scope of official orders. This is why we have stepped up security measures.

[LA REPUBBLICA] How do you think the situation may evolve?

[Pedone] We cannot make any predictions before 19 March, although we can say that the situation is evolving. If things take a turn for the worse, we will take the appropriate steps.

[LA REPUBBLICA] Is it true that the mayor of Sarajevo reported to you that our soldiers have a very martial — in other words, a very decisive — bearing?

[Pedone] Yes, the mayor pointed out our, let us say, soldierly attitude which I, on the other hand, think is completely normal. I explained to him that only ill-intentioned persons could be hard hit by our efficiency, which is not at all threatening to decent people.

[LA REPUBBLICA] Do you think that this is a hazardous situation?

[Pedone] It has always been a hazardous situation because the implementation of the Dayton agreement is not guaranteed by the will of the parties involved. If they had accepted the agreement in a spirit of goodwill, then we obviously would not be here.

[LA REPUBBLICA] What has been the impact of the Bosnian Serb decision to no longer participate in the meetings of the joint military committee?

[Pedone] The Serbs' absence means we cannot operate at our best because we are missing a very important interlocutor in the area in which we are operating. But look, the aim is to successfully build up trust among the parties. I cannot say, however, how much trust there currently is among the parties.

[LA REPUBBLICA] Were you able to gauge the level of trust in contacts with the Serbs and Bosnians?

[Pedone] The Serbs do not have much trust. The Bosnians have to work to acquire this trust but the orders and the goodwill have to come from the very highest levels.

[LA REPUBBLICA] Do you think that the NATO mission could be successfully concluded in one year?

[Pedone] One year may not be enough. It would be enough if the parties involved would begin showing a serious desire to implement the Dayton agreement. But unfortunately one gets the feeling that one year will not be enough. We will see. I repeat, the situation is evolving; these are crucial days.

B-H: Russian IFOR Head: NATO Losing 'Significance'

AU2002172996 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 17 Feb 96 p 8

[Interview with Colonel Alexander Lentsov, commander of the Russian paratroop brigade operating within the IFOR mission in Bosnia, by Jan Gazdik and Lubos Palata in Tuzla; date not given: "The IFOR Mission Is Depriving NATO of its Significance, Says the Russian Commander"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tuzla — The commander of the Russian paratroop brigade operating within the framework of the IFOR [Implementation Force] mission involving international peacekeeping forces, Colonel Alexander Lentsov, has declared that cooperation with the NATO troops is proceeding without the slightest hitch. He did indicate, however, that the Russians would not use force against the Serbs. According to him, the Russians have not received instructions regarding the prosecution of war criminals in Bosnia.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Russia is an uncompromising opponent of NATO enlargement. Your IFOR paratroop brigade in Bosnia, of course, falls under the command of the North Atlantic Alliance and the United States. Now — after your first experiences of cooperation with U.S. troops and NATO units in general —

how do you view the enlargement of the Alliance to include the Central European states?

[Lentsov] Why are you now talking about NATO enlargement? Why do you refer to the North Atlantic Alliance at all? After all, we now have a different task — to restore peace in this country. And, who has the biggest say — whether Russia or America — is neither here nor there. The important thing now is just to make sure that the tasks that the global community has set us and the Dayton peace accords are fulfilled this year. This is now the main thing.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] But, cooperation with the Americans here is problem free?

[Lentsov] Absolutely. I personally believe that if our cooperation continues as rapidly as it has done this year, NATO will — in due course — lose its significance. That is, there will be only a global peace zone.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Does the strength of the brigade that your country has dispatched to Bosnia correspond to Russia's status in Europe?

[Lentsov] We could easily have sent 10,000 or 20,000 troops to Bosnia. The Russian defense minister, however, set a task for whose fulfillment he earmarked the forces of one brigade. But, if we had been given an equally large sector as the commander of the U.S. division in Tuzla, General William Nash, we would — of course — have sent an even larger contingent to Bosnia to fulfill the task. Fifteen hundred paratroopers is enough for the one we have.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] But, is this not, all the same, rather a small contingent? The Americans have 20,000 troops here.

[Lentsov] Russia has a single task in the IFOR operation: To fulfill its historical role in restoring peace in the Balkans. Just like the other countries that are not NATO members, but have sent troops to Bosnia.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] What kind of instructions does the Russian brigade have regarding the detention of war criminals?

[Lentsov] We have no such instructions.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] If the warring sides do not adhere to the Dayton Peace Accords, the IFOR troops can intervene strongly. Are you prepared for armed operations against the Serbs?

[Lentsov] I am absolutely convinced that arms will not be used. I know the standpoints of the Serbian and Bosnian commands just as I know the conditions within the separation zone that divides them. People here are already tired of the war. If, however, my troops are placed in danger, they will, of course, use arms — but only in this case. But, I am not at all inclined toward using force if the Dayton Peace Accords are not being fulfilled.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] The Americans are not ruling out the possibility that, after the IFOR mission is completed, their troops will remain in the military base in Kaposvar in Hungary. Are you thinking about remaining in Bosnia after the IFOR mission?

[Lentsov] I am convinced that this will not happen. The place of every soldier — the Russian soldier included — is in his country so that he can defend it if it is attacked. Moreover, the way things are going, disputes between states will be dealt with in a far more civilized manner than, for example, 20 years ago.

B-H: Serbs Said Passing Through Russian IFOR Positions

AU2002135296 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 20 Feb 96 p 7

[Report by E. Huremovic: "They Can Miss a Whole Brigade"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The recent shift of positions at Mount Majevica, when the Americans handed over this mountain to the Russian IFOR [Implementation Force] troops, has caused a certain fear among the inhabitants of villages at Mount Majevica. The lack of confidence in the Russians is largely caused by the fact that the demarcation line from Brcko to Zvornik is controlled only by 1,500 Russian soldiers.

After the Dayton accord, the inhabitants of villages at Mount Majevica, situated quite close to the border, began visiting their devastated homes in great numbers. After the arrival of the Russians, the number of such visits dropped by half. [passage omitted]

That the distrust of the Russians is justified is shown by a recent event in downtown Kalesija, when, according to eyewitnesses' accounts, one Russian soldier passing by a group of people on a personnel carrier showed them three fingers [Serb nationalist symbol]. "We do not believe it was a mistake," people say. In addition, there have been more and more frequent rumors that a great number of Serbs who spent the entire agression in the Serb entity or Serbia, some of whom used to fight as members of the Serb Republic army, are freely passing across the Russian lines at Mount Majevica. They are now coming back to Tuzla, to stay with their "loyal" relatives, or even in "their" apartments. [passage omitted]

B-H: Serb General Says Boycott of IFOR To Continue

AU2002170896 Paris AFP in English
1652 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Feb 20 (AFP) — Bosnian Serb General Zdravko Tolimir on Tuesday [20 February] said his army would continue to snub the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) until two senior Serb officers being held in The Hague on suspicion of war crimes are released.

Tolimir made the statement on local television in this Serb stronghold after meeting with General Sir Michael Walker, commander of the NATO-led Implementation Force.

Tolimir told the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA that he had asked Walker for the release of the two Serb officers in The Hague, as well as several other Serb soldiers arrested by the Bosnian army since the beginning of the month in an area under the control of IFOR.

"IFOR should no longer take part in any arrests of people not wanted by the criminal tribunal or charged in an arrest warrant," he said. "I stressed to General Walker the necessity of all the parties being treated equally."

SRNA also quoted him as saying that he had missed a key meeting of NATO chiefs and military leaders from the Bosnian factions on board a U.S. aircraft carrier on Monday because of his schedule and bad weather conditions.

B-H: Generals Tolimir, Walker Discuss Implementation

LD2002172396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
1600 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 20 Feb (SRNA) — Major General Zdravko Tolimir, deputy commander of the Serb Republic army, had talks in Pale today with General Michael Walker, commander of the Implementation Force [IFOR] land forces, on the further implementation of the Dayton agreement.

After the meeting Gen. Tolimir said that Gen. Walker briefed him about the details of talks held yesterday between joint military commissions aboard the carrier George Washington in the Adriatic, and about a document adopted at the Rome summit.

"We had talks on the further implementation of the peace agreement in accordance with its provisions, and the strict observance of all obligations assumed by both sides," Gen.Tolimir said, stressing that he did not attend the talks because he was not invited in due time and because of adverse weather conditions for the IFOR helicopter flight.

Speaking about a recent check on weapons in the Serb Republic army barracks in Han Pijesak, Gen. Tolimir said that such activities should not have been carried out by IFOR in places outside the two and 10-km exclusion zones.

"During the talks I asked General Walker to mediate in the release of all prisoners IFOR had arrested in the zone of separation," General Tolimir said and added that the Serb side asked for the release of two Serb officers, General Djordje Djukic and Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic, whom the Muslim goverment handed over to the Hague Tribunal.

According to him, IFOR was told that in future it should not take part in the arrest of persons whom the Tribunal had not indicted and against whom no warrant had been issued.

Commenting on NATO Secretary General Javier Solana's recent statement that Serb Republic Army Commander Ratko Mladic will be arrested during his mandate, General Tolimir said the statement, given at this stage of the implementation of the Dayton agreement, was inappropriate and unnecesary. "I have stressed to General Walker the need for equal treatment of both sides," General Tolimir said, adding that IFOR should have handed over to the Hague Tribunal 11 mojahedin arrested at the terrorist camp in Fojnica.

"The fact that the Tribunal did not investigate their role and did not demand that IFOR deliver them — since there were proofs that they had been preparing terrorist activities — is absurd," General Tolimir concluded.

B-H: 'U.S.-Style Stalinism' Seen in Officers' Arrests

AU2102150696 Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI
in Serbo-Croatian 17-18 Feb 96 p 2

[Commentary by Dragan Davidovic: "American Rules of the Game"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Taking on the decisive role in settling the crisis in former Yugoslavia, the Americans have introduced in Europe some new principles and to us so far unknown rules of behavior. They are pretending to be peacemakers, while behaving as an occupying force; advocating democracy while implementing totalitarianism; and swearing on the Bible while not believing in God. The history of European nations is not familiar with such behavior in politics, diplomacy, and least of all in military affairs.

At this moment the Americans are the prosecutor, the judge, and the executor of their decisions, so it is quite unimportant what is actually covered by the United Nations, NATO, and IFOR [Implementation Force], and when necessary, by the activities of Milosevic, Tudjman, or Izetbegovic. Which is to say, it is important to execute whatever suits the United States.

If he had been alive, Stalin would have been happy to see how the preparations for the accomplishment of the Dayon peace accords were done, and even more happy about the democratic method of its signing in Paris.

In addition, applying the best standards of totalitarian systems, the plan was declared flawless, unalterable, and binding on all parties except its architects. It has another quality: Never, I guess, in history was any such plan devised so quickly, with so few pages, but with so many stupidities and confusions.

It is unnecessary to list all the examples showing clearly ever since the early 1990's how the U.S.-style Stalinism really functions, nor is it necessary to make a detailed analysis of the Dayton peace accords in order to show all of its deficiencies. However, the abduction of General Djukic and Colonel Krsmanovic is one such example that fully and definitely shows the real meaning of the U.S. rules of behavior.

The senior Serb officers were arrested while on their way to take part in negotiations, which was a clear violation of the international military law that is supposed to guarantee to negotiators the safety and inviolability of their persons, and in this case of their army officer's ranks as well. As IFOR was directly involved in this so far unprecedented in European history way of conduct, the General Staff of the Serb Republic Army quite justifiably suspended all contacts with IFOR's officers. The international military law is older than any peace agreement. If there is anyone undermining the Dayton accords it is IFOR, under the U.S. patronage, rather than the Serb Army or Serb politics.

Yet, in Europe — and we believed in the world as well until this latest case — military ethics and an officer's word of honor are older than both the Dayton accords and the international law.

Military ethics are based on the myth of the ancient warrior as much as on codes of behavior of medieval knights. In this region even the much disliked German officers during World War I and II kept their officer's words. After all, the only thing deserving to be mentioned in terms of humanity when speaking about European wars is the respect toward the wounded and the sick, as well as the officer's word of honor. Therefore, the childish behavior of the British, French, Russian, Italian, German, or Spanish officers in the case of arrest of their colleagues, the two Serb officers, is all the more strange. Did they not give their officer's word when they invited General Djukic and Colonel Krsmanovic to negotiations that nothing harmful would happen to them? Did they forget about what officer's ethics are, or simply succumb to the robust American rules of the game?

B-H: Izetbegovic on Croat 'Resistance' to Peace Accord

AU2002204296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] BH-PRESS asked Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to comment on today's situation in Mostar.

Asked whether Mostar had been opened up, that is, whether freedom of movement has been realized in the city, President Izetbegovic said the following: I have been following the situation and have been in a constant contact with the responsible people who can help this process.

President Izetbegovic said that he was not satisfied with the process.

I am not satisfied. The process has started, but it is rather slow. It is still not known whether it will continue or stop. It seems that there is great resistance on the Croatian side, Izetbegovic said.

Asked what he would do if the Croatian side failed to open up the city and thwarted the formation of the joint police force, Izetbegovic said the following: I will be travelling to Europe, the United States, and Muslim countries and I will be informing them on what has been happening. In that case, Croatia would bear the consequences for failing to respect the obligations undertaken and for undermining the peace process. I would have plenty to say.

Asked whether concessions should have been made in Rome, Izetbegovic said the following: We had to try. If the world was ever going to do anything at all, it is now more obliged to do something, as we have done everything to make the agreement work. If that does not happen, we will have lost nothing at all. We would have been left at the same point, but at least we have tried to ensure the city's unity and thereby the unity of Bosnia. The consequences could have been serious, but we have at least tried to avoid them.

In that case, what would the destiny of the Rome peace document have been, was the last BH-PRESS question. In that case, it would of course be [word indistinct], President Izetbegovic replied.

B-H: Koschnick Says Mostar Unification Process Begun

AU2002200496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] According to EU Administrator Hans Koschnick, the process of unifying the Mostar police and implementing freedom of movement has begun, despite certain problems. As Koschnick explained at a special news conference at the EU Administration headquarters today, on the basis of the agreement between interior ministers of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, the work of the joint patrols began at 1400 [1300 GMT] instead of 1200 as planned. Mirsad Behram reports from Mostar:

[Behram] However, today nothing worked according to how it had been planned in Rome. According to our information, the Croatian police in the western part of the city arrested four Bosniaks and there has still been no information on whether they have meanwhile been released. (?Administrator) Koschnick and his [word indistinct] of the West European police [word indistinct] assessed as small scale incidents that should not threaten the (?initiated) processes.

However, we have meanwhile learned from the Mostar public security station that the joint patrols have begun working, while freedom of movement is still not as it had been envisaged by the Rome agreement.

By the way, according to the agreement between the representatives of the two police forces, according to what was said at today's news conference, by 1 March joint patrols will exclusively act in the central city zone, while a single police force for the whole of the city should be formed after that date.

EU Administrator Hans Koschnick told journalists that he had been assured by (Mile Puljic), deputy mayor of the western part of Mostar, that all Croatian police checkpoints will be removed today.

On the basis of everything, it can still be said that, despite today's incidents during which, as we learned, there was some shooting, the process in Mostar has nevertheless begun, which is extremely significant at the moment.

B-H: Mostar Official Stresses 'Very Cool Heads' Needed

LD2002235796 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2225 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer Tihomir Ladisic] We have a direct telephone line to Mostar and Mr. Mijo Brajkovic, president of the Mostar municipal committee, is on the other end. Good evening. Can you hear me, Mr. Brajkovic?

[Brajkovic] Good evening. Yes, I can hear you.

[Ladisic] [passage omitted] Can you tell me what the situation in Mostar is like this evening?

[Brajkovic] I have just come from these places. I believe the situation is satisfactory and that everything is peaceful and that there are no special problems. Today, naturally, on the first day of complete freedom of movement, we could not expect everything to pass off in an ideal manner. Owing to some objective and some subjective weaknesses, this came into effect with a two or three- hour delay, but in the main the freedom of movement has been established throughout the city.

You have to realize that today is a Muslim Bayram holiday. There was a carnival in Mostar today, and there was heavy rain too, etc, and all this had the effect to some extent of causing delays in its implementation etc. But the most important thing — and this should not be a big problem — is, as I have said, that the freedom of movement has been established and that people are able to move to both sides of the city and that joint police patrols with police from Croatia, Bosnia and the European Union [EU] etc, have been set up.

[Ladisic] Mr. Brajkovic, has complete freedom of movement really been established or is there something which, this evening or over the coming few days, will restrict this freedom?

[Brajkovic] Well, in formal legal terms, it will not be restricted at all, though there could be some subjective excesses, etc, but as regards the policy of the freedom of movement, it has been guaranteed and it will certainly be implemented. As to whether there will be some excesses, you have to know what has been happening here in the city of Mostar and I believe that we have to work very cautiously, but I am happy that things have nevertheless got moving and I am very optimistic that things will end to the satisfaction of both sides.

[Ladisic] Mr. Brajkovic, there was a fresh incident today at about 1300, if I have accurately conveyed the essence of news agency reports. Has anyone involved in this incident been detained, and is this a problem which could arise tomorrow or over the next few days?

[Brajkovic] Well, as I said, today is that Bayram holiday. People have drunk a bit and they set out, with some flags, to cross over to this side. Naturally, there is a very tense atmosphere, with passions boiling, and there have been some minor incidents which, as I have said, are not illogical in this situation — the first time that things are happening which will be of great importance to this city — and it seems to me that everything has now nevertheless ended very correctly and that over the next few days things will be much better than they have today.

[Ladisic] Finally, Mr. Brajkovic, have you today had, or do you intend, perhaps, to have meetings, talks or contacts with administrator Koschnick or with the mayor of east Mostar? Have any meetings been agreed which could perhaps contribute to the establishment of trust?

[Brajkovic] We said when we ended our cooperation with the EU that if this (?crucial) EU policy were to change, the Mostar city municipal council would resume talks. We told the EU today — since in Rome, where I was too, the principles of relations were changed from what was proposed by the EU for the city of Mostar — that we would continue talking as soon as the EU calls us to talks again.

[Ladisic] Are any contacts with the citizens or mayor of east Mostar envisaged?

[Brajkovic] Well, we are holding meetings. For us there is nothing to fear in this. We were in Rome together. We travelled to Rome together and we travelled back together. There is no special — how shall I put it — conflict of policies here. We are now waiting for an invitation. And we will resume the talks because there are many, many problems in the city of Mostar. A formal legal process has ended but now all this needs to be put into practice, but for this we need very cool heads and a good deal of skill in order to implement this.

[Ladisic] Thank you for speaking to us, Mr. Brajkkovic.

[Brajkovic] Thank you, too.

B-H: Rome Accord 'Among Last Chances' for EU in Mostar

AU1902124196 Paris AFP in English
1153 GMT 19 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Feb 19 (AFP) — The weekend accord on the fate of this southeast Bosnian city was among the "last chances" for the European Union in charge of administering the divided town, an EU official said Monday.

"It is one of the last chances for the EU administration," Klaus Metscher, the deputy of Mostar's administrator Hans Koschnick, told AFP on his return here from Rome where he had attended a meeting on the fledgling peace process.

"If it (the accord) fails again, it will be very serious for the EU but also for Mostar," he added.

Moslem and Croat leaders agreed during the two-day summit in Rome to settle their differences over Mostar, one of the key issues holding up full implementation of the Dayton peace agreement.

The weekend accord calls for freedom of movement to be guaranteed in the divided city by 1100 GMT on Tuesday, when a united Moslem-Croat police force is due to start operating under the authority of the EU.

"Tomorrow afternoon, we will know if the text will be implemented," Metscher said. "If tomorrow afternoon, people are still asked (for their) permits, or if men of soldier age are still stopped, then it means that the Rome agreement is not implemented."

He said that EU police on Monday started working on setting up the joint police force which will include officers from Croatia proper and from other regions of Bosnia.

As to the EU's plan to redivide the city into seven municipalities, Metscher said the plan would be reworked so that the main central district that triggered a crisis would be much smaller than originally planned.

Koschnick had proposed three districts each for the Moslems and Croats and one they would run jointly.

The plan triggered mob violence by Croats who said the blueprint favored the Moslems.

Also Monday, Metscher said that the EU was planning to respond to a request by the two mayors of the city for the EU mandate, which expires in July, to be extended for six months.

Mostar was placed under EU administration in July 1994, following 11 months of fierce fighting between the Croats and mainly Moslem Bosnian troops.

B-H: EU's Koschnick 'Optimistic' About Mostar Future

AU2102081496 Vienna DER STANDARD in German
20 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by "win": "Koschnick Confident About the Future of Mostar"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vienna — "As all previous agreements have not been adhered to, skepticism would appear not to be out of place. However, since the special summit in Rome, I am confident that the reunification of the city will begin shortly." Speaking in Vienna yesterday during the course of a brief visit, Hans Koschnick, the EU administrator of Mostar in Bosnia, said that he was relatively optimistic about the future of coexistence in the city.

Responsibility for the repeated acts of sabotage that had occurred lay with a "political-terrorist" group in west Mostar that was possessed by excessive nationalism. Koschnick said that in Rome, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman had clearly come out in favor of cooperation. In light of the obligations that Zagreb had assumed, Koschnick said he expected the "terrorists" in the leadership of the Bosnian Croats to be restrained. Tudjman certainly has the power to keep them in check and that also lies in his interest. At the Rome meeting, it was stated clearly that the Mostar issue is of central importance for the process whereby Croatia was moving closer to Europe. At 1200 today, freedom of movement is to come into force in Mostar and the joint Bosnian-Croatian police force is to start its operations.

B-H: MBO Accuses Leaders of 'Capitulation' Over Mostar

AU1902193696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 19 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The negotiations in Rome have yet again confirmed the mistakes made by our state leadership, the Muslim Bosniak Organization [MBO] believes. Our opponents know of [word indistinct] of five people in the Bosnia-Herzegovina state leadership, which are fatal acquiescence and so-called cooperation, instead of the wisdom and courage to threaten to walk out of negotiations every time pressure is invoked.

Instead of that, they accept the unacceptable reduction in the size of the central district [in Mostar]. This is capitulation in the face of the forces of disintegration, which are preventing the establishment of the Federation and seriously threatening peace. This concession should not have been made, the MBO believes.

B-H: Mostar Joint Police Patrols Commence 20 Feb

LD2002154996 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 20 Feb 96

[By HINA reporter Pejo Gasparevic in Mostar]

[FBIS Translated Text] Croat, Bosniak, and West European policemen will begin their joint patrols between 1530 and 1600 [1430-1500 GMT] today, the Croatian minister of internal affairs [Ivan Jarnjak] said following his talks with officials of the government of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and Avdo Hebib, minister of internal affairs of the [Bosnia-Herzegovina] federation. Each patrol will have seven men: Two from the West European police force, one each from the Republic of Croatia and Sarajevo, one each from the western and eastern part of the town, and an interpreter, Minister Jarnjak explained. During the first 10 days the unified patrols will operate only in the town's central zone. Jarnjak said that he was going to meet Hans Koschnik next week. According to Jarnjak, there are 101 policemen from Croatia in Mostar at the moment and that is enough for the time being.

B-H: Croats Urge Muslim-Croat Division Within Federation

LD1702201396 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 17 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] From Posavina we move to Vitez where an interesting protest rally was held. Zvonimir Cilic reports.

[Cilic] Nearly 2,000 residents of Vitez and the Lasva valley gathered in Vitez today at a protest rally organized by Associations of Victims of the Homeland War dissatisfied with the political solutions that the international community had imposed on the Croat people of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Numerous banners that said: Croat Land to the Croats; Central Bosnia-Croat Canton; Federation-Yes, But Without Mixed Cantons; Herzeg-Bosnia Until the Establishment of the Federation; We Will Not Give Up Herzeg-Bosnia, We Defended This And Will Go On Defending It; Dr. Tudjman — President of Croats of Central Bosnia, and heated speeches accompanied by loud approval expressed the mood of the assembled people.

Full support was given to the leadership of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and the Republic of Croatia, as well as to the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and the implementation of the Federation, although demands were made to separate the Croat from the Muslim within the Federation itself.

With that aim in mind, the Croat leadership was urged to work for central Bosnia to become a Croat canton. Only in this way can the survival of Croats in these regions be guaranteed.

The international community policy of bargaining in Bosnia-Herzegovina, mainly at the expense of the Croats, was condemned. Support was expressed for Mijo Brajkovic [mayor of western Mostar] and his fellow townsmen in their efforts to find a just political solution in Mostar.

Several speakers expressed bitterness that some institutions and individuals from the county and the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia had tried to prevent the holding of this protest rally, which passed without a single incident.

B-H: Croatia's HDZ Policy Seen at Work in Herzegovina

AU2102104696 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 14 Feb 96 p 3

[Commentary by Edis Mesihovic: "Awkwardly, But Sincerely"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mijo Brajkovic is no newcomer to politics. He had swum those waters even before the war, but in the last couple of years he has dived into petty politics. Naturally, a combination of circumstances has helped him to turn from breast-stroker to back-stroker. Is there any other way to explain his statement to the German press that "if Croatia's President Tudjman finds fault with my policy, he will remove me from office!" Apart from that, he has also claimed that "the whole of Croatia is on our side."

For a politician, this awkward, but essentially sincere statement, gives rise to numerous questions, although we know the answer to many of them. But precisely because we know the answer it is wise to ask ourselves what we should do to prevent the questions from arising.

Even small children know that at least the more serious decisions within the Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be made without the consent of Zagreb. By the way, this party usurps the inalienable right of representation of all the Bosnian Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is strongly reflected in the personnel policy in the country because the representatives of all nations should be in the bodies of authority.

For Whose Interests Does He Stand?

According to those schemes, the president of the Federation can be a man who does not want it to start functioning, the minister of foreign affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina can be a man who openly says on Croatian Television that he is accomplishing Croatian policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the minister of defense of the Federation is a representative in the Croatian National Assembly, the Croatian Army officers are key personalities in the HVO [Croatian Defense Council], and so on. And then, it is seemingly normal that also Mayor Brajkovic, does not advocate the interests of Mostar and the inhabitants of Mostar, but those of Croatia.

The stand of Croatian nationalists is particularly eye-catching: they say that they have struggled and spilled blood for the territories and sacrificed many lives. And that is one big admission that they want to divide Bosnia at any cost. There have been many victims on all sides. But, the largest number of them has met with misfortune because they wanted to preserve Bosnia and we are lucky that it is precisely they that the decisionmakers in the world support. To stand behind Brajkovic and "his" victims would be a moral offense to the whole democratic world.

There is a lot of guilt on the Bosniak side, too, primarily because of its indulgence. One cannot justify everything by the realities on the ground and by world pressure. The reality is also that a great number of Croats have patriotic feelings and this does not divide the country into nationalist trenches. One should have paid much more attention to them, regardless of the fact that those people do not enjoy the support of Zagreb.

The Tip of an Iceberg

The existing chaos has also been supported by the hastiness in the adoption of the provisions on citizenship. There are few countries in the world that practice dual citizenship as applied here with us. Apart from the political, it will also represent serious difficulties and inequality of citizens in other aspects of life, too. Now, on the eve of elections, we can see that other states do not allow voting in their territories. And we have a situation that foreign citizens will make decisions about internal political relations. It would be interesting to find out how many people there are in the territories under the control of the HVO, who possess Bosnia-Herzegovina identification papers or passports. One cannot agree upon impossible solutions for the sake of a simulated peace at home. For then, such peace will never come.

The events in Mostar are only the tip of an iceberg that sooner or later had to come to the surface. After the demonstration, the next manifestation of force is the laying of the foundations for Mostar cathedral. We can all be happy that such a project is being realized, but the way in which it is being attempted is utterly primitive. It is not beseeming to a civilized nation and the Croats will certainly be ashamed of their nationalists. After that, the conflict will occur in Sarajevo, then in Usora, and so on.

It is rumored that it was not the inhabitants of Mostar who were demonstrating and raging in Mostar. Brajkovic was leading a bunch of newcomers. It will be interesting to see how many votes Mijo, or someone like him, wins in the elections, if they are regular. The representatives of other Croatian political parties from Bosnia-Herzegovina are forbidden to come to Mostar and western Herzegovina, and it is apparent from this what kind of freedom and what kind of Federation the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] of that region wants.

We hope that President Tudjman will thoroughly analyze the words of his Mostar mayor and make the best move possible. However, if Brajkovic leaves, a larger set of Herzegovina personnel would also have to go. Otherwise, no progress will be made at all.

B-H: Background to Recent Mostar Events Examined

96BA0153A Sarajevo SLOBODNA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Jan 96 pp 5-6

[Article by Senad Slatina: "Is Mostar Threatened by the Fate of the Bosnian Posavina?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Here is the dawn, here is the day/Here is Jure and Boban/Jure is calling, Boban is shouting:/Here I am, Chief!"/Oh, Ustashi, dear brothers,/ The Drina River is deep...."

A few days before Christmas, these and similar lyrics were shouted frenetically in the municipal stadium in Mostar to thousands of participants and observers of the military parade celebrating the anniversary of the 2d Guards Brigade of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council]. The singing of the crowd in an ultranationalistic mood was led by one of that unit's commanders—Ivica Rajic, who was frequently interrupted by the unruly crowd with the greeting "Ready for the homeland," which obviously was never abandoned here. Contrary to the agreement on demilitarization, a number of tanks, multiple-rocket launchers, and armored vehicles were exhibited in the stadium, along with other weapons. The military parade was broadcast by the Mostar local studio of Radio-TV Croatia, and a group of Bosniak journalists from Mostar forwarded a tape of the events to TV Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In response to a letter to Croatian officials, the Bosniak journalists suggested that the content of the tape would confirm allegations in their reports of extremism, radicalism, and fascist behavior of militant Croatian circles in Mostar. In addition to parade details which were described, the seven-minute tape offered to TV Bosnia-Herzegovina also contained segments from an interview recently conducted on the regular program "Eye to Eye" by Smiljko Sagolj with Mladen Misic, commander of the 2d Mostar Regiment. Misic said, loud and clear, that the Bosniaks are a "handful of caterpillars who will either respect Croatian laws or be gone." When the interviewer mentioned the argument that some Croats ("federalists") "have moved like geese in a fog toward the federation, forgetting Herzeg-Bosna," Misic responded in a vocabulary in that was keeping with his origin (a shepherd from the village of Ljuti Dolac near Listica): "They have gone astray. The best principle is to take care of whatever you plant! This is divided. This is now the state of Croatia, not Herzeg-Bosna. If the *balije* [pejorative for Bosniaks] do not accept that, they will be gone!"

How It Began

However, TV Bosnia-Herzegovina did not broadcast this authentic testimony about the atmosphere just before the tragic events in Mostar, or indications as to which people had authority in the field and were supposed to carry out the federal agreements. This delicate decision was, of course, not made in the radio-TV center. In the interest of the "strategic project," Bosnian policy opted once again for compromise and appeasement.

Mostar journalists (who had sent the tape to all the leading world TV networks as well) mentioned in their letter that some 20 murders of Bosniaks committed by soldiers of the HVO since the Washington agreement had already been covered up "in the interest of relieving the tension." In order to "lay the ghosts," the media in Bosnia-Herzegovina have not excessively exploited reports of the continuation of terror, expulsion, and rapes in the western part of Mostar either. So that freedom of movement could "take hold," they also passed over in silence the fact that civilians who since 1 December have been able to pass over into the western part of Mostar have been taken in for background interviews and even beaten. The Bosnian media were also silent about the shots fired Christmas night on the building of the muftis and on many civilian facilities in free Mostar. Then Alan Mustovic, a minor, was killed, and the policemen Ferid Caus and Semir Camo were wounded. Perhaps Bosnian policy and the media would have continued after that "appeasement in the interest of peace," but not the citizens of Mostar. The base lie that Alan was a member of a group of commandos made the cup run over. "Well, we have commandos who are a bit better than those kids," Mostar police whispered to one another. The Croatian policeman Zeljko Ljubic was killed not long after that. Then came nighttime exchanges of rifle fire. The so-called freedom of movement was discontinued. Both sides strengthened their police forces along the lines of contact. The possibility of a major conflict hung by a thread.

At the request of the European governor, the IFOR [Implementation Force] was deployed on the most sensitive lines of separation. (It is worth mentioning here that Hans Koschnick did not react uniformly to the tragic events. He referred to the murder of the Bosniak boy and the wounding of the police as only an incident, but after the murder of the Croatian policeman he issued an alarming press release about the "tragic incident with unforeseeable consequences." Koschnick responded to this criticism by saying: "I still need more details about the incident on New Year's night. Whether this was an overreaction of some policemen to a breach of the rules or was planned. But what happened on the Boulevard, that was planned." Koschnick seems to have forgotten that the shots fired on Bosnian policemen to kill them before the murder on the Boulevard was also "planned." Two policemen received serious injuries to their limbs, but for Koschnick this seems not to have been "an attack on policemen on duty.")

How IFOR Reacted

After six armored vehicles and 50 Spanish soldiers from the IFOR were deployed, the situation on the Boulevard did not undergo any essential change. According to the Mostar CSB [Security Service Center], provocations continued night after night with sniper shots and rifle grenades, but the IFOR did not react at all. Esad Humo, coordinator of relations with the IFOR, confirms that the Spanish troops were not reacting, but only reporting, and sometimes they did even that mistakenly.

"A few evenings ago, rifle grenades fired from the western part of Mostar overflew the IFOR personnel carriers and fell on the eastern part of Mostar," Mr. Humo said. "The next day, a press release was issued, saying that there had not been any extensive exchange of fire, that it was peaceful in the western part, and that some explosions had been heard in the eastern part." (It should be recalled that while they were wearing UN caps, the Spanish troops behaved in the same way just before the conflicts of May 1993, so that the confidence of the Bosnian authorities is still less. Let us recall that after the Croatian ultimatum on the night between 8 and 9 May 1993 the Spanish troops withdrew without notifying the Bosnian side. At 0445 hours on the morning of 9 May, the Croatian attacks began, in which about 2,000 Bosniaks in the eastern part of Mostar were killed during the months of the conflict.)

The Croatian side has begun an authentic propaganda war over what has been happening on the Boulevard, how the IFOR has been reacting, and how it should react. The absurd extent to which this goes is demonstrated in the "Mostar case" by the highly aggressive SLOBODNA DALMACIJA. In its issue of 8 January, this newspaper carried a notice that the IFOR had opened fire on positions of the Bosnian police, and then in the main article of the same issue the editors refuted themselves with the statement of the IFOR spokesman that "the international implementation force did not return the fire of any side in the conflict."

On the Bosnian side, and to some extent even in the administration of Hans Koschnick, people are seriously concerned that the positioning of the IFOR on the lines of separation could freeze the status quo and create the basis for a definitive ethnic division of the city. Because their mandate was drawn up for another entity, the people in the IFOR have been pretty much surprised by the most recent events. When Safet Orucevic, mayor of Mostar, called for the IFOR to be deployed in the depth of the territory and to remove all checkpoints in the city, one unnamed official replied that the IFOR would not do that because Mostar is not in the zone of conflict, but in a zone inhabited by allies. The people at the IFOR believe that the federal police or police of the European Union should be tackling these jobs. The IFOR mission was obviously shaped according to the federation as it is seen in the plans and agreements, not on the basis of the situation in the field. The IFOR even proposed to withdraw from the Boulevard, but on Koschnick's explicit request it will remain here until further notice. Koschnick also has been pushing a joint investigation of the murders, but after the very first inquiries Croatian police have refused this, observing that "they do not want to cooperate with the murderers of their policemen." All of this is being done in order to keep the situation constantly on the verge of conflict, and in order to put pressure on the upcoming political talks in this way.

According to assessments in Mostar, the extreme wing of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] provoked the most recent incidents in order to frustrate the implementation of the Dayton Accords and to prevent full freedom of movement in the city from taking hold. At the same time, the increasingly frequent and increasingly nervous statements made by Mayor Mijo Brajkovic emphasize that the agreement in Dayton called for the creation of three Croat and three Bosniak opcinas, that only the line of demarcation is in dispute, and that it would be best for it to remain on the line of separation of the forces. Brajkovic, however, forgets that if the ethnic criterion is adopted, regardless of who the arbitrators are, assuming the results of the 1991 Census are honored, or any other fair principle, most of Mostar would belong to the Bosniaks. This was, in fact, confirmed long ago by Kresimir Zubak, when at a press conference in Medjugorje, after he signed the Washington and Vienna agreements, he answered the question of why he had consented to the mixed canton by saying: "Well, otherwise, Mostar and Stolac would belong to the Bosniaks."

Politics and/or Mafia?

Mayor Orucevic also presented to us the most recent concept for governing the city which has been offered in order to find a compromise. "We have four opcinas having what I would say is natural ethnic exclusiveness: two Bosniak and two Croatian," Mr. Orucevic said. "The other two are indivisible multiethnic opcinas: Bijelo Polje and City Center. They have always been in dispute. We have called for Koschnick to protect them and to turn them into a municipal opcina whose chief executive would be a Bosniak when the mayor of Mostar as a whole is a Croat, and vice versa. The Croats, however, also rejected that. They do not want anything on a joint basis."

The intensity with which Croatian propaganda is participating in the events in Mostar confirms the thesis that a final and definitive attempt is being made in this city to destroy the entire federal concept. Nevertheless, there are people in the Bosniak political leadership who believe that by appeasing the Croats in Mostar it would be possible to solve more quickly the problems in the remainder of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, foreseeing that the present Croatian leadership will enter the federation only insofar as it must do so under international pressure. According to one source close to the SDA [Democratic Action Party] headquarters in Sarajevo, there was also serious talk about the keys to the gates of Mostar during the recent Tudjman-Izetbegovic meeting in Sarajevo. The Croatian side insisted on the fact that in the Dayton trade the Bosniaks got Sarajevo, the Serbs Banja Luka, and it is essential that the Croats have their own capital, historic city, and cultural center in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Recalling that Sarajevo was obtained in a trade for Prijedor, Doboj, Visegrad, Rogatica, and Brcko, the Croats are said to have offered in return that they withdraw their demand for an opcina in Sarajevo, eliminating visas, opening the Ploce-Sarajevo road and railroad, eliminating customs, etc. Lasting disagreements and ever more certain conflicts remain as an alternative.

Bosniak policy did relatively well in Dayton in negotiations with a sincere enemy. But how it will develop relations with an insincere friend is uncertain. In that context, because of the unenviable military and political position, it is not impossible that when negotiations resume Mostar will experience the fate of the Bosnian Posavina.

Signs of hope for the city on the Neretva, and thereby also for Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole, appeared in the announcements of more determined steps by those who up to now have mainly been guided by the dictates of real circumstances in the field. The German foreign minister has announced a showdown with mafioso structures in Herzegovina, and he expects solid support from Warren Christopher in that regard. Nor should we omit Hans Koschnick, the man who represented the situation in Mostar to the principal sponsors of the federation. In one of his reports he said: "Most of the local HDZ leaders are a special nationalistic sort and have close ties to local military commanders and even to certain gang leaders. Their financial resources, their command of the police, and their ties to organized crime, and also their treatment of the local media as a propaganda instrument, make them frightening warlords. A unified Mostar is not in their personal or political interest, because some of them are considered to be war criminals."

It remains to be seen whether the Germans and Americans will do what they have announced. A deceptive lull prevails in Mostar. The last informal assessment of Hans Koschnick was this: "It is a bit better, but everything could flare up once again at any moment!"

B-H: Croats Refuse To Allow Muslim Return to Busovaca

LD1902182896 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1500 GMT 19 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 19 (TANJUG) — Croat authorities in the central Bosnian town of Busovaca have refused to allow 150 Moslem families to return home, Moslem Radio Sarajevo reported on Monday.

The local Croat authorities are not willing to negotiate the matter and it is highly unlikely that Moslem refugees will return to their houses and flats in Busovaca, if joint authorities are not set up immediately.

Under the Washington federation deal, towns in central Bosnia are to be within a joint, Moslem-Croat canton, the center of which is to be the town of Travnik.

Moslems and Croats bowed to U.S. pressure in March 1994 and signed an agreement to form a binational federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

During fierce clashes with Moslems in 1993 that went on for nearly a year, Croats seized the towns of Kiseljak, Busovaca, Zepce, Vitez and Novi Travnik, while Moslems seized the towns of Vares, Bugojno and Travnik.

Despite all international arbitrators' and mediators' decisions to this end to date, transitional municipal councils have not been set up in these towns as provided for by the Federation Constitution.

Croats organised mass rallies in Busovaca on Saturday, demanding that central Bosnia be a Croat-controlled canton only. They carried banners saying that they were not for the Moslem-Croat Federation but only for the Bosnian Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia.

Moslem representatives in Busovaca, who have fled the town, say no Moslem-Croat Federation or stable peace of Sarajevo, Hadzici included, is to be placed under control of the Moslem-Croat Federation by March 19.

The remaining Serb families have been accommodated in two schools where they get food as well. These are mainly families of combatants of the Bosnian serbs' Republika Srpska army who have either been killed or invalided out of the army.

Bratunac can accommodate another 3,000 persons in the available housing facilities.

The Republika Srpska Government set up an operational staff on Friday for reception and accommodation of Serbs who want to leave Sarajevo, calling on the international community to give safe conduct to them.

B-H: Serbs Being Allowed To Leave Sarajevo 'Unimpeded'

LD2002192396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1610 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 20 Feb (SRNA) — Maksim Stanisic, chairman of the executive committee of the Serb Sarajevo municipal assembly, today repeated that Serbs wishing to leave the city can do so unimpeded by 19 March, as Serb authorities will be in control in all of the municipalities up to that date.

"Serbs who do not wish to remain under Muslim control can leave the city unimpeded and with their property by 19 March because the Serb local authorities will be functioning in all Serb municipalities in Sarajevo up to then," Stanisic said.

He said that "by that date agreement will have been eached on how to transfer power in the Serb municipalities which, according the Dayton agreement, should come under the control of the Federation. Guarantees have been given by Carl Bildt, the Implementation Force, the international police force, and Prime Min- ster Kasagic who took part in the Rome summit".

Stanisic appealed to Serb Sarajevo citizens "not to panic nd make irrational decisions" because, he said, "there s enough time before 19 March to move and all tasks n connection with this issue are being fulfilled in the roper way."

-H: Leaders 'Intimidating' Serbs Into Sarajevo xodus

U2102144596 Paris AFP in English 336 GMT 21 Feb 96

By Adrian Brown]

FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 21 (AFP) — The rdline Bosnian Serb leadership is intimidating people in these lands is possible if Moslem refugees are not allowed to return home.

The Croatian Democratic Union, the ruling party in Croatia and Herzeg-Bosnia, has replaced Chairman of the Transitional Municipal Council in Busovaca, Florijan Flavcevic, for his allegedly cooperative attitude towards Moslems.

B-H: Factions 'Still Arguing' Over Territory Exchanges

AU1902190596 Paris AFP in English
1847 GMT 19 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Feb 19 (AFP) — Bosnia's former warring factions are still arguing over land in the north of the country more than two weeks after forces were due to evacuate territories earmarked for transfer, the official BH PRESS said Monday [19 February].

The agency reported that municipal chiefs and police from towns near the former frontlines in northern Bosnia were still thrashing out the details of a territory swap which, under the Dayton agreement, should have been presaged by troop withdrawal by February 3.

Authorities from the north Bosnian towns of Modrica and Gradacac finally agreed Monday on the transfer of two Serb villages, Borovo Polje and Zdreban to Bosnian Government control and the reciprocal handover of nearby Rajska and Jasenice, BH PRESS said.

But in the village of Ostra Luka, through which the zone of separation runs, Bosnian Croat forces and the Bosnian Serbs were still trying to reach an agreement on jurisdiction in the region.

B-H: Serbs Fleeing Sarajevo, Seeking Shelter in Bratunac

LD2002184596 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1429 GMT 20 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bratunac, Feb 20 (TANJUG) — About 7,500 Serbs in Hadzici, Sarajevo's Serb municipality, who do not want to live in the Moslem-Croat Federation, have registered in Bratunac, eastern Bosnia.

A statement released by the Bratunac Housing Committee on Tuesday said that, of 320 Serb families that had left Hadzici and had already arrived in Bratunac, accommodation had been provided for 82 families.

Under a peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina reached in Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995, the city of Sarajevo, Hadzici included, is to be placed under control of the Moslem-Croat Federation by March 19.

The remaining Serb families have been accommodated in two schools where they get food as well. These are mainly families of combatants of the Bosnian serbs' Republika Srpska army who have either been killed or invalided out of the army.

Bratunac can accommodate another 3,000 persons in the available housing facilities.

The Republika Srpska Government set up an operational staff on Friday for reception and accommodation of Serbs who want to leave Sarajevo, calling on the international community to give safe conduct to them.

B-H: Serbs Being Allowed To Leave Sarajevo 'Unimpeded'

LD2002192396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
1610 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 20 Feb (SRNA) — Maksim Stanisic, chairman of the executive committee of the Serb Sarajevo municipal assembly, today repeated that Serbs wishing to leave the city can do so unimpeded by 19 March, as Serb authorities will be in control in all of the municipalities up to that date.

"Serbs who do not wish to remain under Muslim control can leave the city unimpeded and with their property by 19 March because the Serb local authorities will be functioning in all Serb municipalities in Sarajevo up to then," Stanisic said.

He said that "by that date agreement will have been reached on how to transfer power in the Serb municipalities which, according the Dayton agreement, should come under the control of the Federation. Guarantees have been given by Carl Bildt, the Implementation Force, the international police force, and Prime Minister Kasagic who took part in the Rome summit".

Stanisic appealed to Serb Sarajevo citizens "not to panic and make irrational decisions" because, he said, "there is enough time before 19 March to move and all tasks in connection with this issue are being fulfilled in the proper way."

B-H: Leaders 'Intimidating' Serbs Into Sarajevo Exodus

AU2102144596 Paris AFP in English
1336 GMT 21 Feb 96

[By Adrian Brown]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 21 (AFP) — The hardline Bosnian Serb leadership is intimidating people into leaving the Sarajevo area in an orchestrated campaign of disinformation, international agencies charged Wednesday.

"Local Serb leaders are being threatened. A lot of them are under severe pressure. They are being told to organise an exodus," said Alexandre Ivanko, a spokesman for a UN-run international police force deployed in Bosnia under the Dayton accord.

The targets are those leaders in suburbs of the Bosnian capital due to revert to government control by March 19. Ivanko said threats had come directly from the Serb leadership in Pale, the rebels' mountain stronghold just east of Sarajevo. One of the mayors had had his house broken into, Ivanko added.

Kris Janowski of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], blamed the Pale media.

"Their line is clear. They are inciting fear and in a veiled way telling people to go," he said.

Janowski also launched scathing criticism of one Bosnian Serb official, Gojko Klickovic. His job, Janowski said, is "basically to get the Serbs out of Sarajevo."

On Monday, an announcement from Klickovic was carried on Bosnian Serb television and radio stating that every Sarajevo Serb would have to leave their homes in three days.

"This has led to a pressure cooker atmosphere in the suburbs and the people in Vogosca are extremely worried and extremely confused by those statements," Janowski told reporters.

On Wednesday, Vogosca's mayor was threatened by Serbs angry that there was no transport to take them away before the first deployment of mainly Moslem police forces in that suburb on Friday.

Western reporters saw a meeting by the mayor and members of the international police force, talks called to calm fears, descend into a riot. One woman threatened to kill the mayor unless a truck arrived within the hour to take her family away, the reporters said.

Vogosca is one of five suburbs ringing the city held by the Serbs throughout the war due to revert to Bosnian government control in a phased programme starting this Friday.

Ivanko said the police task force known as the IPTF, whose job under Bosnia's peace accord is to help monitor the transfer, was trying to calm the atmosphere and counter the propaganda from Pale by targetting local media.

He said the main Pale television channel controlled by the rebel leadership was unreliable. "What comes out on Pale TV is not what you said (in the interview). It's more important to talk to the local media," Ivanko said.

The UNHCR however, reported increased movement of people out of the city's suburbs where road conditions are difficult because of recent heavy snow falls.

"We have signals that movement is picking up. The road conditions are atrocious. It is a worrying situation. I wouldn't describe as panic but a lot of people want to leave," Janowski said.

Some 40-50,000 people are still in these areas, though as many as 15-20,000 have already left. Many in the suburbs to be transferred are fearful of reprisals from the mainly Moslem population inside the city.

Those who fought in the Bosnian Serb army are particularly worried about their safety once government control fully returns. The suburbs were a key element in the Serbs' siege of Sarajevo. Emotions run high, particularly with those expelled from their homes at the start of the war.

As a precaution the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) has deployed extra troops in the area but officials said they would not be prevent any one leaving should they choose to go.

"The overarching principle is that citizens have the personal freedom of choice in where they leave and to move unimpeded anywhere in the country," Lt. Colonel Mark Rayner, IFOR spokesman said Wednesday.

B-H: Official Denies Sarajevo Serbs Forced To Leave

LD2002230396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2146 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 20 Feb (SRNA) — The third session of the operational headquarters for the reception and settlement of people from Serb Sarajevo, held in Pale this evening, focused on the solution to technical and organizational problems arising from the Sarajevo Serbs' evacuation.

After the meeting Gojko Klickovic, chairman of the operational headquarters, told SRNA that trouble caused by weather conditions and problems of a technical and organizational nature had to be overcome during the night so that the evacuation of Serb Sarajevo citizens might continue unimpeded tomorrow. [passage omitted]

Commenting on today's statement by UNHCR spokesman Chris Janowski that the Serb authorities were forcing Sarajevo Serbs to leave the city, Klickovic said that "such assessments are arbitrary, untrue and imbued with anything but humanity."

"We are responsibly saying that we will not exert pressure on any Serb to leave. After all, the wish to leave territory which will come under the Croat-Muslim federation's control is part of the consciousness of every Serb," the chairman of the operational headquarters said categorically.

Expressing his respect for UNHCR representatives who have undertaken humanitarian work in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina correctly, Klickovic said that statements like the one above only damage the reputation of this humanitarian organization.

B-H: Serb Exodus From Sarajevo Continues Despite Snow

AU2102102696 Paris AFP in English 0934 GMT 21 Feb 96

[By Adrian Brown]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 21 (AFP) — Heavy snow fall carpeted much of Bosnia Wednesday slowing the Serb exodus from Sarajevo as NATO commanders awaited the outcome of Bosnian Serb political deliberations to see if contacts would resume with their military.

"There's heavy snow throughout Bosnia and that's keeping people indoors but the Serb exodus out of Sarajevo continues," Implementation Force (IFOR) spokesman Major Tom Moyer said.

"They are moving out pretty steadily. There's not much we can do. We would like to see a multi-ethnic Sarajevo but if it's an individual's choice to move out we can do nothing to stop him leaving," he added.

Rebel Serbs who have been deserting their homes in areas due to revert to government control for several weeks, stepped up their departure on Tuesday. This followed announcements on Bosnian Serb official television that "an organised exodus" was being arranged. Buses arrived in the suburbs to take people away.

Under Bosnia's Dayton peace accords, the rebel Serb-held areas ringing the city which helped cement their siege of the capital revert to Bosnian government control at midnight March 19.

The Serb exodus is a setback for the Dayton accords which included guarantees of Serb rights and the presence of an international police force. This force is also monitoring the mainly Moslem federation police due to move into one of the Serb-held suburbs on Friday.

Progress was made elsewhere in Bosnia, with limited freedom of movement in the divided town of Mostar being established. However, the start of joint Moslem-Croat police patrols was marred by an ugly incident in which extremist Croats beat several people in a car from the Moslem-held east part of the city.

Moyer said NATO commanders were "thrilled" that for the first time people were now crossing from the east into Croat-controlled West Mostar. Hardline Croats have previously blocked all but Moslem women and chidren from crossing.

"But on the other hand there are people out there who do not agree with the peace agreement. In that respect, we are disappointed about these events," Moyer added.

Resumption of contacts between NATO and the Bosnian Serb army (VRS) high command still remained a priority but were only a hope, Moyer said.

On Tuesday, Bosnian Serb general Zdvavko Tolimir, the deputy commander of the VRS and the chief point of contact with the rebel forces declined to guarantee a resumption in contacts broken earlier in the month.

VRS commanders are angry over the detention of two of their fellow officers arrested by the Bosnian police and handed over to the Hague-based war crimes tribunal.

At a meeting on Tuesday, Tolimir told IFOR ground commander, General Sir Michael Walker that he would leave that decision to the rebel Serb leadership due to meet in Pale, their stonghold just east of Sarajevo, their Wednesday.

"We can never second-guess the political body. We will just have to wait and see. We hope that it is something positive but we will drive on with this peace deal with or without the VRS. We hope they will come back to the table and resume full dialogue," Moyer told AFP.

B-H: Serb FM Protests 'Anti-Serb Propaganda'

LD1702131596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1152 GMT 17 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 17 Feb (SRNA) — The Hague Tribunal is acting contrary to positive regulations of the United Nations because it is turning into a tribunal against the Serb people with open anti-Serb propaganda, Aleksa Buha, minister of foreign affairs of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, said today.

"The international community should tackle this institution if it does not want to lose its already shaken credibility," Buha, who was the guest on Bosnian Serb radio Studio Sarajevo, said, and added:

"This hunting down of people is in direct violation of the Dayton agreement. One cannot talk about confidence building measures, and on the other hand make arrests without indictment."

Commenting on the problem of Serb Sarajevo, Buha said that "anyone who wishes to leave will have the help of the Serb Republic government," and that "people have to be patient at least until the summer so that issues of their permanent housing and employment can be solved."

"I believe today's meeting in Rome will not bring anything more favorable for the Serbs. Carl Bildt and Leighton Smith have said that there can be no change in the deadlines for the transfer of authority [to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation]; the only thing that IFOR [Implementation Force] has promised to the citizens of Serb Sarajevo is help with fuel and the guarantee of safety on the roads," the Serb Republic's foreign minister said in conclusion.

B-H: SDS Leader Defends Karadzic, Mladic

LD2002212796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1750 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 20 Feb (SRNA) — In keeping with the post-Dayton situation and the preparations for elections in the [Bosnian Serb] republic, the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] has carried out a necessary reorganization: The executive committee has been disbanded and a presidium appointed.

Vlado Vrkes, secretary of the presidium, in an interview with SRNA, specified that it is made up of seven vice presidents who are responsible for particular regions, and a secretary who coordinates the work of this body with other party bodies.

"At its first constituent session the presidium outlined the bases of its policies and its objectives are clear.

"The priority is to maintain production. As soon as the requisite conditions are created by the lifting of sanctions against the Serb Republic, the SDS will present its economic program to the public.

"The second objective is to care for refugees and displaced persons and redeploy in work collectives demobilized personnel," Vrkes explained. [passage omitted]

"In the international community the interests of power prevail and attempts are being made to force some solutions on us, but this could rebound like a boomerang on those quarters from which these pressures come.

"It would be better for all the peoples in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina if the political situation in the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation were respected and if international players were to enter into talks with the legitimate representatives of these states.

"In the Serb Republic, in concrete terms, these are the SDS and Radovan Karadzic, president of the republic and the party. Only those who hold talks with the legitimate state authorities will be able to achieve good progress in the implementation of the peace agreement.

"Our key objective has not changed, and that is to achieve a Serb republic which is a state of the Serb people," Vrkes said, and added that the problem of regionalism "is above all a matter of personal clashes between people with excessive ambitions who want to deal in global politics instead of resolving life problems."

"All regionalism is harmful. We must create a single state with personnel who are committed to the survival of the Serb Republic, because only strong national states survive in Europe today," the secretary of the SDS presidium says. [passage omitted]

"We must all rise up to defend the Serb Republic and its legal and legitimate president, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, and Serb Army General Ratko Mladic.

"The world should be clearly told that the accusations against them are illegal. If needs be, the whole of the Serb nation will appear before this court, because they are part of us and part of our struggle for freedom and independence.

"The only guarantee of the survival of the Serb Republic is its army, police, and state authorities. Many are offering to provide such guarantees today, but we have created for ourselves the institutions which will enable us to do this," Vlado Vrkes, secretary of the SDS presidium, said at the end of his interview to SRNA.

B-H: OSCE Chairman Says Election Timetable 'Tight'

AU1502175596 Paris AFP in English 1725 GMT 15 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Paris, Feb 15 (AFP) — A senior international official charged with overseeing Bosnia-Herzegovina's first post-war general elections admitted Thursday [15 February] that the timetable for the polls was "terribly tight."

Flavio Cotti, current chairman of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) said "the timetable is terribly tight and adds more pressure on the OSCE."

Cotti, the Swiss foreign minister, was speaking after talks here with his French counterpart Herve de Charette.

Under the US-brokered Dayton peace accords the OSCE is tasked with preparing legislative and presidential elections in Bosnia by mid-September at the latest.

Registering the millions of refugees and displaced people from Bosnia-Herzegovina was proving the biggest headache, he said, adding "it would be an illusion to think all the millions of refugees will have returned home to exercise their right to vote."

B-H: Weekly Claims Izetbegovic Visited 'Camps'

AU2002095396 Belgrade INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian 2 Feb 96 pp 15-17

[Article by Momir Ilic, Marica Lalovic: "Alija in Serb Concentration Camps"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The first signs of the possibility of labelling Izetbegovic as a "war criminal" were seen as early as last autumn. The testimonies of Serbs who were victims of the Muslim concentation camps were used as a trial balloon before investigators from The Hague. Goldstone's immediate assistants then very discreetly, but unambiguously, told the interlocutors from Serbia, that is, Yugoslavia, how much they are interested in opening a criminal dossier on Alija's [Izetbegovic] (mis)doings, which are under the juristiction of the International criminal court for former Yugoslavia.

After pointing so very clearly to the new goal of Goldstone's team, the Serb side has, along with all the usual malfunctions, set to work. Once again, the lead was taken by non-governmental organizations, especially the Association of Camp Inmates of 1991. The message was sent to the other side of the Drina River, and so the latest person to make himself heard was Dr. Radovan Karadzic himself, telling the domestic and world public that the Pale authorities possess evidence of Izetbegovic's guilt.

Directors of Massacre

It is still early to speak about the quality of the Serb evidence that will be presented to the investigators in The Hague and which pieces of evidence may possibly be accepted as evidence for the prosecution. However, it is almost sure that the main evidence against Izetbegovic will be the suffering of the Serbs in central Bosnia; to be more precise, in Konjic, Celebici, and Tarcin.

According to everything, the same group of arguments may include crimes in Gradina. It is being said that the Serb side may try to take advantage of this favorable wind and present the entire world, and not only Tribunal, with indisputable evidence that the two Sarajevo massacres, in Vasa Miskin Street and the Markale market, were perpetrated with the knowledge and direction of the very top Muslim leadership.

One testimony that leaves no doubt that Alija Izetbegovic knew about the camps where mainly Serb civilians were imprisoned, tortured, and killed, and that he visited those camps, is that of Slavko Jovicic called Slavuj who spent 1,334 days — from 26 May 1992 to 19 January 1996 — in the Tarcin camp.

Jovicic was the inspector of the State Security Service and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina and, until his arrest, was chief of security of the Serb ministers and deputies in the then mixed parliament and government of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"I saw Alija Izetbegovic on several occasions while I was a prisoner in the Tarcin camp. The first time was on April 1996 [as published]. He left Sarajevo through a tunnel and then was transferred by car to the heliport in Tarcin that we, the camp inmates, had built. From there, he was taken by helicopter to Split airport.

"On such occasions, when Izetbegovic came to Tarcin, we were kept at a safe distance from him. However, even from the 30 to 50 meters from the silo in which we were kept to the heliport — that is, the building of the camp military command — we could see him. It was always easy for me to recognize him because I knew him and his escorts personally. Izetbegovic also knew me and even knew my nickname, Slavuj.

Human shield for Muslims

"True, I did not meet Izetbegovic in the camp, but two of his escorts came to visit me. Then, I felt a hope that I may be relased. Those involved were Fadil Pekic and Akir Susic, with whom I had worked in the former State Security Service of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. They were part of Izebegovic's escort when he visited the camp building and the military command in the Tarcin region. When they came into my cell, I asked them why they had come to Tarcin. "We are here with the president," they answered. I do not believe that they could walk away from Izetbegovic without his consent and without his knowing where they were. As I have already said, the command building was no more than about 30 meters away from the silo. Pekic and Sisic were well armed and clad in camoflage police uniforms. They greated me and one of them gave me two "Marlboro" cigarettes, telling me that they got into the silo in order to see me. We talked for about 10 minutes," Slavko Jovicic said.

The Serbs will try to persuade The Hague Tribunal that the Serb prisoners of the Tarcin silo were not military prisoners, but civilians who were taken from their homes to serve as hostages or human shields in Muslim attacks against Serb trenches. This is confirmed by the second part of Slavuj's statement.

"I can confirm my statement that Izetbegovic knew what was happening in the camp by recounting what was happening in 1994. At the beginning of the year or, to be more precise, on 25 January, one of Alija's most confidential officers, Nedzad Ajnadzic, then head of the military security of the Muslim army and now the commander of the 1st Army Corps and a brigade general, came to the silos at the command of General Rasim Delic. When he came to our cell, he said the following: 'Gentlemen, I can kill you all now. However, I am not going to do so, as you have to be exchanged for 187 Muslims from Hadzici. Otherwise, I am not interested in you Chetniks as people.' Then he asked: 'Which of you is Slavko Jovicic?' When I answered, Ajnadzic said: 'There is no Karadzic to warn you now. Have no hope of leaving this place alive.' He came back again after a month.

"When we believed that the worst had passed, at the beginning of 1995, about 30 Serbs from the silo were taken to Sarajevo. They thought that they would be exchanged, but in fact they were used as human shields and to dig trenches between the Muslim and Serb positions. These poor people went through real hell. Just imagine what they did to them. They usually tied their hands with a 120-meter-long rope and, at the same time, put dynamite in their hands. Then they were forced to walk toward Serb positions to where a trench had already been dug and throw the explosives into the Serb trench. Having seen what the Muslims were doing to our people, the Serb fighters did not want to shoot at them. They even withdrew and left food and weapons.

"When the Muslims took the first and threatened the second defense lines in Sarajevo in that way, the Serbs had to respond with fire. Several of our people lost their legs and camp inmate Dane Cica was killed by a Serb bullet. It was so horrible that even the Muslim guards cried, saying: 'We are very sorry, but if this is not done, Alija will kill us all.'"

Witness From Konjic

When Alija Izetbegovic's file is compiled, one will not be able to avoid the testimony of S.L., a doctor from Konjic. When she got to freedom, she wrote the following, among other things, for the Serb investigators:

"....Alija Izetbegovic often came to Konjic. The håste of the police security when he came could also be felt in the organization I worked in. Even I, as a Serb, knew that Alija Izetbegovic was coming to Zejnel Delalic's staff, a house in front of the motel. Izetbegovic used to come to Konjic almost every tenth day during 1992 and 1993. He came on the second day after Bradina fell, and I heard that it was by his order that all Serb houses that had not been burned during the place's occupation were to be burned down then. A Muslim, B.S., said in my presence that he had heard Alija Izetbegovic say that he had visited concentration camps for the Serbs in Celebici and Konjic and that he had personally ordered the prison guards to be merciless to the Serbs. The guards in these camps often used to come to the building I worked in, and Alija was the name they mentioned in every other sentence."

The story told by this Serb woman, who is a possible witness for The Hague, is also confirmed by Croatian intelligence sources whose report seems to be meant for Richard Goldstone and has unintentionally, or perhaps deliberately, fallen into Serb hands (we have translated it from the new Croatian language). The unexpected Croatian help and attentiveness is not difficult to explain when one knows that the Croats have given up any competitiveness with the Muslims in proving whose is the merit for having the percentage of Serbs in Konjic Municipality reduced from 18 percent to a mere 0.5 percent.

"The first visit by Alija Izetbegovic to Konjic Municipality took place immediately following the fall of Bradina, on 29 to 30 May 1992. He spent that time in the house of Zejnel Delalic, which is situated below a motel in Konjic. After stopping over in Zejnel Delalic's house, Alija Izetbegovic went to a meeting in the Zvonimir Belisa Elementary School at Musala and then to the Social Hall...."

The extent to which the Croats followed every step that Alija Izetbegovic made can seen from the following sentence in the report: "Alija Izetbegovic arrived in Konjic from the direction of Djusina, that is, Klis."

The Croat report become even more interesting further on:

"At the end of his first stay in Konjic, Izetbegovic went to Bradina. With him went Jasmin Guska, Sefko Niksic, Rele Mujanovic, a certain Duracic, and Fadil Spiljak.... After that, Jasmin Guska ordered the torching of the Serb houses in Bradina....

"Alija Izetbegovic visited Konjic for the second time in the middle of July 1992 after Bradina was totally burned down. On that occasion, he apparently visited the Igman factory in the hills around Konjic that was being relocated to Zenica at that time. He spent a full 15 days in a kind of residence of his within this military facility that had been built for the General Staff of the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]. It was then that he also visited the Celebici camp...."

There is no doubt that the Croats were well informed about what was happening in the camps of Celebici and Musala in Konjic. Particularly when it is known that their man, Zdravko Mucic Pavo, commanded one of the camps for some time.

This is what the said report says about that:

"In July 1992, camp commander Zdravko Mucic Pavo banned visits by the relatives of the imprisoned Serbs, with the explanation that the Celebici camp would be visited by President Alija Izetbegovic on that day.... In the talks with the Celebici camp inmates, we learned that Bosnia-Herzegovina President Alija Izetbegovic visited this camp at least twice: once in the summer of 1992 and the second time in the autumn of the same year. On the occasion of one of these visits, ammunition for Visoko was loaded. On that occasion, Alija Izetbegovic visited Tunnel 9, in which a number of inmates were put, most of whom went abroad after they were released. One could hear from them that Alija Izetbegovic went among the group of inmates who worked at loading ammunition...."

At the end of the report, it says:

"....Jovan Divjak, prominent military official of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, frequently visited the Celebici camp...." [passage omitted]

B-H: EU Warns Cash 'Crisis' Threatening Peace Accord

AU2002161396 Paris AFP in English 1430 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, Feb 20 (AFP) — The failure of the United States and Japan to release funds promised for emergency reconstruction in Bosnia is preventing vital repairs to schools and hospitals and other urgent tasks from being carried out, EU sources said Tuesday [20 February].

"We are beginning now to suffer from a lack of money," an EU official involved in the coordination of the reconstruction effort said, warning that the Dayton peace accord would be jeopordised if the situation was not swiftly rectified.

Although more than $700 million has been pledged by international donors to fund urgent reconstruction work in the first three months of 1996, only $62.5 million has actually been made available more than half-way through the period.

All of this money has been provided by the European Commission, which is growing increasingly impatient with Japan, the United States and the wealthy Islamic states of the Gulf for failing to deliver on their commitments.

The World Bank has not been able to release a pledged $150 million, while the question of Bosnia's share of liability for the former Yugoslavia's debts was still unresolved. This has encouraged other donors to hold off, EU officials believe.

The crisis over the emergency reconstruction package has cast doubt on whether the international community will be able to raise the estimated $5 billion needed to rebuild Bosnia over the longer term.

A ministerial-level donors conference intended to share out this bill has been provisionally scheduled for mid-April but therere now doubts about whether it will go ahead.

Croatia: UNTAES Head on Reconstruction of Srem-Baranja

LD1602212396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1949 GMT 16 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vukovar, Feb. 16 (TANJUG)—Transitional U.N. Administrator of the Srem-Baranja Region Jacques Klein said here Friday that the international force would protect the lives and property of people and work on the return of refugees and the region's reconstruction.

U.S. diplomat Klein said reconstruction was a key to the success of the international operation in the crisis region, which lies between Croatia and the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro.

He said sizable amounts of money were waiting to be invested in the city of Vukovar and elsewhere in the region, which comprises parts of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and West Srem.

Klein said during his visit to Vukovar, where his headquarters will be based, that the region's reconstruction would start the minute the process of demilitarization was over.

The transitional adminitsrator of the Srem-Baranja region was, however, unable to say precisely when the demilitarization would begin.

He said he had met with international bankers in Brussels recently and the money was practically on the table, as he put it.

Klein said he did not see any reason why Serbia's, Croatia's and Hungary's borders towards the region should not be opened in a year's time, with trade flourishing and a free circulation of people and ideas.

The U.S. diplomat said the international force (UNTAES) [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] would comprise about 5,000 troops, which would monitor the implementation of the peace accord signed in November last year by representatives of Croatia's Government and the Srem-Baranja Serbs.

He said it was extremely important in his opinion that he had received support for his mission from Presidents Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, who he said wanted very much to see the operation succeed.

Head of the Srem-Baranja Delegation to the talks with Croatia Milan Milanovic, who met with Klein, said afterwards that he had received assurances that the U.N. administration would be absolutely unbiased.

Croatia: E. Slavonia Commander Discusses Security

LD2102001096 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2225 GMT 20 Feb 96

[Rebroadcast of item from an unidentified Eastern Slavonia Serb TV station; logo invisible—from the "Picture versus Picture" program]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Correspondent Boro Rkman] Milan Milanovic, chief of the negotiating team for Srem-Baranja region, has said at a public roundtable held in Ilok that there will be no Croatian policemen but only UNTAES (UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia) and Serb police in the mixed police patrols which will be patrolling the territory of Srem-Baranja region. Milanovic added that Serb policemen will wear UNTAES insignia on one sleeve of their uniform and the traditional Serb police insignia on the other.

At the roundtable organized under the title "Status and problems of Serbs in Srem-Baranja region," Major General Dusan Loncar, commander of the Slavonia-Baranja corps, spoke in addition to Milanovic. General Loncar's exposition referred to the demilitarization of the region. Representatives of the authorities who had bilateral contacts and talks with the representatives of diplomatic corps of different countries had noted several conditions under which the demilitarization could be carried out.

[begin recording] [Loncar] First, the corps must be fully operational to perform its tasks until General Klein, the UN ambassador for this area, publicly addresses our people through all the media in this area, and through two TV stations, saying that he has assumed full responsibility for the security and safety of this area. The same should be done by Butrus-Ghali and the UN Security Council. The 30-day demilitarization deadline will be counted from that day.

The second thing on which we have insisted and which we have achieved is that nobody can disarm us—we will start disarming on a voluntary basis.

Third, whatever shape or form the demilitarization takes, I do not wish to reveal all details because some may be secret, that will not threaten the combat formation of our corps. [end recording]

[Rkman] The demilitarization will most probably begin in May. UNTAES Command has already asked the corps to add some of its units to UNTAES with a view to providing logistic support; this means, General Loncar said, that even after the demilitarization the Corps will continue to exist.

Speaking about essential questions of the future of refugees who have been accommodated in great numbers in Croatian houses in Ilok, the head of the Srem-Baranja region negotiating team, Milan Milanovic, said—quoting a statement by Jacques Klein—that there is no chance that Serbs will be evicted from those houses until new accommodation or fair compensation for their lost property is secured. [passage omitted]

Croatia: TANJUG Reports Tudjman's Return to Zagreb

LD1802175396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1646 GMT 18 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Feb 18 (TANJUG)—Croatian President Franjo Tudjman said in Zagreb on Sunday that the Rome Summit on Bosnia had made headway in surmounting obstacles to the implementation of the Dayton peace accord.

Tudjman was speaking at Zagreb airport on his return from the Rome meeting of the signatories to the peace accord that was negotiated at Dayton, Ohio, U.S.A., in November 1995, and signed in Paris the following December.

This was a step forward in dealing with differences and crisis situations created by certain European circles in an attempt to compromise the Dayton accord and the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia, he said.

The Bosnian Croats and the Tudjman government were at the receiving end of international mediators' criticism for rejecting a European plan for organising the southern Bosnian city of Mostar, divided between Muslims and Croats after their year-long war.

The European Union's Administrator of Mostar Hans Koschnick, refusing to recognise divisions made in war, has recommended that the city be organised into three Muslim and Croat districts each and a common central district.

The Bosnian Croats and the Zagreb regime have never made any bones about their aspiration to make Mostar the centre of the Croat ethnic community in Bosnia.

Croatia: Opposition Leaders Reject Tudjman Accusations

LD2002201796 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Chairmen of seven opposition parties today sent an open letter to the president of the republic in which they polemically examine the president's letter sent to them on 15 February in reply to their previous letter in connection with the Zagreb assembly crisis.

The parties have rejected the accusation that their representatives are doing everything to win over international circles for discrediting, destabilizing, and ousting the democratically elected authorities of independent and sovereign Croatia. For them this amounts to a blanket and unfounded assessment against the entire opposition block.

However, the opposition parties in their letter mostly ask questions and fail to reply to the president's political analysis in reply to their open letter dated 1 February.

FYROM: PDP Leader Says Ethnic 'Gap' Deepens

AU2002125196 Skopje PULS in Macedonian 16 Feb 96 pp 7-10

[Interview with Abdurahman Aliti, president of the Party for Democratic Prosperity, by Sinisa Stankovic and Vladimir Jovanovski; place and date not given: "We Do Not Profit From the Rift"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [PULS] How do you assess President Gligorov's recent addresses to the Macedonian public in connection with the announced reconstruction of Prime Minister Crvenkovski's cabinet?

[Aliti] The PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] has already presented its views in connection with the past and the present events within the framework of the Alliance for Macedonia. I can freely conclude that our views fully coincide with the views of the president who presented them in his first public address and, if I may say so, in his second explanation. We believe that the reconstructed government has to be composed of the same participants, but the rift in the Alliance for Macedonia opens additional questions to which it is not possible to give answers at the moment.

[PULS] You believe that the Alliance for Macedonia still exists.

[Aliti] Not any more, because it is obvious that the future government will be composed without one of the participants in the Alliance for Macedonia. In practical terms, the Alliance will not exist if the Liberals are not there. The second address that the president gave, in my opinion, arose from his wish to give additional explanations to the events around and within the Alliance and I think that he made it clear when he said that he would perform his previous presidential duties without changing direction, that is, that he would act as president of all the citizens in the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. So, I do not see reasons for any changes in President Gligorov's general course, and as far as the future work of the government is concerned, we will have to wait before giving any assessments, because here some changes in the agreement of the parties that joined the same political bloc—the Alliance for Macedonia—may be possible.

[PULS] From the aspect of your view that all party members should participate in the present as well as in the new government, do you believe that the newly reconstructed government will have the PDP's support if the Liberals are exempted?

[Aliti] We have discussed this issue in the PDP presidency and we came with the view that we will continue to participate in the executive power. There had been some other ideas suggesting that we should reexamine our view as far as the other participants are concerned—that is whether we should associate our participation or nonparticipation with another participant. The prevailing view was that we are not in a position to make our participation conditional upon other events also because we do not have reliable information about the real disputes between the SSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] and the LP [Liberal Party]. I might say that I am not convinced that the publicized disputes between the two sides are in fact the real reason for the rift. I believe that some other problems are at stake, but since we do not have proper information, we do not want to make any deep analyses. Our conclusion is that it is their own dispute and that it is improper for us to interfere in their relations. We had grounds to suspect that it is inappropriate for us to form a view on the basis of scant information.

[PULS] Have you had recent contacts with the Liberal Party, knowing that you had contacts with President Gligorov and Prime Minister Crvenkovski?

[Aliti] We announced our party's stance that the participation of the liberals in government is necessary before Gligorov's public address. (Even before the rift in the Alliance for Macedonia I discussed with the prime minister, who mentioned the reconstruction of the government, and I asked him whether the government could be "refreshed" with more Albanians, because this was the PDP presidency's stance. He agreed with our intention.) However, I must be honest and admit that I had not expected Crvenkovski to make this move, even after the disputes between the two parties had become public. For me, this was a new quality in mutual communication, because I believe that the problems could be solved through personal contacts. We had discussions with Assembly Chairman Stojan Andov and we presented him with our views. My impression was that Mr. Andov did not disapprove of them. I also wanted to inquire about Gligorov's stance and I explained to him our views before he made his public address, and this coincided with what he stated in public later on.

[PULS] In a way, you gave the president support for his further address.

[Aliti] It is true, although I repeat that we had the discussions upon my initiative. In another informal discussion with the prime minister I told him about my discussions with the president. I asked him whether he had done the same, and he replied positively. It was my duty to clarify our stances on this issue, and I did so. Normally, we cannot be arbitrators in the relations of the coalition partners who make one political bloc and, as far as we are concerned, they have identical views about our requests.

[PULS] Nevertheless, you supported the presence of the Liberals in the government. Knowing that the views of the Liberals in relation to your requests have often been more rigid than the views of the SDSM, your announcement came as a surprise.

[Aliti] I can partly agree with your conclusion. If we analyze the attitudes of the LP representatives in government, it is true that they have been more rigid in some instances. However, this is not sufficient for reaching a final view, because the truth is that the views of the SDSM and the LP regarding our requests are identical and the only difference is the way in which they utter their disapproval. It has to do with subtlety, euphemism, or crudeness. I would particularly like to emphasize that our announcement was not pro or contra anybody. The PDP's position is that it cannot advocate cooperation or alliance with only one party. We cannot and we must not say that if the DP [Democratic Party] or VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] win the elections, we will not cooperate with them.

[PULS] Is it because the PDP is the most important political representative of the Albanians in Macedonia?

[Aliti] Yes, and I hope that it is a lasting determination of the Albanians and the Macedonians that the Albanians must take part in the authority. I believe that the authority in Macedonia must consist of a real participation of the Albanians, that it will not be formal, as is some people's desire. I speak of a participation that will be respected, as a condition for the functioning of all the authorities, not only the executive.

From this position I told the president and the prime minister that if the SDSM's announcement is analyzed, the conclusion will be that the SDSM program was also a basis for the Alliance for Macedonia [SZM] program, on which grounds the elections were won and the president elected. I believe that such a formulation was totally inappropriate because the syllogism leads to a conclusion that the program of the SDSM is identical to the one of the SZM and that the election program of the SDSM actually represents Gligorov's platform. So, as a participant in the government coalition, the PDP should support the SZM platform, which is totally wrong. This was a further reason for us to think that these issues should not be opened now. If they are opened, it should be said that the election platform of the SZM was a compilation of the platforms and programs of the parties that composed the Alliance, and the government's program is partly also based on the PDP's platform.

[PULS] Could you now find the PDP's place among the Albanian voters, particularly after Arben Dzaferi's letter to Stojan Andov in which he accused you of being irresponsible by participating in the government?

[Aliti] In general, I refuse to comment on views that have been expressed in closed or open letters, because it is not my duty. The PDP is fortunate because it has abandoned the practice of writing similar open letters. Today we are no longer presenting the party's views in letters because we have the possibility of stating them in parliament and government, and the Macedonian public has the possibility of being informed. Assessments like irresponsibility and narrow minds are personal views and I am not interested in them. I can respect them as views, but I do not have any comments.

[PULS] What is your view about the possible transition of the Liberals in parliamentarian opposition?

[Aliti] This can be analyzed from different aspects. Some believe that the dispute between the SDSM and the LP has been artificially created and that it is based on the absence of opposition in parliament.

[PULS] Is it because of the foreign political assessments?

[Aliti] Yes, mostly because of foreign remarks that the parliament is nearly one-party, that only some minor parties oppose it but without any influence on the total activities of the parliament. This is why some believe that the Alliance for Macedonia was in need of creating a conflict that would appear real in order to cover up a big failure in the present parliament.

[PULS] Do you personally share this opinion?

[Aliti] I will be completely honest with you because this is the only way in which I can discuss this: When the SZM won the elections, we in the party believed that an opposition bloc would be formed in parliament for the sake of balance. We were probably naive to believe this. Now it seems that it was not an invented, but a real conflict.

[PULS] Let us view the real influence on the development of democracy in Macedonia in case the liberals go into opposition and new coalitions are formed.

[Aliti] From a purely theoretical aspect, the opposition is something that every parliament needs. A parliament with a strong opposition makes the government more responsible because of the fear that someone might reveal its weaknesses and possible manipulations. It makes the whole situation more mobile and the approach is more democratic. If the liberals pass over to a constructive opposition, there will not be any possibilities for accusations like the parliament is "one-party," but there will be possibilities for other developments. The nonparliamentary opposition bloc may be reinforced with the liberals, which will result in a movement for possible early elections or for various critical situations and the tension in the political ambience in Macedonia will rise. However, new changes are also possible in relations between those in power and the opposition.

[PULS] What are the PDP's views on the possible confidence vote for Assembly Chairman Stojan Andov?

[Aliti] We do not think that it is necessary and we will oppose any such ideas. However, if this is done, we will vote against, not for Stojan Andov's sake, but because we believe in principles. It is politically primitive to believe that if the LP goes into opposition Andov cannot act as Assembly chairman. There are no rational arguments for such a request. Developed democratic countries usually choose the assembly chairman from the ranks of the parliamentary minority in order to maintain balance. Regardless of the fact that our assembly chairman is at a higher level than a spokesman in an ordinary parliament, I believe that if a confidence vote is demanded, it will not have a successful outcome.

[PULS] Do you agree with the assessment that the PDP is profiting most from the recent political events in Macedonia?

[Aliti] Not at all. An objective analysis in the political situation in Macedonia will certainly deduce that the present participation of the Albanians in the executive power is bearable.

[PULS] Bearable for whom?

[Aliti] Bearable for the Albanians, but it should also be bearable for the Macedonians. Out of the 20 ministers in government, five are Albanians, which makes a quarter....

[PULS] What can be considered as a gift to your members of parliament? [Aliti] We participate in the government as the Party for Democratic Prosperity and all the foreign observers know that Albanians participate in the Macedonian Government. The foreign observers do not care about the name of the political entity that represents the views of the Albanians in the executive power, all they care for is their actual presence there. Now, if we played the game by the common rules in the democratic world, I am convinced that we would not have five ministers knowing the election results. However, since the Macedonian Government is legitimate in the world because of this component of democracy, then the number of Albanians in government is at the minimum acceptable. Unfortunately, some representatives of the Macedonian political parties believe that the presence of Albanians in political life should be just formal.

From this aspect, our Albanian opponents may be right when they attack us by saying that our participation in the government is just a formality, that the Albanian ministers are there only to give Macedonia legitimacy in the eyes of the world, and they even claim that the Albanian ministers are nothing but decoration, that the PDP is in no way present in the program of the government.... There is some truth in all this, but the PDP's present view is that our participation in the government is the only possibility for constructing bridges of mutual confidence, which we used to have, but which we demolished, and now we are not engaged in constructing new ones. We would really like to construct such bridges, not for the sake of making personal or group careers, but because it is true that only this can promote the quality of life and remove tension.

[PULS] Are you aware of your new role in Macedonia's political life? Perhaps your role is of the greatest importance in avoiding (or not) a government or parliamentary crisis.

[Aliti] I do not wish to answer hypothetical questions. I am not sure that we have the power to contribute to early elections or a government crisis. If there are no PDP members in government, there will be Albanians from other parties—it is no secret that other political parties of Albanians had offered their participation. On the other hand, even if we join the new opposition, there will not be conditions for early elections.

[PULS] Does this mean that you are not in favor of new elections? Do you believe that this is not the right time for elections or do you think that the PDP may come out of such elections as a loser?

[Aliti] Honestly speaking, we have not made such analyses, but if there are conditions for new elections, we will analyze this possibility, but I assure you that we will not be preoccupied with the number of our members in parliament. Political parties exist and they are either in power or opposition.

[PULS] Have you thought over the PDP's position if a new Macedonian-Albanian opposition bloc appears?

[Aliti] Such groupings are always possible in policy, and I find this natural. The other Albanian political bloc sometimes accuses us of being leftist, we consider ourselves to be centrist, although we often go for "walks" sometimes to the "left," other times to the "right," but with the passing of time, the political parties will have to be profiled, although in practice and theory there are not such definite patterns. If the possible new Macedonian-Albanians are in opposition.

[PULS] Have you ever tried to win some of the sectors in government that are of importance for your party, or do you think that you are mainly "given" second or third-ranking sectors?

[Aliti] We in Macedonia, and I here refer to all of us living in Macedonia, whether we like to admit it or not, are unfortunately burdened by the past and the present. Both my own and your generations are burdened. I dare say that this is present with all of us because the barriers have not been demolished and it is my impression that today we are not doing anything to tear them down. Just imagine an Albanian as Macedonian foreign minister. I am almost sure that this time the prime minister had the opportunity to nominate a respectable person for foreign minister. Such a person was mentioned—Mr. Srdzan Kerim. He is not an Albanian, but this time the prime minister had the chance to choose a non-Macedonian. I do not wish to emphasize national feelings, but I now speculate in saying that he was not in contention because of his surname. We would probably hear it said that Macedonian Foreign Minister Srdzan Kerim is unbefitting.

[PULS] Are we so much burdened by looking through ethnic glasses?

[Aliti] I am speaking about our common spirit. It is another question whether we want to admit this or not. Perhaps you privately share my opinion, but it is more profitable to declare yourself as really democratic and altruistic.

[PULS] Thank you, thank you.

[Aliti] This is possible. I do not wish to offend anybody. Just imagine: Abdurahman Aliti, minister of the interior. The reaction will be as follows: Who is going to save the country if we have an Albanian minister of the interior?

[PULS] If we take this logic as granted, why are there no reactions to the fact that we have an Albanian minister of science? Your thesis "leaks," do you not agree?

[Aliti] I do not defend this logic, but I claim that it exists, mostly among the politicians. I do not believe that the people have prejudices. With the aim of covering up our own prejudices, we speak on behalf of the people, without consulting it. Your remark that we accept second- or third-ranking sectors in the government is right, but we believe that in such a way we demonstrate our goodwill for cooperation, hoping that the present prejudices will be either moderated or eliminated. This is a kind of direct concession.

[PULS] Does this mean that you are satisfied with the prime minister's proposal, by which you get an additional place in government?

[Aliti] This additional place is a question of sympathy, because these places remained and they were "brotherly." It is another question whether we are satisfied or not. I am convinced that there is not a mandator who can form a good government, because this has always been the case. The problem is to create a cabinet that will be less bad.

[PULS] Have you tried to get the ministry of education?

[Aliti] I would not like to go into detail, but we had to offer a person that is of authority in the educational sphere in Macedonia. After we had seen the mandator's attitude toward this issue, we did not insist on it.

[PULS] It seems that the most shocking PDP proposal, and an even greater shock that the prime minister accepted it, was to appoint Mersim Polozani as deputy minister of justice. How is it possible for a person who advocated the idea of "Ilirida" [name associated with Great Albanian aspirations for annexation of parts of Macedonia and Kosovo to Albania] to become such an important official in the ministry of justice? How much substance is there in this proposal of yours?

[Aliti] I have also heard how famous this question is becoming. This proposal was accepted by the party's presidency with consensus. Polozani is an intelligent lawyer who has at some times reacted impulsively and emotionally, but with the passing of time, he became very rational in presenting his views, particularly after acquiring experience as a member of parliament. He is a serious person who is ready to cooperate.

[PULS] He is ready to cooperate?

[Aliti] Absolutely, and he is also a person with manners, and, from this point of view, I am firmly convinced that he will be of benefit and that he will manage to cooperate with all. I can assure you that those who now criticize Polozani will change their opinion in two to three months.

[PULS] Recently, the PDP has announced a possibility for abandoning the system. You are now present in parliament and government. Has the authority changed its attitude toward the PDP's requests, or have your requests been changed? Can you imagine the effect on PDP's rating among your voters because of your participation in the reconstructed government?

[Aliti] I really do not know whether our rating will increase or not because of our participation in the government. The reason is because we are not able to organize an opinion poll and we have to trust the analyses that are made by competent institutions and we are satisfied with their "approximate" findings. I hate to comment on assumptions, but the assumptions are that we are the party that is getting the greater number of votes because our platform says that our goal is to participate in the authority, to cooperate with the Macedonian political parties in the government, and to fulfill a number of our political determinations in the institutions of the system. So, if some think that by participating in the reconstructed government we have let down our voters—this is wrong. It does not have to do with an election of a new government, but with the reconstruction of the old one.

It is good to hope that there will be a change in the authority's attitude toward the PDP's requests for the use of the Albanian language, but, sincerely speaking, I am not a big optimist and I do not believe that there will be any radical changes. The Macedonian political parties can claim consensus only on issues that are related to the Albanian requests. Everything remains within the limits of some restricted rights that are granted to someone. This can be applied to all political parties, starting with the VMRO-DPMNE, DP, LP, and SDSM. Our general views and pledges in education and use of the language have not been changed and it is impossible to expect us to make any such changes. These pledges are civilizatory and generally acceptable; they are not exclusive rights. Is the national identity of the Macedonians or the territorial integrity endangered by a university in Albanian? We are very cautious here and this is a question that is present with all communities, and therefore, among the Albanians as well.

[PULS] Is the question of making the Albanians a constitutive nation on the same level and what European references can you make in this sphere?

[Aliti] I have often answered this question in public. In Macedonia we have a number of constant resolves, and these are listed in our proposal for the change of the Constitution that we have submitted to the President and in our attempt to offer parliament a declaration on equality of the Albanians. In policy it is possible to make priority lists. The question of the Albanians' education is of priority for the PDP, and Macedonia will not lose anything, on the contrary.

[PULS] The question of education is and will continue to be a subject of discussion, but all the Macedonian political parties are unanimous in refusing any discussion on making the Albanians a constitutional nation. Where do you see a way out of this vicious circle?

[Aliti] We are discussing the bypassing of the present situation by advocating education and language use as priorities and conditions for our participation in parliament and government. We have never made our participation in the system conditional upon the status of the Albanians. If we analyze the objections to a university in Albanian, all arguments will clearly be seen to be political. The political view was afterward transformed into a law, which closes doors and perspectives for the Albanians.

Foreign observers are often told that the Albanians are separating themselves in the elementary and secondary schools because they are studying in the Albanian language and that this should not be repeated at university level, because if there is no point of integration, the Albanians will end up in ghettos. This argument is groundless and I will ask those who believe it to try and find new "arguments": First, only an uneducated person runs the risk of ending up in a ghetto. Second, there are many "analysts" who would solve the problem of Albanians' education by sending them to schools in Kosovo and Albania. In which language would they study there? Will they not end up in ghettos? And what is the logic in allowing such ghettos with the only difference being that the Albanians will not be educated in Macedonia, but abroad.

[PULS] How do you explain the metamorphosis in formerly liberal minds, who at one time looked favorably on the rights of the national minorities and who have suddenly started to advocate rigid views on the same question?

[Aliti] I hope that you are not asking me to mention names here. I know many people who are engaged in science and publishing and whose views had been acceptable for us from a scientific point of view. However, the moment they adhered to policy, you could not recognize their views anymore. It is not a pragmatic but a psychological question. There will always be someone who will tell them "if concessions are continually given to the Albanians, we will lose the state." Here lies the fear that liberal thinking will make them lose their state.

[PULS] This fear is certainly based on mistrust of the other side's honest intentions.

[Aliti] Yes, this is exactly what I had in mind. There is always this big fear, particularly because our day-to-day life is constantly burdened with new metaphysical components. The gap is daily deepened and normal communication becomes impossible. Thus, we meet a rigid attitude toward clearly conceptualized requests that do not offend anybody's feelings.

[PULS] What is your attitude regarding the role of the Albanians in Macedonia toward the development of relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Albania and how much can future relations depend on the forthcoming elections in Albania? What are your visions about the future development of relations with the northern neighbor, generally regarding Kosovo?

[Aliti] The Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Albania have a common interest in promoting the level of mutual relations for many reasons, among others because they both wish to become a part of Europe. The economy directs them to closer cooperation, and the existence of Albanians in Macedonia and Macedonians in Albania normally requires greater openness from both countries. Democratic processes must be developed in the two countries in transition and there are no historic or other reasons for not developing a fruitful and overall cooperation. I personally believe that a possible change of power in Albania will not affect relations with Macedonia because the Albanian opposition parties are constantly pointing to the need for good-neighborly relations with Macedonia.

The PDP's stance on relations with the FRY coincides with the official stance of the state, which advocates further development of relations immediately after mutual recognition, and we hope that the situation of the Albanians in Kosovo will soon be changed.

Poland: NATO Secretary General on Expansion, Russia

WS2002142196 Poznan WPROST in Polish 18 Feb 96 p 59

[Interview with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana by Andrzej Szoszkiewicz in Brussels; date not given: "Pass to Brussels"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Szoszkiewicz] On his return from Brussels, President Aleksander Kwasniewski stressed that he found in you a true friend supporting our NATO membership. What does this mean in practical terms?

[Solana] I think we understood each other very well. I know President Kwasniewski not only from his political activity. We both dealt with sports in the past—he was responsible for physical education on behalf of the government, I was in charge of preparations for the 1992 Olympics. Our most recent meeting in Brussels provided an opportunity to exchange opinions. We spent several hours talking, partly eye to eye, partly in the company of ambassadors of NATO member states. The president made a very good impression on everyone.

[Szoszkiewicz] Yet not everyone warmly greeted the Polish president's remark that NATO will begin to reform only after it accepts the first state of the former Warsaw Pact as its member.

[Solana] Kwasniewski made that remark during a meeting with the Council of Ambassadors of the 16 member states. That statement was obvious to me. I have no doubt that, once our alliance accepts states from the former Eastern bloc, it will undergo radical changes. Former foes may now become friends. They are pursuing a common target within one political and military structure. We already have a concrete example of that cooperation within IFOR [Implementation Force]. Soldiers from states that stood on opposite sides are now bringing peace to Bosnia arm in arm.

[Szoszkiewicz] Did President Kwasniewski assure you during his Brussels visit that Poland can afford to join NATO?

[Solana] We did not discuss finances at the time. Rather, we rather talked about the general political aspects of Poland's joining NATO. Financial issues, however, are an unavoidable element of the discussion that lies ahead. You have to answer the question of whether you can afford to join NATO yourselves. You still have some time. All through 1996, bilateral talks are to be held. They will decide how the adaptation process will proceed and how much it will cost. This year we have to get to know each other better and exchange our views on the future of NATO. At the NATO summit scheduled for December, we will decide what steps are to be taken next. The NATO Council will then present its opinion on the possibility of admitting new members.

[Szoszkiewicz] Will the presidential elections that are to take place in Russia and the United States this year cause this schedule to be postponed?

[Solana] All elections have an element of the unknown. I can only hope that their results will be positive for the process we are discussing. Most of all, we do not want them to impair our relations with Russia. We also want Russia to proceed with the reforms—economic and political—that it launched a few years ago.

[Szoszkiewicz] How far do you think the Polish Armed Forces are prepared to cooperate with NATO?

[Solana] Military cooperation is strengthening. Poland is taking part in the Partnership for Peace program, which gives us an opportunity of getting to know each other better during exercises at testing grounds. The participation of the Polish troops in IFOR will be extremely important. Both Partnership for Peace and the Bosnia operation will help Poland find an answer to the question of how contemporary armed forces should work.

[Szoszkiewicz] One obstacle in the way to NATO's eastward expansion may be the high costs of the operation. NATO members, operating on stringent budgets themselves, do not want to hear of any additional expenses—for example, related to accepting new members.

[Solana] NATO has already decided it will expand. Now the time has come to discuss details, including financial issues. It is certain, however, that new member states will have to make a contribution.

[Szoszkiewicz] Can Russia's firm protest put off the decision of accepting new members?

[Solana] We are trying to coalesce the process of expanding the alliance while retaining good relations with Russia. I think we can succeed in both. This is very important for European security. NATO must not only expand, but must also reform if it is to meet the new challenges. At the same time, we must try to maintain the best possible relations with Russia because it is a crucial state for security in Europe. That is why NATO and Russia must cooperate.

Poland: Rosati: German Stand on NATO Expansion Unchanged

LD2002160496 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1125 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 20 Feb (PAP)—According to Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati, the results of yesterday's meeting between German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Russian President Boris Yeltsin do not indicate a change in Germany's position on the issue of NATO expansion.

"In my opinion, both sides stood by their positions; I do not see any change in Germany's position," Rosati told journalists today.

Rosati pointed out that, with regard to the issue of NATO expansion, the stress is to be placed primarily on adjusting the technology and on "essential work." The decision on when Poland is accepted into NATO—because the decision whether this will happen is in fact a foregone conclusion—will be made by the NATO ministerial council in December of this year.

Poland: Presidential Aide on Foreign Policies

WS2102124596 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 16 Feb 96 pp 1-2

[Interview with Professor Wojciech Lamentowicz, under secretary of state at the Polish Presidential Chancellery and presidential aide on international issues, by Adam Stasinski; place and date not given: "We—NATO—Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Stasinski] You accompanied President Kwasniewski during his visits to Germany, France, and Belgium. What is the perception of Poland in the West today?

[Lamentowicz] These visits were, as our partners confirmed, an indisputable success. The president expressed his full readiness to perpetuate the pursuit of strategic targets in our foreign and defense policies, particularly integration with the EU and NATO. The speech delivered by the president before the NATO Ambassadors Council was particularly well received. It discussed, among other things, the advancement of our preparations for membership in West European structures. We heard many words of praise about the president and our country. Our Western partners are still very interested in having Poland join the EU and NATO. They confirmed the basic commitments they made toward us. There is no reason to fear that our neighbors' views might change.

[Stasinski] In the countless discussions of our integration with the euro-atlantic structures, the problem of regional defense policies keeps reappearing. How is Poland's cooperation with the Visegrad states, Ukraine, and the Baltic states proceeding?

[Lamentowicz] Both military and economic cooperation with the Visegrad states is proceeding very well. Much more, however, is going on within the Central European Free Trade Association. It has recently accepted a new member—Slovenia. The group is willing to accept more members. I believe this is the proper trend in trade and economic integration in our greater region. It does not contradict Polish aspirations to integrate with the EU. On the contrary, it brings that integration nearer if only because, by gradually eliminating customs barriers in trade with the particular states, we are preparing for similar activities within the broader structure of the EU.

As for Ukraine, I would like to remind you that it is carrying out a policy of so-called active neutrality. It does not openly support the idea of the enlargement of NATO to include the states of Central and East Europe, but neither does it firmly veto it. Part of the political elites would like to have well-developed cooperation with the alliance. In fact, we already cooperate to the benefit of security in Europe and Poland. The second dominating trend in the policies of our neighbor is leaning toward developing military and political cooperation with the CIS states. Poland is a very important economic partner for Ukraine. I think it is not in our interests alone that Ukraine be an independent, democratic state with a well-developed economy.

Our relations with the Baltic states are good. They are regulated institutionally and by treaties. Scandinavian countries advocate the presence of Baltic states in European security structures. I wish to mention that there is some tension in our relations with Lithuania due to the way the authorities treat the Polish minority there and unpleasant incidents with the Lithuanian minority in Poland. I believe all conflicts should be solved at the parliament, government, and self-government levels. This is also part of foreign policy.

Cooperation with Baltic states in the field of international security should be developed by, among other things, implementing the Partnership for Peace program.

[Stasinski] Preparations are under way for the Polish president's visit to Russia. What is your assessment of current relations with that state?

[Lamentowicz] From the strategic point of view, Russia, apart from Germany, is our most important partner. That is why good relations with Russia are tremendously significant for both our security and our position in Europe. In response to the veto to Poland's NATO membership, we should enter an ongoing dialogue with Russia on international security and persistently try to persuade our partner that Poland's aspirations are not targeted against Russian interests but are designed to enlarge the security zone, and that Russia can benefit as a result. One of the dilemmas of our security policy is how can we retain friendly, partnership relations with Russia while aspiring to join NATO. This is a problem that has to be solved by all Central European states and the Western partners who want Polish-Russian relations to be good. Richard Holbrooke confirmed this during his most recent visit to Warsaw. Neither the United States nor the states of West Europe will forfeit their deep belief that the alliance should be gradually enlarged, regardless of whether Russia changes its view. We will try to reach a compromise, but that compromise cannot imply that we give up our targets.

I wish to state at this point that Chancellor Kohl, in a conversation with President Kwasniewski, said that Germany and Russia would never hold talks on security that would be directed against our interests nor discuss these issues without informing Poland of the conclusions.

Several problems still remain to be solved in our relations with Russia, among them the uncompleted process of historical reconciliation. This involves symbolic compensation for Poles who were imprisoned in labor camps in the former USSR during the World War II and afterwards. We still have to settle the case of the Katyn murders. We need to reinstate contacts between the young people of our countries because they have deteriorated over the past years.

[Stasinski] As someone from outside the military, what do you think about the readiness of our Armed Forces for integration with NATO?

[Lamentowicz] Membership in the alliance requires members and candidates alike to observe certain conditions as to the structure of power and management of the Armed Forces. Poland is often blamed—and a recent report prepared for the U.S. Congress confirms this—that there is an overgrowth of high-ranking cadres in comparison with younger officers and servicemen. Such opinions should not be dismissed lightly.

There is another thing. During each Sejm debate on the budget of the Ministry of National Defense [MON], the question surfaces whether outlays on staffing are not growing too quickly and whether greater means should be allocated to purchases of arms and equipment, training and modernizing the Armed Forces. These problems should not be neglected. It is up to us to make these decisions. We must restructure our Armed Forces relatively swiftly. It is worthwhile to invest in training, including the civilian training of officer cadres, just as it is done in the West. The quality of that training will be decisive for the state's defense capability, as well as the so-called interoperationalism that provides for foreign language skills, a specific model of management and command, and cooperation between staffs and military units. Generally speaking, we must construe the MON budget so that more means could be invested in the young cadres who will decide about the future shape and development of the Polish Armed Forces.

[Stasinski] In 1990-92, you gave a series of lectures at the NATO Defense Academy in Rome. What are your memories of contacts with officers of the various NATO armies?

[Lamentowicz] That is a very specific academy. The full course lasts two semesters yet educates one-star generals and a small number of civilian personnel from defense ministries. Graduates land in high offices at the integrated structures of NATO. In my lectures I mainly discussed topics related to security in our part of Europe. I can immodestly say it was at this academy, in 1990, and later during a conference at NATO Headquarters that I presented a precursory suggestion that was "bought" too late. I proposed that once the Warsaw Pact was dissolved—and its end was nearing at the time—a system of bilateral agreements between NATO Headquarters and all member states of the Warsaw Pact be established. Had this been done in 1991 and not in 1994, the participation of Russia and other republics of the former USSR in the Partnership for Peace program would have been altogether different. I recall Russian Ambassador Afanasevskiy saying at NATO Headquarters in 1992 that his country wanted to be a part of NATO. The atmosphere and situation was entirely different back then. I often repeated during my lectures that, in strategic planning, the most important thing is to choose the proper time for taking action—timing is security [preceding phrase published in English]. It is important not only what you do, but also when you do it. I also had the opportunity of speaking to General Shalikashvili, who has supported the idea of expanding NATO to the East from the very start, naturally within a reasonable timetable. Today we are close to reaching our goal.

[Stasinski] Thank you for the interview.

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Wojciech Lamentowicz (born in 1946) is a professor and doctor of law, a graduate of Warsaw University, where he worked as a lecturing professor for many years. In 1976-81 he lectured at the Higher School of Social Sciences and the Diplomatic Service School. He is an author and coauthor of books and textbooks on the theory of state and law and international relations translated into foreign languages. He has published some 250 papers and books. He has also lectured abroad, mainly in the United States, Germany, Australia, and the Scandinavian countries. He is cofounder and director responsible for scientific research at the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences (1991-94). Since 1993 he has been a Sejm deputy and deputy chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission. Married, with two children.

Poland: Prime Minister Cimoszewicz Interviewed

WS2002152996 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish
17-18 Feb 96 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Polish Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz by Ewa Rosolak and Stanislaw Cwik; place and date not given: "I Want To But I Do Not Have To"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [TRYBUNA] You announced that there would be different relations with the coalition. What does this mean?

[Cimoszewicz] The current coalition is something special. It has been functioning for nearly two and a half years; that is the longest since 1989. Furthermore, if we ignore the special kind of coalition before 1989, then we must say that this is probably the longest-lasting coalition in the modern history of Poland.

There are a number of consequences of this situation: Some of them are good—because, as I see it, we are satisfied with the results yielded by the socioeconomic policies of the coalition cabinets; some of them are bad—because people are often bored with the same people, disputes, tugs-of-war.

Now, as far as new qualities are concerned, I would like my colleagues in the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] to think of me as a prime minister who is equally close to and equally far from both these parties. I would also like them to look upon me as a person who is guided by his own understanding of the interests of both the state and the efficiency of the government's actions.

[TRYBUNA] You probably realize that it is a difficult task to be such a "nonaligned" prime minister...

[Cimoszewicz] I certainly do. When I was forming my cabinet, I foresaw how difficult it might be, especially when I received offers that were against the intentions of both coalition parties. I think, however, that one can achieve a lot in this coalition if one uses rational arguments.

[TRYBUNA] A new style in relations with the opposition is to be one of the trademarks of this government and of yourself personally as prime minister. What exactly does the new style mean?

[Cimoszewicz] I tried to present this in my official Sejm speech. I believe that, recently, various groups and activists have come into conflict with one another; the conflicts were so acute that the politicians lost one of the elementary abilities that politicians should have: the ability to discuss things with each other. Now, even if your views are the same as they were before the talk, the talk was a good idea anyway. It allows you to become familiar with the stand taken by the other person; it allows you to grasp it. Of course, it takes two to achieve this; you must also be convinced that the state and people need a period of peace and stabilization.

[TRYBUNA] The platforms for agreement with the opposition, as proposed in the Sejm speech, were not received enthusiastically. [Freedom Union] Deputy Rokita was even rather spiteful.

[Cimoszewicz] However, an official statement also came from Deputy Geremek, who, on behalf of his party, if we ignore the way it was formulated, approved as many as eight main points of my Sejm speech. These issues happened to be exceptionally important from the point of view of the government. After adding a long list of critical remarks, the deputy ended his speech by giving assurances about a readiness to hold serious talks on foreign policy, security of the state and citizens, administrative reform, and a few other issues.

[TRYBUNA] Do you not disbelieve the sincerity of these assurances? After all, the previous governments also offered the opposition dialogue, but in practice nothing much seemed to result from that.

[Cimoszewicz] Indeed, the real situation may not change much here. However, there may be some psychological changes. We have gone so far in the heat of our conflicts that we are all dreaming of sobering up. Moreover, perhaps it will be easier for me than it was for my predecessors in office to launch various initiatives in this regard.

[TRYBUNA] More specifically, what should the cooperation with the opposition involve?

[Cimoszewicz] This cannot be determined by one side only. I believe that it is necessary to jointly seek various solutions. I have already had one useful experience. I offered to consult the chairmen of two parliamentary commissions on the content of some parts of my Sejm speech; both of them are opposition politicians. Even though I will keep the discussions secret, I can tell you that they were very calm and objective and that we easily reached an understanding. As far as I know, both of them saw traces of these talks in the speech I delivered later on in the Sejm.

[TRYBUNA] What about cooperation with the extra-parliamentary opposition?

[Cimoszewicz] That depends on the attitude this part of the opposition assumes. I am prepared to propose a serious talk to various trade unions in which they will be treated as coequals: the coalition-linked All Polish Trade Unions Agreement and the oppositional Solidarity. There will be only one limitation: I am not interested in political rallies or public demonstrations. Thus, if the other side is prepared to talk seriously about employees' issues, economic problems, and jobs, I am open to such talks.

[TRYBUNA] The media can also be called part of the opposition. What kinds of cooperation can you see in contacts with them?

[Cimoszewicz] Looking at things from my own—most probably subjective—point of view, I can say that Polish journalists are quite heavily involved in politics. It is not bad if citizens are interested in politics; however, when this involvement begins to really show—not only in the way of commenting on events but also in the way of perceiving reality—then this is contrary to the principles of objective journalism. It so happens that the electronic media and the press more often display a negative attitude toward the government than a positive approach. Nonetheless, I can see some changes here as well. Therefore, it seems to me that this government did not have such a bad start.

[TRYBUNA] Do you not think that [Health] Minister Jacek Zochowski's case shows that the salami tactics [as published] are beginning to be used more widely?

[Cimoszewicz] Perhaps in someone's intentions there is something that might be called such a tactic. However, intentions are of no interest to me—I am only interested in a serious case that needs to be clarified. Regardless of external reviews, I believe that I myself and ministers subordinated to me must arrive at our own conclusions and assessments; also, what I would particularly like to see them do is the following: When they come to the conclusion that the law has been violated or some irregularities have taken place, they should not be afraid to take firm action. I am a definite opponent of the approach that tells you to defend the criticized person at any cost without taking a closer look at the accusations—only because he is in your entourage. I am also against yielding to pressure, in line with which all criticism must be right.

[TRYBUNA] Why did you decide not to include Jaskiernia and Konieczny in your cabinet? Was it because you admitted that the opposition was right or because you drew certain conclusions?

[Cimoszewicz] I had serious reason to make such decisions. Even though my closest colleagues disagree with me on this, I know that my views were not influenced by the opposition.

[TRYBUNA] How should we interpret your statement that "there is not a single person in this government who was not agreed to by both parties and me"?

[Cimoszewicz] The negotiations on the composition of the cabinet were very complex. They consisted of three [as published] stages: The coalition parties discussed individual candidates with me; I held separate consultations with representatives of the PSL and the SLD to be able to know whom my partner will certainly not accept. Incidentally, there appeared unacceptable candidates—unacceptable to either me or the coalition partners. The fact that the candidates did not become official and were not taken into consideration in the talks made the negotiations easier. From the point of view of the coalition parties' interests, the final composition of the government is optimal.

[TRYBUNA] Where do you see the biggest threat to your government?

[Cimoszewicz] I can see threats posed by ourselves, as well as external threats. The internal threats include such things as lack of respect for certain rules of the game that must be strictly observed. For example, if it turns out that there are cases of incompetence among ourselves or among high-ranking officials subordinated to us and if we do not take appropriate action; if we fiercely defend people making gross mistakes; if we treat our participation in the government as a chance to achieve small successes; if in this government we again see people publicly manifesting their differences of opinion; if we see open disputes or attempts to win over public opinion for one's own gains—then all of these would be threats.

[TRYBUNA] Will the decency of the government be enough to keep social peace?

[Cimoszewicz] Of course, decent, wise, and reasonable actions taken by the government or by the coalition are not a guarantee, but they are certainly a necessary condition.

Aside from that, in Poland there are still enough objective reasons for social tension. Overcoming the crisis, unavoidable tension caused by structural changes in the economy, changes in the positions of entire professional groups will constitute an objective reason for social unrest or conflicts.

[TRYBUNA] What about the political platform and the role of the elections?

[Cimoszewicz] Theoretically, because of that, the year 1996 stands a chance of being a quieter year. This government and this parliament have 10 to 12 months to go; during this time they can work peacefully—it is a period in which a lot can be achieved.

[TRYBUNA] What if during these months the primary problems are the Concordat, success or failure of the enfranchisement referendum, or miners' wages?

[Cimoszewicz] There may be various reasons for social tension. I would not like to make any forecasts.

[TRYBUNA] What about your stand on the so-called Oleksy case?

[Cimoszewicz] It is simple. This issue must be impartially, dispassionately, and independently clarified by institutions of the judiciary.

[TRYBUNA] What are you going to do to make that happen?

[Cimoszewicz] I am not going to do anything, which will guarantee that neither I nor any of my closest associates will try to influence the proceedings in this case in any way. If anyone—the prosecutor in charge of the case, the chief military prosecutor, or the prosecutor general—told me that attempts are being made to exert influence on this case, I would appropriately respond to that.

[TRYBUNA] Now, because you want to keep your distance from all, are you not afraid that you might become a politician who finally finds himself alone?

[Cimoszewicz] If I may paraphrase the famous [Walesa] saying: "I do not want to, but I have to," then here is what I would say: I want to, but I do not have to. This is important to me: I am doing consciously what I am doing; this is my choice, and I want to do it as best I can. However, I am appalled by the prospect of a different kind of activeness and a different way to get on in life.

[TRYBUNA] Are you going to run in the future elections?

[Cimoszewicz] I certainly am. As things look today, everything points to that, not only because my political group, the SLD, stands a very good chance of achieving an even bigger success than it did in 1993, but also because I get the impression that there is still great support for me in my electoral region, in Bialystok Voivodship...

[TRYBUNA] You are an advocate of a long-term strategy; if we translate this into the language of the statistical citizen, this means that at the beginning there should be a miracle and then things should continue that way. What do you propose as a starting point in this long-term strategy?

[Cimoszewicz] The starting-point is quite good. I am thinking of at least a medium-term concept of our social-economic policy. However, long-term policies are needed by the people, the government, and entrepreneurs. This is the offer this government should make because it is the only one it can prepare, believing that it will be the most proper and best proposal possible. Whether it will be accepted by the government that comes after the elections depends on results.

[TRYBUNA] Do you hope you will be the person to usher Poland into the EU and NATO?

[Cimoszewicz] First, no individual person will be able to do that. Second, among the public figures in our state, the person who has the greatest chance to achieve that is President Aleksander Kwasniewski because he is guaranteed a five-year term.

[TRYBUNA] Does the continuation of changes in the government structure mean that the new cabinet has to be formed from scratch and that the sphere of influence must be divided anew?

[Cimoszewicz] This is a significant problem, but I believe that a more important thing is to specify what a structural reform of the government should involve. I have no doubts whatsoever that we ought to carry out a reform of the administrative center. However, I will be able to answer this question no sooner than in five weeks. Today three theoretical answers are possible: We are determined to implement the reform in the form and time that have been proposed, we can implement the reform but time it differently, or we decide to make some changes in the reform.

[TRYBUNA] Will your government carry out the health-service reform, or will it only confine itself to making more preparations for it?

[Cimoszewicz] It is our desire and social need that this should happen. However, will we be able to do this? As a consequence of the special—social and political—delicacy of this reform, the awareness that the opposition may take advantage of it in political gamesmanship naturally makes the government think twice and postpone the reform.

[TRYBUNA] There is not a country where these reforms were implemented without any pain...

[Cimoszewicz] That is true. However, the current state of affairs is so unsatisfactory—also to people who are included in the social-security system—that there is potential expectation of changes. I believe it is possible to try to prepare changes that will not entail drastic threats to the interested large groups of people.

[TRYBUNA] Are you going to visit Silesia?

[Cimoszewicz] I certainly am.

[TRYBUNA] In the immediate future?

[Cimoszewicz] I am not saying that I will go there to negotiate miners' wages. This is something that should be handled by employees and employers, but.... Within the next month, the government will deal with the mining reform program for the next few years. It is a good reason for me to handle this personally and to form an opinion on it. I am also convinced that it may prove risky to separate the mining industry from all of the other problems of the Silesian region because many of the reasons for the difficult situation in the region are closely interrelated. I do not think it is possible to say that one illness can be efficiently cured without applying general treatment.

[TRYBUNA] Should the reforms be implemented less rapidly, but with social consent?

[Cimoszewicz] We are in a good situation in that the most difficult reforms do not have to result in a hopeless situation for people afflicted with their consequences. As a society and state, we are obtaining increasingly more financial resources, which can be used to help a region, town, or industry branch go through a difficult period. Today we should definitely not ignore probable social consequences; we should actively anticipate them. We should think not only about what is important for the implementation of a technocratically understood reform, but also about what is vital from the social viewpoint.

[TRYBUNA] Do you expect any problems in cooperating with the president?

[Cimoszewicz] No, I do not. Not really.

[TRYBUNA] Where will you go for your first foreign visit?

[Cimoszewicz] At the end of March, I will visit Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia.

[TRYBUNA] Why those countries?

[Cimoszewicz] First of all, this is in line with agreements that were made earlier. The [former] prime minister's visits to those countries were postponed. I decided that everyone should know that our problems are not so big that they prevent us from meeting such commitments. Another reason for this visit is that these states belong to the group of the fastest-developing countries in the world. We are proud—and rightly so—of what has happened in Poland over the past years, but in Thailand, for example, gross domestic product growth is 8.2 percent, inflation is lower than 5 percent, and unemployment is at 3.3 percent. I wish we could achieve such results in Poland.

Not unlike Poland, these countries are interested in diversifying their economic links, granting a dominating position to some partners, and, although they are glad that they have good relations with the strong economies of their closest neighbors, they are seeking new partners.

[TRYBUNA] What about other directions?

[Cimoszewicz] Perhaps I will visit the Netherlands sooner than scheduled. There are also talks under way to prepare my visits to Israel and Germany as soon as this half of the year.

[TRYBUNA] What about your farm in Kalinowka?

[Cimoszewicz] We leased a large part of it to our good, old neighbors two years ago; they are taking good care of the land. We still have three hectares of land, where we have all our beautiful trees, an orchard, flowers...

[TRYBUNA] And your family, who agrees to your staying in Warsaw...

[Cimoszewicz] I am afraid I have a limited choice.

[TRYBUNA] You are not moving to Warsaw with your family?

[Cimoszewicz] My wife and my son do not want to. I understand them, but perhaps things would be easier for me....

[TRYBUNA] Thank you for the interview.

Poland: Cimoszewicz 'Ready To Reveal' Moscow Loan Papers

WS1902120896 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 19 Feb 96 p 3

[Article by Maciej Cholodowski: "SdRP and the 'Moscow Money'; Cimoszewicz Ready to Reveal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The prime minister is ready to reveal documents related to the case of the "Moscow money" if they are in his disposition.*

According to press reports, the money borrowed by [former prime minister and chairman of the Polish United Workers Party] Mieczyslaw Rakowski from the CPSU in 1989 was used to finance the establishment of the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland [SdRP].

Asked whether he would respond to the appeal by the Union of Labor [UP] calling for revealing all of the documents related to the "Moscow money" case, Prime

Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz said yesterday: "All of the documents that are at the prime minister's disposal and are not classified can be revealed at any time."

Talking to reporters in Kalinowka Koscielna (Bialystok voivodship), where he cast his vote in the referendum, Cimoszewicz made the caveat that he does not know whether such documents exist, adding that "they are rather at the disposal of the prosecutor's office." [as published]

He said that UP should direct its appeal to the prosecutor general. "The prosecutor's office is autonomous, and no one, the prime minister included, should give it any orders," he added.

Poland: Cimoszewicz To Talk to Rosati About Oleksy Remark

LD2002143196 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0900 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Referring to a statement made yesterday by Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati, in which he said that Jozef Oleksy's appointment to the post of chairman of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] could harm Poland's chances to be accepted into NATO, Prime Minister Cimoszewicz said that he would talk to the minister about that. However, he declined to comment on the statement, saying that he knew it only from the press.

Leszek Miller, the head of the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM], however, said that he did not share Rosati's opinion. "Minister Rosati is not an SdRP member, and I think he should leave the assessment to the SdRP members," Miller said.

Elzbieta Lukowska was speaking from the URM for the Polish Radio First Program.

Poland: Sejm Commission Member Bugaj on Oleksy Case

WS2102155596 Gdansk DZIENNIK BALTYCKI in Polish 6 Feb 96 p 2

[Interview with Ryszard Bugaj, chairman of the Union of Labor and member of the Extraordinary Sejm Commission, by Barbara Madajczyk-Krasowska; place and date not given: "Schizophrenia Without Symptoms"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Krasowska] Should Deputy Tadeusz Iwinski, who has revealed some secret materials of the commission, bear any responsibility?

[Bugaj] Perhaps he should. His statement was blameworthy, but it must be compared to other information.

[Krasowska] Which one?

[Bugaj] Earlier, the press published different information coming from the leaks that revealed more extensive facts.

[Krasowska] Including yours on Jerzy Konieczny's mission, who by the president-elect's order got in touch with President Walesa and church representative?

[Bugaj] One should differentiate between the two aspects of the matter. We struggle for the committee to maintain state secrets. We see no obstacles, however, in revealing the political circumstances of the whole affair. Unfortunately, the commission's sessions are totally secret, which I think is absurd. I cannot see any reason that, for instance, Mr. Bartoszewski [former minister of foreign affairs] or Mr. Miller [former labor minister] could not be questioned openly.

[Krasowska] But the Sejm voted down your motion on making the committee sessions partially open.

[Bugaj] Yes, it did. A funny situation arose because Oleksy proposed revealing everything down to the core. Kwasniewski stipulated similarly: unveil everything. But, when it came to voting on the issue, the whole left alliance voted against unveiling the commission's work. A similar stand was taken by some deputies from the Polish Peasant Party and, fancy that, the Freedom Union in majority abstained from voting. We are supported only by the Confederation for an Independent Poland and the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms.

[Krasowska] Although the commission report stated that there was no provocation from the special services, coalition representatives keep on claiming that this was the case. Doesn't the ruling party's stand pose a threat of pressuring the prosecutor's office?

[Bugaj] It surely does. For the time being, we are talking about what, during the Brezhnev-era Russia, was called schizophrenia without symptoms.

[Krasowska] What does that mean?

[Bugaj] At that time, they would lock up people and say: schizophrenia. Are there any symptoms? None, because it is without symptoms. The very same holds true on this matter. Is there a provocation? Well, I cannot see any, but perhaps there is because we have not checked everything. Perhaps. I am ready to change my mind. To this day, however, the special services cannot be charged with anything. Nothing can be ruled out: The services may have acted according to the law, and perhaps the prosecutor will discontinue the lawsuit. The Polish system of law provides that in court all doubts are resolved in favor of a citizen. In such cases, very rarely is the evidence 100-percent proof. If the Oleksy case is discontinued or if he is found not guilty, I will not criticize these decisions. As a citizen, I will even be happy to a certain degree.

[Krasowska] Meanwhile, the military prosecutor is investigating the case.

[Bugaj] The fact that the prosecutor has decided to launch an investigation into the case means that, to a certain extent, he has made those materials more credible.

Poland: Sejm Speaker Zych Interviewed on Vetting Law

WS2102112396 Poznan GLOS WIELKOPOLSKI in Polish 6 Feb 96 p 3

[Interview with Polish Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych by Alicja Daniluk; place and date not given: "Once I Made a Mistake, Too"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Daniluk] Last week, the Extraordinary Sejm Committee that was set up to examine the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSZ] and Office of State Protection [UOP] activities in the "Oleksy case" filed its report. Has its mission thus been accomplished?

[Zych] The committee has completed its first assigned task. But this does not conclude its work. In the Sejm there are two bills to extend the committee's powers. Consultations on those bills are being held in terms of their compliance with existing laws, as one of the bills provides for supervision over bodies set up to investigate crimes.

[Daniluk] Does this mean that nothing will be a secret in our country? Will muck-raking never end?

[Zych] We are at a decisive time at present. We have draft bills on vetting, heralded by the minister of internal affairs in the case of the so-called leaks, and, finally, we had to take a stand on a more general question because, first, as in every civilized country, one should have materials that constitute a state secret and they should be protected as such. On the other hand, when it comes to explaining current affairs of significance to the state, such explanations should be presented to society using the appropriate mode. The next thing is how far and how deep these affairs should be revealed. I think we should explain all existing affairs to resolve guilt and what results from it—punishment or dropping the case. While taking a closer look at past problems, one should consider that certain regulations exist—among other things, regulations about erasure of a sentence and about a ban on quoting related facts. We cannot, at any rate, consider all those cases. There are open cases that need to be explained and definitely solved, where guilt should be established and sentence pronounced. There are also closed cases that should not be reopened because the guilty ones were punished and served their sentences. And there were cases that were erased, and, from a formal point of view, they never existed. I, myself, could be the best example of it. The deeds I was charged with when I was young would entail no legal responsibility whatsoever now. The whole affair is not of any significance today, but at that time I bore legal consequences from which I have drawn the right conclusions for the rest of my life. That is why, after 35 years, I can talk about this calmly. The reason I am talking about it is that attempts are often made today to return to very remote affairs that not only have no significance in life but also have been erased by law.

[Daniluk] That is to say, clearly defined boundaries are needed here.

[Zych] Both the boundaries of law and of certain values.

[Daniluk] It seems that one of the assets of the extraordinary committee is that opposition representatives participate in it. This fact makes its findings more credible.

[Zych] I think the committee's great success was the fact that, despite big caucus differences, one could work out a joint stance, and that the Sejm accepted it without opposition.

[Daniluk] Does the Polish Peasant party [PSL] have a concept on vetting?

[Zych] We also have prepared a bill draft that is being discussed in our milieu now, and it will surely be presented in the Sejm.

[Daniluk] Why didn't the PSL struggle firmly for the prime ministership during the political wrangling that took place after Oleksy resigned?

[Zych] We analyzed the situation profoundly and came to the conviction that the head of the cabinet should originate from the SLD, with appropriate changes in government.

[Daniluk] Is the PSL coming out weakened after the cabinet restructuring?

[Zych] No, I do not think there was any weakening. Please remember that it was not only about jobs, but also about a discussion of the program.

[Daniluk] Will the coalition agreement be altered?

[Zych] I believe the case is simple; the agreement is a legal text, the will of both parties is decisive here, too. I think there will be some program and organizational corrections.

[Daniluk] Soon, on 18 February, the enfranchisement referendum will take place. What will be the consequences if it fails, if the turnout is so low that the referendum is void?

[Zych] It would be a political setback that the enfranchisement referendum planned by the former president and Sejm failed to meet social expectations. One should analyze this whole affair thoroughly because yet another—a preconstitutional referendum—is ahead of us, which, I think, could take place no earlier than in September.

Poland: SdRP Leaders Respond to 'Open Letter'

WS1602141096 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 7 Feb 96 pp 12-13

[Article by Jozef Oleksy, Leszek Miller, Izabella Sierakowska, and Jerzy Szmajdzinski: "We Are Not Extremists. Response to Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski's 'Open Letter to Political Parties' by SdRP Leaders"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We have attentively acquainted ourselves with the "Open Letter to Political Parties" by Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski (GAZETA WYBORCZA No. 18). Both are recognized authorities in historical matters, as well as leaders and cocreators of the Solidarity Movement. They have great experience in public activities, and their voice always has been and will be weighty.

We agree with the authors' opinion that "the greatest value the Polish people gained after 1989 was the democratic and independent state." We share the opinion that the "internal logic of democracy rests in conflicts between social interests, as well as in conflicts among leaders and political groupings that are played according to acknowledged rules and values. Because of that, conflicts do not split the state." We believe that all social and political conflicts have to be overcome according to this line of thinking about democracy, and about a sovereign and lawful Polish state.

The diagnosis that Poland is in a state crisis is exaggerated. The state and its institutions are functioning normally. The economy is growing, inflation is falling, and the number of jobs is growing. The security of Poland is unimpeded, and all public matters are heading in the right direction.

There is no state crisis; there is a political struggle.

The political elites that took power after 1989 assumed that the formation represented by us would remain for a long time a pariah in Polish political life. The succession of democratic elections has been damaging to that view. The victory of Aleksander Kwasniewski has revealed the real geography of social support. After each success of the left, there were attempts made to discredit the democratic verdict of the Polish people. An extraordinary intensification of that line, preceded by warnings about "broken spines" and "damaged jaws," are being experienced now.

We share the anxiety of Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski regarding the role of the Polish secret services in the recent events. We also consider the criticism of these services' actions during the times of the Polish People's Republic to be accurate. Disquieting facts attesting to their specific participation in political crises arouse suspicion as to their functioning in the conditions of a democratic order.

Pointing out the premises of that suspicion in the "Open Letter," Kuron and Modzelewski lose force when it is necessary to formulate logical and dramatic hypotheses regarding the connections of some higher functionaries of the special services with Lech Walesa's camp. Or when the hypotheses cause suspicions that nowadays, just as in the times of the former political order, organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Poland are subordinate to the goals of the political elites that control them.

It is also difficult to understand why the authors of the "letter" search for a single causal relationship between their opinions about the special services, which they do not thoroughly explain, and the so-called Oleksy case. Why should we seriously and with no critical reflection accept charges presented by these services against a particular politician? Why is it necessary to teach the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] that the sooner it understands that Jozef Oleksy is a failed politician, the better?

Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski have personally tasted the results of exchanging law and lawful procedures for political slander. Do they have any doubts today? Can they watch without repugnance how a man and a politician is being destroyed only because a charge has been made against him? We pose these questions and await an answer, which will also be an opinion on the subject of the legal and moral rules that govern our young democracy, the role of the special services and the control over them in a democratic state of law.

The reform of the special services must go deep in order to, as soon as possible, entirely and irreversibly exclude the possibility of their engagement with any side of the political rivalry. That is why it is necessary to bring the services under strict and democratic control; to make them guarantee the law, state security, and reliable and objective information.

We fully support the postulates of Kuron and Modzelewski that go in that direction, and we will try to give them a practical dimension.

We express the belief, identical to that of Kuron and Modzelewski, that the composition of the government and the creation of parliamentary coalitions should be decided by the majority of the voters and by questions related to the program and not by internal bargaining and combinations in parliament and, even more, not by the activities of the special services. Appointing the authorities of the country in a way other that through elections would mean that Poland was becoming an undemocratic state. We also speak against fanning animosity among the citizens and dividing society into two camps, full of hatred and fighting each other. We regret that advocates of Lech Walesa and the former president himself gave those characteristics to the presidential contest.

The political polarization is going too far, and, just as the the authors of the "letter," we are of the opinion that, apart from the left and the extreme right, there is a place in Poland for a moderate center. We state, nonetheless, that the intense activities of the right result in destruction and marginalization of centrist forces. We have always regarded these forces with respect; we have appreciated their role in the defense of democratic order and their will to compromise and agree.

Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski appeal for creation of a specific balancing alliance that should "oppose the postcommunists but, to the same degree, be separate from the militant anticommunists."

The above vision of things means the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] and the whole SLD are treated as political extremists. In our opinion, there is no reason for such a verdict. After all, in what way is the SdRP program extreme? Is it maybe totalitarian, undemocratic? We are a political party that, from principle, aims at dialogue and communication with others. We do not divide the Polish people into better and worse, according to their views or political camps. More and more young people who did not take part in political life before 1989 vote for us.

The appeal of the authors of the "letter" is unrealistic. It contradicts the real and diverse popular likings that are expressed by citizens who vote for the left or for the right, for the peasants or for the center, in proportions that more and more reflect a modern understanding of their own interests as represented by different social groups. More and more, this has less in common with the passing historical divisions. Parties that fan anticommunist phobias fight something that no longer exists, feeding themselves in that passion by libels and slander.

Society does not want to be divided and antagonistic, it does not want "leaving the enemies in socks," "breaking spines," settling accounts, decommunization, files, and similar disturbance. That is why elections are won by those who remain cool and propose common work in a common Poland developing its economy and strenuously improving the citizens' living conditions. The elites who do not understand these expectations cannot turn to society. What remains for them are other—"special" methods. We condemn these methods, just as the authors of the "Open Letter" do.

We think that the one who presents society with a better program, aimed at solving problems, will win in the eyes of the Polish people. To bring peace to society and to introduce law in the state, this is an aim worth uniting the efforts of different political options.

Once again we propose the powers of reason and discretion to communicate and initiate common actions for strategic matters. Among those, we include areas like fulfilling Polish aspirations to participate in NATO and the European Union, creating a citizens' society, great social and economic reforms in the fields of health care, social insurance, job market, economic growth, and curbing inflation. Though there are attempts to entangle us in a permanent fight, giving us no time to realize great reform of the political system, we will not retreat from the strenuously constructed policy of communication and social peace.

Social Democracy of the Polish Republic never has been, is not, and will not be a party of extremism, phobia, and hatred. The results of the past two election campaigns have proved that the Polish people know that. We believe that matters most important for Poland require common action, one that should be undertaken by all democratically oriented forces that understand that problem number-one for Poland is not "the Oleksy case" but the normal functioning of the Polish state.

The title comes from the editors.

Poland: Opposition Signs Declaration on Education Reform

LD1702165496 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1500 GMT 17 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Representatives of the opposition in parliament and outside of parliament today signed a declaration concerning reform of the education system in Poland. The declaration envisions the creation of an education program that would compete with the program prepared by the Democratic Left Alliance-Polish Peasant Party [SLD-PSL] coalition.

[Correspondent Elzbieta Lukowska] The declaration calls for increased budget expenditure on education and for transferring funds to local government for the financing of education. The declaration was signed by representatives of the Freedom Union, the Union of Labor, the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland, the Christian-National Union, Mazowsze Region Solidarity, the 100 Movement, the Republicans' Party, the Conservative Party, the Conservative Coalition [KK], as well as by the initiators of the meeting, the Social Education Society [STO].

STO Chairman Wojciech Starzynski said that the signing of the declaration was aimed at achieving political accord among pro-independence post-Solidarity groupings, in order to set up a joint election bloc for the parliamentary elections.

Participants in the meeting were very critical about the appointment of the new education minister. Professor Jerzy Wiatr made an outstanding contribution to making Poland a communist country, said Czeslaw Bielecki, leader of the 100 Movement. KK Chairman Kazimierz Ujazdowski thinks that this appointment means a blockade of any positive changes in the education system.

Poland: Solidarity Expert Says NFI's Can Launder Money

*WS1902110596 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish
14 Feb 96 p 3*

[Article by Marzanna Zielinska in Lodz: "Solidarity Against Certificates; the NFI's Are Laundering Money"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Tomasz Wojcik, head of the Enfranchisement Team of the Solidarity National Commission, claims that shareholder certificates of National Investment Funds [NFI's] that have been issued to date should be invalidated and the money be returned to its owners.*

"The NFI project provides an excellent opportunity for laundering money earned, for example, on the drug and arms trade," said Tomasz Wojcik, head of the Enfranchisement Team of the Solidarity National Commission, at a meeting in Lodz.

"Buying out shareholder certificates has nothing to do with enfranchisement. Citizens who purchase the certificates quickly get rid of them, making several zlotys in the process—approximately one-third of the value of the certificate. They are thus expropriated before they become actual proprietors of the national assets," claims Wojcik.

He maintains that this is why Solidarity is postulating that everyone say "no" to the referendum question: "Are you for raising the value of the NFI shareholding certificates so that more companies could be included in the project?" Solidarity believes that the certificates are being passed on to the wrong hands by profiteers hanging out in front of banks.

Tomasz Wojcik is suggesting that the certificates issued to date be immediately invalidated and money refunded to the buyers.

"We will then see whose hands the Polish assets are going to," he claims. "The certificates should be replaced by bearer coupons not for resale. We can express our wishes only in the referendum; therefore we must take part in it."

Poland: Deputy Defense Minister on Finances

*WS2002091696 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA
in Polish 9 Feb 96 pp 1-2*

[Interview with Tadeusz Grabowski, Polish deputy defense minister for finance, by Ryszard Choroszy; place and date not given: "Counting the Army Money"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Choroszy] Minister, why do the Armed Forces need to economize? They cannot exist without money, and in times of war or threat nobody counts expenses.

[Grabowski] The defense system, just like the size of the Armed Forces, depends on the intensity of threat and the state's economic condition. In times of peace, outlays on the Armed Forces depend on the financial capabilities of the state, whereas in times of mobilization the outlays depend mainly on the political assessment of the threat to the state, alliances, and financial conditions. In the end, however, it is always the taxpayer who is burdened.

[Choroszy] Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko often points this out. It seems that the military understands these issues.

[Grabowski] The military is fully aware of these issues. Although it is true that we have been learning about the market economy for only a few years, the recent drastic budget cuts recently forced all of the military command and administration units to count their money. The system of planning and implementing the budget as well as the accounting system are being adapted to meet the needs of rational, cost-effective administration. We are currently introducing a system of managing defense assets that will provide optimal conditions for allocating funds to the units of the Armed Forces.

[Choroszy] Why was the Economic and Financial Directorate of the General Staff dissolved, especially inasmuch as the law on the office of the defense minister obliges the chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces to "oversee the material and financial projections within the Armed Forces"?

[Grabowski] The defense minister is responsible for the finances of the Armed Forces. That responsibility is prescribed by the budget law, the Law on the Office of the Defense Minister, and various other laws and regulations passed by the Council of Ministers. It is true that the law obliges the chief of General Staff to program and project the material and financial needs of the Armed Forces, but the chief of General Staff has adequate organizational structures within the staff, the command headquarters of the military districts, and the forces. They are fully prepared to fulfill this task. The dissolution of the Economic and Financial Directorate should thus pose no threat in this respect.

The economic and financial structures of NATO states are similarly organized.

[Choroszy] What can the Armed Forces count on this year? We are meeting on the same day the Budget Commission of the Ministry of National Defense [MON] assembles. You have probably heard a long list of wishes from the managing cadres of the Polish Armed Forces.

[Grabowski] The debate revealed the entire poverty of the army. The commanders say they need approximately 1 billion zlotys [Z]. Unfortunately, the ministry is not capable of meeting those needs.

[Choroszy] Does that mean we are back to 3 percent of the GNP?

[Grabowski] The condition of the Army can be improved only by adapting its structures to the financial possibilities of the state.

[Choroszy] The Armed Forces are currently living from one budget law to the next. Is it realistic to expect that the planning horizon will be extended to at least five years? This was the purpose of the widely known Sejm resolution providing that 3 percent of the GNP be allocated to state defense as of 1997.

[Grabowski] In a note sent to the Sejm on 2 October 1995, the government clearly expressed its stance on the Sejm resolution. It outlined the feasible outlays on the Armed Forces in the longer term and promised to prepare a five-year plan for the development of the Armed Forces. This plan was to have the binding force of a law and specify outlays on the Armed Forces, projects for the technical modernization of our Army, scientific, research, and implementation projects, and the organizational structures of the Armed Forces. We would like this to be an incremental plan, corrected every two years to meet the needs of the Armed Forces and adapted to the financial means available. I believe that the draft law, once the interministerial consultations are completed, should be ready in the third quarter of this year.

[Choroszy] Estimates show that, if real outlays on the Armed Forces are increased by 3 percent annually, in a few years the share of the MON budget in the GNP will be smaller than it is this year.

[Grabowski] Preliminary simulation estimates were carried out on the basis of the growth of outlays on the Armed Forces declared by the government for the years 1998-2000. Spending on staff is to be reduced, outlays on the infrastructure are to remain unchanged, and expenditures on training and equipment maintenance are to increase slightly. In light of the above, outlays on technical modernization would reach an estimated 14 percent of the MON budget in 2002. We think they should grow to 20 percent by 2002 and 30 percent by 2010.

[Choroszy] The future of the Polish aviation sector looks bleak. It is currently seeking to purchase a modern multifunction plane.

[Grabowski] This is a very complex problem because of the huge needs and the inability to finance them from the state budget over the next few years. The only viable solution is taking a foreign credit with very good payment terms. This problem requires a political solution.

[Choroszy] Is it known what our costs of integrating with the NATO structures will be?

[Grabowski] Talks on the terms of our entry into NATO will commence soon. Costs will be a major topic during the discussions. They are difficult to calculate at the moment. I think they will be huge.

[Choroszy] Everyone knows we will have to meet certain technological and training standards.

[Grabowski] Naturally, we are very well aware of that. There is, however, the problem of meeting those standards with our small resources.

[Choroszy] Bosnia is currently a testing ground for our soldiers and economists. The costs of keeping the Polish troops there were initially estimated at Z30 million. Currently they are said to be Z70-80 million. Who will pay?

[Grabowski] I agree with you. This is one of the forms of slowly integrating with the NATO structures. The costs are high. The most recent estimates indicate they are some Z70 million. We want Z30 million to be financed from the reserves of the Council of Ministers and the remaining Z40 million from the MON budget.

[Choroszy] Some steps have already been taken. The staffing at MON is to be cut by one-fourth.

[Grabowski] The defense minister has assigned this task to the team responsible for developing the organizational structure of MON in compliance with the provisions of the Law on the Office of the Defense Minister. The team is to complete its task by the end of March. Once the task is completed, concrete financial results will follow.

[Choroszy] You speak of reducing staffing, yet those who get laid off will receive pensions. Money in the MON budget will simply flow from one drawer to another.

[Grabowski] You must remember that not all positions are occupied at the moment and that each year many soldiers from central institutions enter the reserves. Many employees quit their jobs. Limiting the number of positions does not necessarily imply reduction. The same goes for replacing military positions with civilian ones within the Armed Forces. This is a process that will take place over many years.

[Choroszy] We are talking at a time when the cadres of the Polish Armed Forces are expecting pay raises retroactive to 1 January. I think many of them may be disappointed with what they get.

[Grabowski] The budget law provides that the president of the Polish Republic decides about the proportion between the salaries of professional soldiers and the average salary in the public sector. The index is currently 1.88, which means that in 1996 the average salary of soldiers will be Z1.508. [passage omitted]

Poland: Defense Minister: GS Needs To Be Cut

WS1602154096 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish
15 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by "(kf)": "Fewer Generals"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski has announced that the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces is to be reduced.

"It is necessary to dissolve redundant units and cut staffing," the minister said at a hearing in front of the Sejm Defense Commission. "The General Staff should not be bothered by such things as, for example, training."

Dobrzanski agreed with the opinion of Deputy Janusz Onyszkiewicz (of the Freedom Union) that the structure of the Army has to change and that 400 generals have to be laid off. He declared that he will support the domestic arms industry, provided "it will at least match the quality of arms industries in the West."

"It is only natural to prefer your own equipment," said Dobrzanski.

Poland: Wilecki on Troops for Bosnia, Changes in Army

WS2102102596 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish
20 Feb 96 p 3

[Article by "ALF": "General Wilecki Praises Young Soldiers, Criticizes Legal System; Not a Dinner but a Visitation in Drawsko"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *General Tadeusz Wilecki has visited the Drawsko training ground to watch the winter exercises of young soldiers of the 12th Szczecin Armored Division.*

The chief of the General Staff assessed the training favorably. He said, among other things, that "one of the significant theoreticians of military thought, who is present on our political scene," had asked the following question: What kind of army is this if it cannot afford to appoint one battalion that should go, for example, to Bosnia? According to the chief of the General Staff, today more than 80 battalions are ready, and it is not a problem to send troops anywhere. However, the general was critical of the current legal system, which allows the Armed Forces to send only volunteers on peacekeeping missions; volunteers are hard to get because neither the media nor meager financial rewards encourage soldiers to decide on such service. The selection of soldiers for battalions that are going abroad disrupts the cycle and efficiency of training in those battalions.

Asked by TRYBUNA whether a command headquarters for the ground forces would be established, the chief of the General Staff said: "Yes, it will be established. We have put forward this idea, and now it is being worked on. The command headquarters of the ground forces or the training inspectorate—that is almost the same." However, Gen. Wilecki is against proposals to dissolve military districts.

After the inspection, the general left the training ground to resume his leave, which he had discontinued for one day.

Poland: Air Defense Forces Receive 10 New MiG-29's

LD1902163296 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1224 GMT 19 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 19 Feb (PAP)—The symbolic handover of 10 new MiG-29 planes by General Tadeusz Wilecki, chief of the General Staff, to the 1st Warszawa Fighter Air Regiment in Minsk Mazowiecki today began the restructuring of the Air and Air Defense Forces. At present, the Polish Army has 22 of these machines.

In the view of Lieutenant-General Kazimierz Dziok, commander of the Air and Air Defense Forces, the new MiG's are modern and safe aircraft that are held in high regard by experts. The cost of one plane, produced in the years 1989-90, was $3 million. These machines were flown to Poland thanks to a Polish-Czech agreement. They are being exchanged for 11 Polish PZL Sokol helicopters.

The restructuring process and the rearming of the Air Force, planned to last until 2005, will run its course in stages because, according to the chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army, Poland is at present not able to afford a one-stage modernization.

Poland: Air Force To Buy Irydas After Modernization

WS2002142496 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 20 Feb 96 p 3

[Article by "PW": "Air Force Commander on Talks With Mielec; Tete-a-Tetes About the Iryda"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Armed Forces will not purchase Iryda planes from Mielec until the manufacturer modernizes them following the recommendations of military pilots, said General Kazimierz Dziok, chief commander of the Air Force.

The general said that, after the crash in January of an Iryda plane in which two pilots were killed, he held a tete-a-tete with Wieslaw Pustula, director of the Polish Aviation Plant in Mielec. "At the moment, the plane is not being used for training aviation cadets at the Eaglet School [Szkola Orlat]," said Gen. Dziok. "We presented our opinions about the plane. The managers of the Mielec plant know exactly what we mean."

The aviation plant is to present two modernized planes, which will be examined by a commission from the Ministry of National Defense [MON].

The general said that the steering system must be modernized. The MON commission investigating the crash found that this system was the cause of the accident.

Poland: New Law on Defense Minister Post Viewed

WS1902145296 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 14 Feb 96 p 1

[Article by "rok": "MON Comes Into Force"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Today a new and in many respects innovative law on the Defense Ministry [MON] comes into force. The new regulations clearly define the authorities of the defense minister and the Polish Armed Forces General Staff [SSWP] chief.*

According to the law of 14 December 1995, the defense minister is the highest state administration body in the sphere of the country's defense and is responsible for, among other tasks, directing the whole of the Armed Forces' activities during peacetime; exercising general control over issues related to universal military duty; managing cadre issues among the troops; overseeing the activity of the Military Police; administering matters of material, technical, and financial support in the Armed Forces; exercising the financial management of MON; and directing economic activities in the Armed Forces. The minister supervises the activity of financial and economic control units, training, combat readiness, and the chaplain corps. The Military Information Services and the Academy of National Defense are directly subordinated to him, as well. The defense minister may apply all disciplinary measures to those on active military service, and his decisions have the force of an order with regard to all servicemen.

Decisions regarding the structure, organization, and activity of the Armed Forces are made by the defense minister after consultation with or following a proposal from the SSWP chief. The latter, as the highest official on active military service, is subordinated directly to the defense minister and commands the Armed Forces on his behalf during peacetime.

The tasks of the SSWP chief include his participation in working out the concept of the Armed Forces' development and planning this development; the maintenance of combat readiness and mobilization capability; control over the complex planning of mobilization and strategic-operational deployment as well as the use of Armed Forces; control over the training of troops, the military education system, and material-financial planning in the Armed Forces.

The defense minister controls the activity of the Defense Ministry and the Armed Forces in a direct manner as well as with the help of the SSWP chief and deputy defense ministers. In his absence, his tasks are performed by the secretary of state or an appointed under secretary of state. The scope of the defense minister's duties during wartime is determined by a separate law.

The text of the law on the post of defense minister was published in Legal Gazette No. 10 of 30 January 1996.

Romania: Goals of New Political Alliance Discussed

96P20269A

[FBIS Report] On 3 February, Democratic Party [PD] chairman Petre Roman—the first prime minister of Romania after the December 1989 revolution—announced that he would be the candidate of the Social Democratic Union [USD] for president of the country in this year's elections. (1)

According to the independent daily EVENIMENTUL ZILEI, the USD—a political alliance between Roman's PD and the Social Democratic Party of Romania [PSDR]—was launched at a Bucharest meeting on 9 January, with "the participation of representatives of 20 European and Western countries." The chairman of the PD's women's organization presented the "Appeal to the Country" which calls for a guaranteed education, free competition, strengthening of civil society, elimination of arbitrary wage ceilings and indexing, protection of pensions by guaranteeing an average pension equal to 75 percent of the median wage, elimination of agricultural taxes, equal employment oportunity for women, creation of jobs and reduction of wage and profit taxes. (2)

A commentary in the independent daily ROMANIA LIBERA noted that PSDR chairman Cunescu and his party had no other place to go after they left the other opposition alliance, the Democratic Convention [CDR]. The writer said that he would not criticize the "Appeal to the Country" which pledges to fight "hunger, pain and cold." Calling the creation of the USD a "good omen for the establishment of a normal political life" in Romania, he speculated that it might attract members from President Iliescu's Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR], if they realize that it would be "political suicide" to remain in a party that "has bankrupted the country." (3)

Interviewed by the PD daily AZI, Nicolae Cerveni, chairman of the National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention [PNL-CD], said that he thought that the USD would play a positive role in Romanian political life and could be useful to the world social democratic movement. He envisioned cooperation, during the coming elections, between the USD and the CDR, with which his party is allied, for the purpose of "removing the current ruling party, the PDSR, from power." He called for all the opposition parties to back "the best placed" opposition candidate on the second ballot but said that the question of whether the CDR and the USD could form a ruling coalition if there is an opposition victory should be postponed until the opposition actually wins the general elections. (4)

In the same issue of AZI, Tudor Mohora, chairman of the Socialist Party, said that it remains to be seen whether the persons who launched the "Appeal" have the "ability and desire" to accomplish its stated goals. He objected to Petre Roman's attempt to take credit for the fact that the period of the Roman government was the most prosperous since 1989. Although Mohora admitted that this was true, he chided "the gentleman" for "forgetting" to mention that when he came into office the country had "practically no balance of trade deficit and no foreign debt." (5)

The PDSR's daily, DIMINEATA, claimed that the USD's "populist" program would "plunge the country into a social crisis" that could take "uncontrollable violent forms." (6) An article by a PDSR parliamentary deputy noted the "discrepancy" between the "current electoral promises" of the USD and the voting record of the PD, the PSDR, and their allies, the Liberal Party '93 and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania. He charged that these parties practiced the "most destructive opposition." (7)

Media Sources:

(1) Bucharest AZI in Romanian 5 Feb 96 p 5
(2) Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 10 Jan 96 p 10
(3) Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 11 Jan 96 p 1
(4) Bucharest AZI in Romanian 13 Jan 96 p 4
(5) Bucharest AZI in Romanian 13 Jan 96 p 4
(6) Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 23 Jan 96 p 1
(7) Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 25 Jan 96 p 1

Romania: PD's Roman Offers 'New Political Structure'

AU2002202496 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 13 Feb 96 p 5

[Interview with Petre Roman, president of the Democratic Party, PD, and presidential candidate of the Social Democratic Union, by Liana Sega; place and date not given: "We Need Another Political Structure"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Sega] You were recently asked about the type of voters you can count on. Your answer was brief; it seemed at that time that you were in a hurry and could not give a full answer. Therefore, I would like you to elaborate on it now.

[Roman] The political answer that I have given on other occasions, too, is the following: We are counting on all social categories and all people who, in our view, must become the middle class of Romanian society, as this society is going to look when it is called a "developed society." By that, I mean all those who must profit, in the good and profoundly social meaning of the word, from the true reform. These people can be found everywhere. It is true that I have referred to the young generation, but I also meant the technical intelligentsia, the workers, entrepreneurs, and pensioners. [passage omitted]

Therefore, our first political assessment is that in the coming election campaign we will primarily be relying, as is only natural, on the country's social-democratic backbone, that is, on those who have repeatedly and explicitly called for this candidacy, namely, the militants and sympathizers of the Democratic Party [PD] and the Social Democratic Party of Romania [PSDR]. However, in a general sense, we are also relying on all those who must become the middle class of Romanian society. In very many countries, the middle class clearly makes up more than half of the country's population, which is a good thing for the social and economic balance of the respective countries. [passage omitted]

[Sega] Only a few hours after the announcement of your candidacy, the Democratic Convention [CDR] came up with rather varyied reactions. How do you think that this problem can be solved, given that the opposition, be it within or outside the CDR, needs unity more than ever before?

[Roman] I am not surprised that this actually happened. After all, it was only to be expected, but this is not our problem. I remain fully attached to an older idea, namely, that the opposition must be able to convey a united message and present itself as an alternative to the current leadership. [passage omitted] Of course, it would obviously have been better if the opposition only had one candidate, but here we are with two candidates and there might be even more than two. But we all have a common denominator, namely, opposition to everything that has happened in the past three and a half years in this country, that is, opposition to those who have led us over the past three and a half years into the bad situation in which we find ourselves today. [passage omitted]

Anyhow, I refuse to engage in polemics. However, it does seem logical that, if the CDR claims to be a growing movement and the most important political force in Romania, it should not antagonize or create resentment among the electorate of the Social Democratic Union [USD], with whose help it might eventually win the elections, or vice versa. That presupposes a clear-cut political commitment on its part, too, namely, that the CDR should give us its votes if the USD candidate qualifies for the second ballot.

[Sega] Some political analysts claim that the only figure who might create problems for President Ion Iliescu in the coming presidential elections is Petre Roman. What is your opinion on that?

[Roman] I see things in a slightly different way. It seems to me that what is going to create very big problems for the current president is the poverty in the country. The poverty in the country is my adversary, too. However, while I am saying now that "we can fight the poverty and here are the solutions," well, those who have created and are responsible for this poverty will rather have a credibility problem. [passage omitted]

My goal is to say what a president should do today. Well, he should build a new political structure and display the political will to launch a true government drive to implement reform and bring about economic and social recovery. [passage omitted] It is the president's role to build the necessary political structure for a government of true reform, which can start its activity with a solid political support, based on a solid political foundation.

[Sega] Mr. President, we hope that you will have the opportunity to implement your ideas.

Romania: Rusu Reelected PL'93 Executive President

AU1802182896 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 12 Feb 96 p 5

[Report by Cristina Sofronie: "Horia Rusu Was Reelected Executive President of the Liberal Party-1993"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The main point on the agenda of the meeting of the National Council of the Liberal Party-1993 [PL'93], which took place at the Town Hall of Bucharest Sector 4 on 10 February, was the election of the party's executive president. Horia Rusu, who was unopposed, was reconfirmed in his post with 99 out of 108 votes cast; four votes were against and five were canceled.

Horia Rusu said that next week his party will start consultations with the other opposition parliamentary parties to gather signatures for the dismissal of Virgil Magureanu from his position as director of the Romanian Intelligence Service since "his staying on is a danger for our national security." [passage omitted]

Slovenia: NATO's MacKenzie Ends Official Visit

AU2002181196 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] General Jeremy MacKenzie, deputy NATO commander for Europe, is ending an official visit that lasted several days to Slovenia today. He has been visiting our country at the invitation of Lieutenant Colonel General Albin Gutman, Slovene Army General Staff commander. This is the most senior official military visit to Slovenia so far. We heard many details about the visit at today's news conference, which was also attended by Robert Skerjanc.

[Begin Skerjanc recording] As general staff commander Albin Gutman said in his introduction, the purpose of the visit was primarily to brief the guests on our views on activities that Slovenia is supposed to carry out within the framework of the Partnership for Peace [PFP] plan. Gen. MacKenzie was also briefed on the overall organization of the Slovene Army and the possibilities that the Slovene side sees for deepening the cooperation within the PFP in the future. That is why the senior guest was, in addition to the defense minister, also received by Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler, Prime Minister Drnovsek, and President Milan Kucan.

As a part of the visit, Gen. MacKenzie also visited the training center on Mt. Pokljuka and the air defense unit in Ljubljana.

The program also contained the general's lecture on current military issues in Europe to Slovene officers. Here the important guest also gave a presentation on the mission of IFOR [Implementation Force] in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The senior guest once again thanked our country and the Slovene Army for their assistance, primarily in transportation and logistics for IFOR's requirements. He is leaving Slovenia with extremely positive impressions and, he said, he sincerely hopes that he will soon be able to visit our country again. [end recording]

Slovenia: Austrian Investment in Retail Trade Detailed

AU2102104596 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 29 Jan 96 p 3

[Report by Ljiljana Djeric: "Austrians Biggest But Most Choosy Investors in Slovenia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 28 January—If statistics had not listed Croatia as the co-owner of the Krsko nuclear power plant, the Austrians would have been leading in foreign investment in Slovenia. Our northern neighbors were the first to venture into more substantial investments in our country. The interest has not subsided, and they have a heap of plans for investments in our country, including the third Interspar shopping center. They have another good two weeks to think about its location in Maribor. However, over the past few years, the Austrians have invested more in Hungary, the Czech Republic, and eastern Germany than in our country.

The information on foreign investments in Slovenia in the past year is not available yet. All we have are data for investments through 31 December 1994. According to Bank of Slovenia data, the Austrian investments in our country amounted to $250 million, which means that the Austrians have a 20 percent share in foreign investments in our country. They primarily invest in retail, banks, and other service industry, and also in the paper and chemical industry.

According to Austrian data, there are more than 700 direct Austrian investments in Slovenia. The bulk of the Austrian companies invest in medium- and small-sized companies. Our country is interesting primarily because of its well-qualified workforce, which is cheaper than in Austria. Our northern neighbors prefer forming new enterprises that are 100 percent owned by them rather than investing in already existing companies.

The presence of Austrian capital in Slovenia became a little more apparent shortly before independence, when Spar and the domestic Mercator started opening foodstores and general stores. The Austrians increased their share in the Slovene retail trade by opening the first Interspar shopping center in Ljubljana. When they saw that it was sufficiently profitable, they opened another in Celje, and they are supposed to open the third one in Maribor.... Namely, they have set themselves the goal of achieving a 50-percent share in this branch of retail by the year 2000.

Maribor responded to Interspar's interest in the construction of a shopping center by offering a plot of land on the right bank of the Drava River that is lacking in vital facilities. Interspar would pay for most of the cost of their installation. To facilitate the decision on whether to undertake the project or not, the town prepared a cost estimate. The Austrians have until 15 February to consider the offer.

Austrian capital is also very much present in the lucrative retail trade in oil derivatives. In 1992 the Austrian OMV and Zagreb Ina gave Istrabenz Trgovina a capital injection. OMV-Istra is currently financially the strongest within the Istrabenz group, opening petrol pumps also in the areas where, for many decades, only Petrol's pumps used to be. It has a 23-percent share in our market. In the same year they formed a mixed retail company, Jeklotehna Spoeck. Hoedlmayr, a company for the deconservation of new vehicles and their transport to buyers, jointly with BTC, formed a mixed company, HBH, last year, which is without a true rival in its field in Slovenia. Bank Austria and Creditanstalt were the first two foreign banks to arrive on the Slovene financial market, and the Austrian auditing and consulting house KPMG formed a mixed company of the same name at the beginning of 1993 in which it has a 49-percent share. The Austrians have a 95-percent share in the Maribor insurance company Prima.

The Austrians are very much present in our paper industry probably due to foreign analysts' forecasts that the world's paper consumption will increase considerably over the next few years. The Austrians are co-owners of Papirnica Vevce, Europapier Medvode, and Trespack from Brestanica. Austrian capital is also clearly present in our chemical industry—its share of Henkel Zlatorog is 51 percent, while in Sava Semperit its share is smaller than the domestic share.

Slovenia is, therefore, very interesting for Austrian capital, but it is not the most interesting. According to data of the FGG (Finanzierungsgarantie Gesellschaft) financial consulting house, which functions under the auspices of the Austrian Finance Ministry, the Austrians have lately invested most in the reformed countries. The West-East Foundation (OWF) was formed within FGG for the support of investment projects whose value exceed 10 million shillings. This support takes form of a partial responsibility for the risk (ranging from 50 to 90 percent).

In the first five years, OWF has participated in nearly 100 projects in 22 countries, but the countries in transition account for the biggest share. In the reformed countries, the foundation helped realize some 70 projects, the majority of them in Hungary (31) and six in Slovenia, with a total value of 551 million shillings. Judging from the projects that it will help realize over the next few years, Slovenia—bearing in mind its size—will be the most attractive for the Austrian capital. OWF plans to assume a considerable portion of risk in nine new projects in our country. Only in Hungary (11), the Czech Republic (11), and China (14) that they will participate in more projects.

Slovenia: Kacin on New Army Training Method

AU2002150396 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 16 Feb 96 p 2

[Report by Vladimir Vodusek: "No More Training Centers But Combat Units"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Five years after the then Yugoslav Republic of Slovenia organized military service in the Territorial Defense in spring 1991, the time has come when all training centers will gradually be closed down and transformed into combat units. Defense Minister Jelko Kacin and State Secretary Bojan Suligoj spoke about this at a news conference.

From now on, Slovene citizens will serve their national service from beginning to end in one place in a combat unit and no longer separately, that is, one part in a training center in one place and the other part in a combat unit elsewhere.

The first generation of soldiers whom the officers will follow from beginning to end will be sworn in tomorrow in Bohinjska Bela. So far, this type of service has only been on a trial basis. The training centers will be phased out by the end of 1996. Combat units will be the only thing to remain. There will be twice as many as there are at present, which will substantially increase the Slovene Army's combat readiness and fire power. This will help realize the standards that are taken for granted in NATO countries.

At any given moment, the Slovene Army will have at its disposal three combat units for immediate response, and each of them will have its own fire-support troop with 120-mm mortars. The fire power of the artillery units will increase greatly, too.

Kacin said that its value of the purchase of the communications system does not exceed $19 million. The entire system is subdivided into five systems, but the competition for all of them has not been closed yet nor will it be in 1996. Kacin affirmed that Harris's offer was incomparably more expensive. [passage omitted]

Jelko Kacin denied negotiating the purchase of the aforementioned equipment during his visit to Israel with Dusan Sesok and the president of the state. He also stressed that the law [facilitating this purchase] was only passed after his visit in 1994 and that the deal involved no intermediaries and no commission was paid.

Any contract that serves the realization of the basic development programs also contains an anti-corruption clause, which states clearly that the deal is considered void if it is discovered that a domestic or a foreign citizen received a commission for it. The expert commission ascertained that, in terms of technology and price, the system chosen was the best, while the commission headed by two ministers concluded that no mistakes had been made in the selection procedure and that the selection was entirely appropriate.

Federal

FRY: Milosevic, UK's Bonsor Discuss Issues

LD2002191196 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1413 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 20 Feb (TANJUG)—Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia, received today Nicholas Bonsor, minister of state in the British Foreign Office, and his aides, President Milosevic's office announced.

Talks were held on the political situation in the region and on further development of bilateral relations and cooperation between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and Great Britain.

The importance of efforts toward successful implementation of the peace process in Bosnia was stressed at the meeting. Confidence was expressed that firm commitment toward strengthening of peace and stability in the Balkan region will enhance overall development in the region.

The two sides concluded that it is in the mutual interest of the FRY and Great Britain not only to renew the already developed contacts and ties, established in the past between business and other partners from the two countries, but also to widen their scope.

The normalization of relations between the two countries will have a positive impact on the overall relations and the efforts to remove all imposed obstacles from the area of cooperation.

Taking part in the talks were Federal Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic and British Charge d'affaires Ivor Roberts.

FRY: UK Minister Comments on Meeting With Milosevic

LD2002211496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2013 GMT 20 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 20 (TANJUG)—British Minister of State at the Foreign Office Nicholas Bonsor said Tuesday [20 February] that a British delegation had come to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to promote economic cooperation between the two countries.

Speaking at a news conference, Bonsor said that he and the managers of 15 leading British firms had come to Yugoslavia primarily to stimulate trade exchange and examine prospects for British investments in Yugoslavia.

Referring to his talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Bonsor said that he was impressed by Milosevic's role in the implementation of the peace process.

He said that his meeting with Milosevic had focused on economic cooperation but that they had also tackled the situation in Bosnia.

The British diplomat expressed the conviction that the sanctions against Yugoslavia, which were currently suspended, would be soon lifted and that Yugoslavia would be recognized very soon.

Great Britain will recognize Yugoslavia as soon as Yugoslavia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia recognize each other, Bonsor said.

Bonsor said that British firms were interested in trade, investments and other forms of economic cooperation and that there existed no specific obstacles in the Yugoslav legislation.

Milosevic confirmed that the process of privatization would continue and that the model of market economy would be further strengthened, Bonsor said, adding that the issues had also been extensively discussed in talks with the governor of the Yugoslav National Bank and the Yugoslav and Serbian prime ministers.

FRY: Kontic Receives Britain's Nicholas Bonsor

LD2002200996 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1402 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 20 Feb (TANJUG)—Radoje Kontic, federal prime minister, today received Nicholas Bonsor, minister of state in the British Foreign Office, who was accompanied on his visit to Yugoslavia by 18 leading British bankers and industrialists.

In lengthy, cordial, and open talks which were also attended by Radoslav Bulajic, deputy federal foreign minister, and Ivor Roberts, charge d'affaires of the British Embassy in Belgrade, there was an exchange of opinions on the renewal and improvement of Yugoslav-British cooperation in particular in the economic sphere, the Federal Secretariat for Information says.

It was said that there were favorable conditions for the renewal, development and improvement of comprehensive bilateral cooperation between the two countries. Both parties agreed that it was necessary to intensify the political dialogue and contacts at the highest level in order to strengthen Yugoslav-British relations.

Prime Minister Kontic thanked his high-ranking guest for the humanitarian aid Great Britain has been giving for the settlement of refugees in the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia and noted the importance of the economic development of Yugoslavia for strengthening peace and stability in the region.

Kontic presented the British delegation with a detailed overview of the development of the open market economy in our country and said there was great scope for the investment of foreign capital in the Yugoslav economy.

Nicholas Bonsor expressed his wishes for the speedy renewal of Yugoslav-British bilateral cooperation and the establishment of diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level; he also said that the system of visas was slowing down the more rapid development of economic cooperation between the two countries.

He said that Great Britain would advocate that the EU revise the list of countries for which visas are needed. In the meantime it has been agreed that the two countries will issue business visas valid for up to two years, the Federal Secretariat for Information's statement says at the end.

FRY: Milutinovic Receives New Russian Envoy

LD2002195296 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1501 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 20 Feb (TANJUG)—Milan Milutinovic, federal minister of foreign affairs, today received Yuriy Mikhaylovich Kotov, the newly appointed ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], who presented him with copies of his letters of accreditation.

The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs has announced that during the meeting it was stressed that bilateral relations and cooperation between the FRY and the Russian Federation have hitherto been at a high level, but that there is scope for further improving and developing them in the future.

FRY: Normalized Ties with IMF, World Bank Requested

LD2102003596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0029 GMT 21 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 20 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Central Bank governor said on Tuesday he had signed an official request for a normalisation of relations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

Governor Dragoslav Avramovic said at a meeting of the Yugoslav Banking Association managing board that a normalisation of Yugoslavia's relations with the two financial institutions might take some time.

Meanwhile, the Yugoslav economy cannot wait for foreign credits, but must look about it at home to obtain at least a part of the funds necessary for reviving production, especially that for export, Avramovic said.

Production revival necessitates between two billion and three billion dinars (600-900 million German marks), which means that the present capital in the commercial banks of 300 million dinars is insufficient for the purpose, he said.

FRY: Belgrade, Vatican Open Full Diplomatic Relations

LD2002181296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1636 GMT 20 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 20 (TANJUG)—The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Vatican reestablished full diplomatic relations and immediately appointed a Yugoslav ambassador to the Vatican and an apostolic nuncio to Belgrade.

The Vatican informed on tuesday the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry that Pope John Paul II had approved an appointment of Monsignor Santos Abril Y Castelo as new apostolic nuncio to Belgrade, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry said.

Prior to being appointed Yugoslav ambassador to the Vatican, Dojcilo Maslovarica held the post of foreign relations secretary in the government of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia.

FRY: Serb Republic Refugees Should Return to Homes

LD2002192196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1817 GMT 20 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Novi Sad, Feb 20 (TANJUG)—Serbia's Commissioner for Refugees Bratislava Morina asked the leadership of the Serb Republic to urge its citizens who have found refuge in the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia during the Bosnian civil war to return to their homes.

Under the Dayton Peace accords, the Serb Republic (RS) has the status of a special entity and RS citizens should return to their homes, Morina said during talks with municipality officials of the northern Serbian city of Novi Sad.

Morina referred to a Serbian Government decision that citizens from the Serb Republic would not have the status of refugees because they were expected to return to their homes.

Morina said that over 2,000 Serbs from Bosnia had expressed readiness to settle in Serb Sarajevo.

The aid provided by the international community for displaced persons from the Republic of Serb Krajina is inadequate and incommensurate to the tragedy and exodus of the Serb people, Morina said.

Over 250,000 Serbs were driven away from their homes in Croatian Army offensives against the western, northern and southern parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina, the Serb state in Croatia, in May and August 1995.

Representatives of 11 Novi Sad municipalities briefed Morina on problems in accommodating over 83,000 registered refugees who account for 15.9 percent of the population in the district.

About 700,000 refugees from war-stricken areas in the former Yugoslavia have found shelter in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

FRY: Belgrade, Kosovo Entering New Phase

96BA0156B Belgrade SRPSKA REC in Serbo-Croatian 29 Jan 96 pp 10-11

[Article by Milan Bozic: "Alternative Dinner"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The West is exerting a certain amount of pressure on Rugova to join the Yugoslav political scene. This pressure has been further heightened by the fact that the war in Bosnia is drawing to an end and that, at least for the next 10 years, "fishing in troubled waters" will be impossible, and that, "until the next war," the borders of the new states on the soil of the deceased Yugoslavia will remain as they are. From time to time, "test balloons" are released from Kosmet [Kosovo and Methohija] indicating the possibility of participation in the federal elections, because such elections seem less controversial to local Albanian politicians since they have always regarded themselves as a constituent federal element of Yugoslavia and have contested Serbia's right to deprive them of that trait.*

A couple of weeks ago, the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade announced its intention to open an information center in Pristina.

In a normal country and under normal circumstances, such news would have been scarcely reported. And even if it were reported, it would have been pushed to somewhere at the bottom of page two of POLITIKA, among the diplomatic news, or at the very best it would have been perceived as an announcement of expanded relations between the two states.

Of course, this is not a normal country, and things are the exact opposite. Because the Americans, with this ultimately normal demand, put their finger on the Serb sore spot, on a paranoid concern that has been around for years now. We need only recall how during the war the message coming from various sides was that, regardless of the war's outcome, "Kosovo is next."

The political parties reacted immediately. The nationalist Right maliciously noted that even before restoring its embassy in Belgrade, the United States was heading off for Kosmet. The centrist parties peevishly stated that the United States' right to open such a center is not disputed, but that there is also a need here to put an end to the U.S. presence in Kosmet. As usual, the MIP [expansion unknown] and the government were silent.

Several days later, Gerd Ahrens, the co-chairman of the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, also showed interest in Kosmet. He paid a visit there, but he also met with official bodies of the quasi-receivership appointed by Belgrade, and to a certain extent he assuaged the fears stirred up by the U.S. move, declaring that the formation of an independent state in Kosmet is not even under consideration; rather, the only issue that can be considered is the degree of autonomy of local Albanians.

Almost at the same time, a conference of Albanian political parties and public figures was held in Pristina. The goal of the conference was to possibly come up with a joint political platform, with which they would enter into negotiations with Belgrade and Serbia in general.

Obviously, something is going on in Kosovo.

Political Currents

It appears that the Dayton accords and the approaching peace have begun to melt the Kosovo ice, which froze over nearly a decade ago with the arrest of the local leadership at that time, led by Tito's Youth and the now almost forgotten politician, Azem Vlasi. Recall only Milosevic's famous words to the enraged crowd before the Federal Assembly of the then-SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]: "What are you saying? I don't hear very well..." (Right then, the words "arrest Vlasi!" could be heard from the crowd.) "Ah ha... I promise you that everyone... will be punished and will be arrested!" An interesting sequence. First punished and then arrested!

Whatever the case, regardless of the sequence, winter, oblivion, ashes, and bulrushes settled over Kosmet after those arrests. The imperial army took to the road, the Kosmet separatists took to the woods, and the war went to Bosnia.

Now it is obvious that the time has come for the ice to thaw, and thus either for the imperial army to move into the woods or for the Kosmet separatists to come out onto the road, or for all of them to meet in some clearing, which would be the least bloody solution.

It is also obvious that there is fear of a thaw on both sides. The Serb side, of course, is afraid that the thaw will be too fast and cause flooding. The Albanian side, meanwhile, is thinking about where to direct the water.

In any event, one way or another an "intimate encounter" between the two sides is imminent. Whether this will be dialogue or conflict depends on many factors, both old ones and new ones.

The new ones comprise, most of all, the international factor, which was practically meaningless until the war over the Yugoslav inheritance broke out. The internationalization of this war brought all possible international centers of power into the game: both those concerned with threats to human rights—in Kosovo and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia—and those who view the Kosovo problem as a convenient way to exert pressure on Yugoslavia, but also those who, like the Americans, see the Albanians on both sides of the border as their sphere of influence. With the arrival of NATO troops on our borders, the significance of international factors becomes enormous. Even if we assume that their goal is not to destabilize Yugoslavia from within—which is not certain—and that they actually want the breakup of former federal states in the East to stop at republic borders, it is still not certain that some signal could not be misinterpreted by one side or the other.

For example, the leaders of the Kosmet Albanians could interpret heightened U.S. interest—as in the case of the opening of an information center in Pristina—as encouragement to continue their previous separatist policy. After all, remember how much the prolonging of the war in Bosnia was influenced by the Muslims' continuously bolstered hope that the international community would intervene militarily. And on the other hand, statements like Ahrens's, if additionally misinterpreted, could be perceived in Belgrade as stimulus for changing nothing in Kosmet, precisely now when change and dialogue are more than necessary in order to resolve the focal points of conflict.

Rugova and Competition

Of course, we can philosophize about international factors in great detail, but unfortunately we cannot have any more influence on them through domestic policy. They have finally and irrevocably intervened in the Yugoslav drama, and thus in the Kosmet act as well, as a constituent part of it. Grumbling by the ruling socialists along the lines of "we must avoid the internationalization of the Kosovo problem" is of no help here. The Kosovo problem has already been internationalized. The only thing that is up to us is whether, when, and how we will approach solving this problem, thus gradually depriving the international community of its opportunity to intervene.

That is why we should return to an analysis of the old, internal factors. The most important of the numerous internal factors is the degree to which the Albanians are ready to recognize the sovereignty of Yugoslavia and to accept the fact that they live in Yugoslavia.

The meeting in Pristina, which was not attended by the leaders of Rugova's DSK [Democratic Alliance of Kosovo], which continues to be the strongest Albanian party, hands down, was a step forward in this regard. Although the meeting's attendees, which included a party with a very indicative name—the Parliamentary Party—concluded that there should be a return to the principles of the 1974 Constitution, which was also a source of conflict and which the Serbs would never again accept, the overall impression is that the meeting was actually a step forward.

Why?

Well, if the Albanians nevertheless enter into negotiations on the rights granted them by that constitution, no matter how excessive they were, since the provinces were practically granted the status of federal entities, then that immediately means that they are abandoning the rebellion launched with the Kacanik Constitution, through which they unilaterally declared an independent state, and that they recognize the Yugoslav state. It is possible that the demands made by those Albanians who are willing to participate in negotiations will be substantial, at first glance even "unacceptable," as the communists were in the habit of saying. For example, they might seek a redefinition of federal entities in Yugoslavia, whereby Kosmet, or the majority of it, would be on equal footing with Serbia and Montenegro. However, all of this is unimportant compared to having negotiations that, in fact, proceed from the viewpoint of recognition of Yugoslav sovereignty.

It is likely that this was precisely the reason for the absence of Rugova's party, which is still sticking to its separatist program. Rugova was rather unconvincing when he first said that he could not attend because of an alleged dinner with the British charge d'affaires, only to later replace that justification with the words "I cannot attend every single meeting that is organized in Pristina." However, it is quite certain that Rugova monitored the meeting and the reactions to it with utmost attention and care. He was not too concerned about the small, civic-oriented parties, which he does not have to fear very much since they are able to pull together as many votes in Kosmet as, for example, the Civic Alliance can in Serbia, although with time—which could ride roughshod over Rugova if he continues to be too radical and passive—they could of course become serious competitors. His main concern came from the many old Albanian politicians, both those arrested and those not arrested during the years of crackdown on the "Kosovo counterrevolution," who are "threatening" to reactivate and take the political initiative among local Albanians.

The Pristina meeting thus underscored the main dilemma of the Kosmet Albanians—whether or not to participate in the Serbian political scene. It is very clear that there already exist adequately large, moderate political forces that want to participate in that political scene, but they are being blocked by Rugova's Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, which is not even a party in the proper sense of the word, but rather a national separatist movement which only needs to define itself as a party or parties, if a split-up and division take place.

The West is exerting a certain amount of pressure on Rugova to join the Yugoslav political scene. This pressure has been further heightened by the fact that the war in Bosnia is drawing to an end and that, at least for the next 10 years, "fishing in troubled waters" will be impossible and that, "until the next war," the borders of the new states on the soil of the deceased Yugoslavia will remain as they are. From time to time "test balloons" are released from Kosmet indicating the possibility of participation in the federal elections, because such elections seem less controversial to local Albanian politicians since they have always regarded themselves as a constituent federal element of Yugoslavia and have contested Serbia's right to deprive them of that trait.

Lesson From Macedonia

On the other hand, the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia], which "has members but no leaders," and its partner the JUL [the Yugoslav Left], which "has leaders but no members" and thus makes a perfect marriage with the socialists, have launched a huge campaign to recruit Albanian members. This campaign is apparently being waged on a serious scale, since Rugova's party has on several occasions felt the need to declare that it is untrue that Albanians are joining those parties, which is obvious proof that the number of "quislings" is not negligible. After all, in the communist days national minorities were "more equal" than many nations, especially the Serbs, and it would not be a miracle if at least part of the Albanian establishment were to turn back to the communist party, to which, after all, almost all of them belonged; especially now that it is clear that the situation is grave and that there is no independent state "on the horizon" so that a retreat should be sounded.

The most likely development is that in the coming period official Belgrade will encourage the more moderate participants in the Pristina meeting and various political organizations and individual leaders of the Kosmet Albanians in order to undermine the position of Rugova's party and, naturally, bring at least some Albanian voters to the polls, to its advantage. Political favors or some sort of concession could also bring some of these parties into the electoral process and even commit to them a significant share of the Albanian electorate, which would thus recognize Yugoslav sovereignty and begin to fight for autonomy from within, through political means. As soon as that happens, the Rubicon will have been crossed, and Rugova's party will either be transformed or split up into radical and parliamentary wings. After that, the whole thing becomes an internal political problem, which it would have been all along if reason had prevailed 10 years ago.

Whether or not the process will move in this direction will be indicated most clearly by the fate of the Albanian alternative state in Kosmet. If and when its individual institutions begin to fall apart—for example, professors begin working for the Serbian state and receiving pay from it—that will be the clearest sign that Rugova is losing the game. Some more radical move can be expected from the socialists as well—precisely the sort of thing that Seselj's radicals would call "treason"—for example, acceptance of the structure of that alternative Albanian state under the condition that it renounces demands for independence and is transformed into some sort of federal-provincial "state" that would be guaranteed autonomy through special legislation.

Thus, it is clear that the authorities in Belgrade and the Albanian leaders in Kosmet are entering into a new, extremely complicated and sensitive phase of the political game begun in 1981. Each side is doing its job and has nothing to be surprised at. What is most surprising, and worrisome at the same time, is the complete paralysis of the Serbian opposition parties. They already have a poor infrastructure in Kosmet, completely aimed at Serb voters, and they are not the least bit prepared for communication and cooperation with the Albanians. For that reason, they must regard the present-day processes in Kosmet as an extremely serious warning and begin opening up to local Albanian political forces as soon as possible. If they do not, then in some future parliament they could face several dozen Albanian deputies who not only would not "help" them bring down the socialist government, but could, in fact, be just as happy cooperating with it. The example of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] and the Albanians in the government there is more than instructive.

FRY: Military Industry Development Strategy Required

LD2002182296 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1657 GMT 20 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 20 Feb (TANJUG)—The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia must urgently adopt a strategy for military industry development, taking into account the defense needs, the material possibilities of the country, and the impact of the international situation, it was concluded at the meeting which Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic held with the directors of factories manufacturing military equipment.

We must bear in mind that the political security and safety of the country depend on this production, the press office of the Federal Defense Ministry announced.

Present at the meeting were the representatives of the federal and republic governments and chambers of commerce.

As one of the possible solutions to the difficult situation, Major General Radojica Kadijevic proposed urgent conversion of part of capacity to civilian manufacturing programs.

Directors of factories manufacturing military equipment are unanimous in their demand that development and manufacturing capacities should be preserved as well as the experts without whose knowledge it would be unrealistic to expect a successful transformation of this sector of the economy. It is this sector that is the generator of the scientific and technological development of the country, the announcement said.

Serbia

Serbia: Milosevic Said To Favor Cooperating With Hague

*AU2002191296 Paris AFP in English
1752 GMT 20 Feb 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 20 (AFP)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic said Tuesday [20 February] that Belgrade should cooperate with the UN war crimes tribunal at The Hague, according to a British Foreign Office minister.

Nicholas Bonsor, minister for the former Yugoslavia, the UN and Eastern Europe, met Milosevic here for talks centred on trade issues, the future of Bosnia and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. "I also stressed the need for full cooperation with the war crimes tribunal, which the president entirely endorsed," Bonsor told reporters, adding that he hoped an office of the tribunal would open soon in Belgrade.

Under the Dayton peace accords, all signatories have to cooperate with the UN war crimes tribunal.

Milosevic is in a tight spot over the tribunal's request that Bosnian Serb civilian and military leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic face trial for war crimes, as he signed the Dayton accords on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs.

Richard Goldstone, the senior prosecutor for the UN tribunal, complained last month that Belgrade was not cooperating with the court.

Bonsor arrived here Monday heading a delegation of British businessmen. He also met Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic for discussions on boosting bilateral economic links.

Meanwhile, the International Court of Justice at The Hague announced that a public hearing over a dispute between Belgrade and Sarajevo will open on April 29, a court statement said. These hearings will focus on complaints lodged by Belgrade, which contests the court's competence to rule on the dispute, as well as the admissibility of the Bosnian request.

Bosnia-Herzegovina lodged a complaint against the rump Yugoslavia at the tribunal in March 1993, and the latter responded by referring the case back to the court in August 1993. Both sides have accused the other of genocide and asked the court to rule on measures of conservation to stop crimes being committed against their respective populations.

In April and September 1993, the court called on the rump Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to respect a UN convention on genocide adopted in 1948, and to refrain from all acts which would aggravate the conflict. Since then, both sides have submitted written memorandums stating their side of the case.

Serbia: Seselj on War Crimes Charges, Milosevic

AU2102100396 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Feb 96 p 4

[Report by V.D.: "A Process Against Milosevic Is Being Prepared"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—"Everything that The Hague War Crimes Tribunal has been doing in the last several days is aimed at preparing a large-scale process against Slobodan Milosevic," Vojislav Seselj, the chairman of the Serbian Radical Party, said at yesterday's news conference, adding that "Richard Goldstone's request for the extradition of General Djukic and Colonel Krsmanovic is practically the search for an official 'pass' to the Yugoslav Army General Staff, to Gen. Djukic. "Djukic and Krsmanovic are called officers of the Serb Republic Army, but they are actually Yugoslav Army officers, whose commander-in-chief is Slobodan Milosevic," Seselj stated.

Asked by correspondents whether his statements about his voluntary departure for The Hague served "the big process against Milosevic," Seselj answered that many correspondents and politicians have claimed that he is a war criminal himself. "I care for my reputation, and I cannot allow anyone to accuse me of such a thing without doing anything to refute it. I would like to have the opportunity to prove at the international level that I did not commit crimes, but simply participated in the struggle of the Serbian people for liberation," Seselj said, adding that he was "personally affected since"—as he claimed—important Serbs, nut not he, were being indicted.

Regarding his recent request for a Dutch visa Seselj said that consultations on whether he should be granted the visa or not were still under way in ministries of that country. The leader of the Serbian Radical Party warned the persons suspected of having committed war crimes to be aware of "the possibility of kidnappings organized by Milosevic's police."

Serbia: Pale Serbs Said To Benefit From Rome Summit

AU2002194096 Novi Sad DNEVNIK in Serbo-Croatian 20 Feb 96 p 5

[Commentary by Milan Bozokin: "The New Verification of Peace"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The meeting of three presidents, Slobodan Milosevic, Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic, who had signed the peace accord on Bosnia-Herzegovina in Dayton, Ohio, three months earlier, was held last week in Rome at just about the right time, because the essential principles of peace were endangered. At this meeting, called by many Dayton Nr. 2, several important documents were agreed upon that refer precisely to problems that raised a potential danger to peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Whether the crisis has been definitely eliminated there remains to be seen because everything depends on the degree to which the principles signed on paper will be observed in practice.

The Rome meeting on Bosnia ended more easily and successfully than expected, without any of the sides demanding concessions for their agreement to the new documents. This speaks for their great readiness to continue with rebuilding of peace. A crisis in the implementation of the Dayton accord could have been expected because it was not possible to know in advance what sorts of obstacles would appear in its practical implementation. It appears that such misunderstandings and unclarities have been settled in Rome, so what remains to be done is that the signatories to the agreement implement it in practice.

Serb Republic Fared Best

The Dayton Nr. 2 meeting in Rome brought the most advantages to the Serb Republic. In the talks with the U.S. team and representatives of the Contact Group countries, the Serb delegation, led by Milosevic, achieved that, as soon as this week, the process should start for the suspension of the sanctions on the Serb Republic by UN Security Council. The Bosnian Serbs earned this ending of their isolation on the ground, by pulling out in time both their troops and weaponry to the required distance from the demarcation lines. Both IFOR representatives and their commander Leighton Smith were able to confirm this, on whose reports the fate of the Bosnian Serbs still depends.

In Rome an agreement was reached for a better position for the Serbs in Sarajevo than was anticipated by the general agreement. The Serbs will participate in the authorities to the proportion based on the 1991 census. This, according to a statement by Rajko Kasagic, the premier of the Serb Republic, is much more favorable than using the current percentage of Serbs in the entire population. As is known, the current four Serb municipalities within Sarajevo (Ilidza, Vogosca, Grbavica, and Hadzici) will be handed over to the Muslim-Croatian federation authorities on 19 March and will be jointly governed by the authorities of the Federation and the Serb Republic. According to the Rome accords, the mayors will be Serbs, while chairmen of executive councils will be from the Federation, and vice versa. In that way the Serbs, who will remain in Sarajevo after 19 March, will enjoy more substantial protection. On this occasion, they were invited once more to stay in their homes. The Muslim [Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation] side guarantees them the same treatment as other members of the Federation have and the prime minister of the Sarajevo government has reminded them that an amnesty law has recently been passed by which all participants in the war except war criminals are pardoned. All this, however, the Sarajevo Serbs are accepting with disbelief and continue to move out of districts that will belong to the Federation in a month's time.

Among the significant decisions of the weekend summit in Rome there is also the one on the resumption of negotiations by the Bosnian Serbs, that is, ending their boycott on all contacts with representatives of IFOR, Carl Bildt's team for implementation of the civilian part of the accord, and with the authorities of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serb Republic had decided to suspend contacts with them after the arrest and extradition of General Djukic and Colonel Krsmanovic to the Tribunal in The Hague on 30 January. After 20 or so days negotiations are being resumed, which can only advance the peace process, for all three sides are responsible for the implementation of the agreement. The announced re-establishment of telephone lines soon and arranged monthly meetings between Milosevic and Izetbegovic will considerably contribute to that.

In order to avoid misunderstandings, IFOR members will arrest only those stated on the list of 52 suspected war criminals issued by the Tribunal. IFOR members will not chase suspects throughout Bosnia, but will rather detain them if they come across them.

Mostar as a Unified City

As well as Sarajevo, the question of resolving the situation in Mostar was one of the central issues discussed at the meeting in Rome. The city on the Neretva remains unified and as of today a joint police force under Hans Koschnick's command will patrol the city. At the same time the mayors of both parts of Mostar, Orucevic and Brajkovic, demanded that the EU mission in Mostar be extended by an additional six months. Whether the fate of the city on the Neretva has definitely been resolved by this remains to be seen, but it is certain that this will be a new test of the West's patience.

Conflicts regarding the division of Mostar that began early this year have seriously called into question the further existence of the Muslim-Croatian Federation and endangered the Dayton peace accords. The blame for the crisis in Mostar has been placed on Croatia and its President Tudjman. Tudjman's major commitment in the post-Dayton period, in the West's opinion, should be to strengthen the Muslim-Croatian federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In that period Tudjman appeared to be the main obstacle to the forming of joint federation authorities, because he considered that those parts of Bosnia with a Croatian majority should be appended to Croatia.

The Croatian president left Rome first. Apparently, he was not in a very good mood while leaving, nor was he willing to talk. He said the problem was not only about Mostar alone, but rather about overall relations within the Muslim-Croatian federation. The Croats have not been satisfied with the way in which their relations with their Muslim allies have been going for quite a long time. The Federation is still being sustained by the West, although on shaky legs. In almost two years of its existence, the Federation has experienced more or less difficult challenges, but it has never fully taken roots, because the Croats and the Muslims cannot live together. Even though it is known where the danger comes from, until Rome the West did nothing to prevent the Croats from destabilizing the Bosnian Federation, which has considerably influenced the implementation of the entire accord in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Kosovo

Kosovo: LDK's Agani on Germany as 'Greatest Support'

AU1802171696 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT No 814 in English 16 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The vice chairman of the Democratic League of Kosova [LDK], Dr. Fehmi Agani, hailed today (Friday) [16 February] the shared view of President Berisha of Albania and President Rugova of Kosova, expressed during their meeting in Tirana early this week, that as far as the Albanian side is concerned, there is no hesitation whatsoever to engage in dialogue with the Serbian side on Kosova in the presence of a third party.

Speaking to reporters in Prishtina [Pristina], the LDK vice chairman said President of the Republic of Kosova Dr. Ibrahim Rugova had a "fruitful" meeting with Danish Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Petersen in Copenhagen. "We highly appreciate the Danish support for the Albanians and Kosova," Dr. Agani said, noting that the PL-Fonden's Award to Dr. Ibrahim Rugova "is an acknowledgment to his political concept and engagement for the independence of Kosova by political means, as well as an acknowledgement of a respected institution for the non-violent, democratic, and liberation movement of the Albanians of Kosova."

The LDK vice chairman welcomed the reconfirmation this week by German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel of the Kinkel-Juppe statement two years ago that self-styled Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot get reintegrated into the world community until the Kosova issue is not solved. "Germany's attitude, together with the well-known U.S. position, represent the greatest support for Kosova and its future status," he said.

Commenting on a visit Wednesday to Prishtina by the president of the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia, Zoran Lilic, Dr. Fehmi Agani remarked: "If it was not for the sealing off of Prishtina streets, the noisy aircraft, and an increased police presence, hardly anyone would know the SPS (Socialist Party of Serbia) was holding a party convention and the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia's president was here." Slogans on "cohabitation" and "national equality" were the only "verbal concessions" Lilic made in his addresses, Dr. Agani said, noting that the Serbian official defended Serbia's policies in Kosova by further threatening the Albanians, that is pressing them to "fully subjugate themselves to Serbia," as the LDK official put it. The acme of the arrogance of an occupier and a hypocritical expose was Lilic's insistence that the Serbian Constitution of 1990 is the political and legal framework for the resolution of the Kosova problem and the "equality" of Albanians, the LDK vice chairman said, calling that very constitution "an utter negation of all Kosova autonomy and the basic document of Serbian hegemony over Kosova."

During the meeting with the Serbian-controlled University of Prishtina, Zoran Lilic bestowed his commendation upon the work of the university from where Albanians have been kicked out, Dr. Agani remarked, echoing the Serbian self-laudatory statements embodied in the "coercive rector" Papovic's words that "Serbian is the language of instruction [in his university], and only the Department of Albanian Language and Literature and the Turkish Department are allowed in mother tongue." [There is no Albanological Department in the Serbian University in Prishtina, KIC].

Dr. Fehmi Agani, the LDK vice chairman, said although the perpetrators of the alleged blasts on Sunday in several Serbian refugee camps in Kosova are as yet unidentified, the very fact the Albanians in Kosova were against the resettlement of Serb refugees here has led the Serbian media to lay the blame with the Albanians, that is "the headquarters of separatists in Prishtina." "One can't overlook the similarity between the explosions in Kosova and the terrorist shooting in Sarajevo," Dr. Agani said, adding that "warmongers and war criminals are fearful of peaceful settlements everywhere." "We have opposed and still oppose the settlement of refugees in Kosova as an act of Serbian colonization of the country and a source of new conflicts and provocations," the LDK vice chairman told reporters, and went on to say: "The stabbing to death of Ali Shabanaj and the wounding of four other Albanians in Decan [by Serb refugees, KIC] and the blasts in Kosova, if they occurred at all, are proof of our rightful position."

The LDK vice chairman Dr. Fehmi Agani said Friday a dossier on Serbian crimes against Kosova Albanians has already been handed over to the Hague Tribunal, and that new cases will be filed. "The Kosova dossier [prepared by the Council for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms and the Kosova Government] has been at the possession of The Hague Tribunal," he concluded.

Kosovo: Liberation Movement Statement on Bombings

AU2002171996 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 20 Feb 96 p 2

[Unattributed report on statement by Sejdi Veseli, "representative of the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosova outside the occupied territories": "The National Movement for the Liberation of Kosova Cannot Be Identified With the Kosova Liberation Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "In connection with certain articles in various Albanian newspapers about the events of 11 February 1996 (bomb blasts at certain sites in Kosova where Serbian refugees are settled), I, the legal representative of the LKCK [Levizja Kombetare per Clirimin e Kosoves, National Movement for the Liberation of Kosova] outside the occupied territories, consider it necessary to issue the following explanations:

"I, the legal representative of the LKCK beyond the occupied territories, have not declared to any newspaper that the organization I represent was behind these explosions.

"The public has read in the newspapers RILINDJA and ALBANIA of 17 February that the Kosova Liberation Army [Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves] has claimed responsibility for these explosions.

"I consider it necessary to explain to the public that the LKCK cannot be identified with the Kosova Liberation Army.

"The LKCK possesses all the facilities necessary to inform the public of its activities at the proper time.

"This explanation is issued for the sake of accurate public information and we ask you to publish it in its entirety," concludes the explanatory statement of the LKCK signed by Sejdi Veseli, legal representative of the LKCK outside the occupied territories.

Vojvodina

Vojvodina: Manifesto Calls For Autonomy

96BA0126A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 5 Jan 96 pp 10-13

[Article by Petar Ignja: "Vojvodina—The Awakening of Autonomy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The news that 17 political parties and nonparty organizations have signed the Manifesto for an Autonomous Vojvodina might have surprised only those who know nothing about Vojvodina. Those who in the last several years have been feeling what centralistic Serbian power represents have now decided to raise their voices and let the chips fall where they may! That is, they are all risking being called insidious autonomists by both the government and the patriotic opposition, and we all know the load which that word once carried. Being an autonomist was a greater shame than making adulterated wine in the midst of the Fruska Gora.

The signatories of the Manifesto are demanding that constitutional procedure be instituted as urgently as possible to alter the constitutions of Serbia and Yugoslavia, to make it possible for Vojvodina to set itself up as an autonomous, multinational democratic community of free and equal citizens within the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and as a modern region of Europe with an opportunity to establish links based on interest with neighboring and other regions of Europe. It also demands an autonomous legislature and judiciary. All those rights would be guaranteed by the Constitution of Yugoslavia, and Vojvodina would be a constituent and independent part, as an autonomous territorial-political entity within the Republic of Serbia....

Put simply, they are demanding something which Vojvodina has already had, or something close to it.

Rape

The time for commentary and debate will come. Today, we will concern ourselves only with supplying information. What is it that drove some people to sign the Manifesto, and what do they have to say about it?

Mile Isakov, our well-known journalist and deputy in the Vojvodina parliament, says: "We are proof that there are also parliamentary forces among the signatories of the Manifesto.... Vojvodina has been raped and plundered, but it has remained silent and patient because there was a war. Now the war is ceasing to be an excuse for all the faults of the regime, and so it is an occasion for Vojvodina to present its demands and take the initiative. The Manifesto is, at the same time, an answer to all the charges that a demand for real autonomy of Vojvodina signifies separatism."

One of the principal initiators of the Manifesto was the Vojvodina Club (a group of intellectuals who previously did not get involved in politics), but the president of the club, Stanimir Lazic (a Serb from Deronj), told our newspaper: "Vojvodina's present constitutional status is a false autonomy divested of content. The consequences? Well, Vojvodina has been plundered in an economic sense, and humiliated. The Republic of Serbia is an absolutely centralized state inappropriate to the real situation and the time in which we live, and we have not only come to the end of our tether, we are choking."

What can he say about the harsh reactions to the Manifesto, in which the Chetniks and Communists agree perfectly? "It is a question of the lasting interest of all governments in Belgrade in controlling and exhausting the economic wealth of Vojvodina. As for the real attitude of the public toward the Manifesto, we should, of course, wait. We did not expect any of the nationalists to put an arm around our shoulder. But there are those who are not spitting at us and who have an understanding for our demands," Lazic said.

Another well-known journalist—Mihal Ramac—was ready to make a statement for our paper: "While Vojvodina had autonomy, there were hardly any autonomists in it. It was self-evident that Vojvodina was something else, something different. And people lived with that feeling, giving Belgrade as much as it asked for and never thinking about any separation from Serbia. The self-styled autonomists never attempted in their dispute with Belgrade to seek the support of the masses, nor to explain to them the essence of the quarrel. That is why for most people this was a conflict between two party leaderships. When the wave of rallies began, it was too late. The people of Vojvodina, regardless of nationality and origin, longed for autonomy only when someone put his hand in their pocket. The health care funds, educational funds, and pension funds were taken off to Belgrade. The post office and railroad were plundered. All the equipment in the former TV Novi Sad was hauled away if it was worth anything, some to Belgrade, some to various SAO's [Serbian Autonomous Oblast]. Honest journalists were scattered all over the world.... Let us take the railroad, for example. On local lines in Vojvodina several departures are canceled every day, always with the same explanation: All the worthwhile trains have gone to Vuk's monument (whereby both the passengers and Vuk's personnel and the monument to him are mentioned in a context not worthy of the honorable old fellow)."

The well-known autonomist (as Nenad Canak refers to him) Mihal Ramac mentions wheat (white wheat). He says that everyone in Vojvodina, be he Serb or Hungarian, every peasant knows that Belgrade is going to invent a new method of looting every summer. And this winter, new tax collectors, referred to as fenders (from the German pfaenden—to take an inventory, to confiscate), who in some areas are also referred to as *fenderasi*, have been making the rounds of the villages. They are reminiscent of those in leather coats who pulled the peasants by the mustaches and cleaned out the last kernel of grain with feather dusters to go to Albania (among other places) for Broz's pal Enver Hoxha. The author of these lines knows on reliable authority that the *fenderasi* are being mocked in their games by the children in southern Banat (and probably in the northern part as well), all of the time shouting and yelling at one another: "Wealth, damn your hide!"

The Gusle

Ramac says that in displacing everything that resembles Vojvodina it is now the turn of the traditional Golden Tamburitza. "The organizers did not dare to advertise a competition without a message from Belgrade. When it arrived, there was only enough time left to arrange a program of old songs," Ramac said. Incidentally, another event which has an unselfish name—Competition of Vojvodina Gusle Players, is also becoming a custom.

Our informant also talks about the altered ethnic composition of Vojvodina following the arrival of 200,000 refugees. He says that the ones who came in 1991 have made themselves at home in a big way and have become bosses, mostly thanks to their countrymen who after the Yogurt Revolution were properly assigned everywhere where it was necessary. Previously, a disproportionately high number of supervisory positions were held by Montenegrins. Now, one hears, they have been displaced by Bosnians and Herzegovinians.

What most gets on the nerves of Vojvodina natives is that Belgrade bosses Vojvodina around. It milks it and skins it. Given those circumstances, Ramac says, not only do the old settlers become autonomists, so do the colonists who were resettled here following World Wars I and II. "None of them ever dreamed of secession from Serbia, that is, of a state of Vojvodina. Such things could be heard only in babbling after midnight when five liters of spritzer had been drunk. But even that passes the very next morning with the hangover. The people of Vojvodina remember what it was like in states belonging to others, and that is why what seems to them theirs hurts still more.... The autonomists certainly will not demand that Vojvodina, as a part of Yugoslavia and Serbia, have its own army or customs administration. But neither can they put up very long with a situation in which every dinar is taken from them, and in their own country, on the land which is their patrimony, they are not citizens, but beings of a second order. An example? Only Vojvodina natives were sent home on mandatory leave from Radio-TV and DNEVNIK. Their places were taken exclusively by those who speak the ijekavski dialect when they are not on duty," Ramac said.

Nenad Canak, a thorn in the eye of the Serbian centralists and nationalists, has told NIN that the centralist policy in Belgrade is manifested at two levels in Vojvodina: the centralism which is smothering the local (opstina) power and the centralism which is erasing the very existence of Vojvodina as an entity.

The first level is not unique to Vojvodina, but is true of all of Serbia, so that Novi Sad and Kragujevac and all other towns are grumbling equally under that "Belgradization." This can be seen above all in the installation in the most responsible local posts of people who do not belong and do not come from the communities where they hold power, whereby the regime guarantees their blind obedience and allegiance, regardless of the interests of their immediate surroundings.

Chief Officials

However, by contrast with Serbia, where both the "old settlers" and "new appointees" are mainly ethnic Serbs, because of the very mixed ethnic composition of Vojvodina, this practice runs a risk of more than a disruption of interethnic relations. For example, the fact that in Potisje (seven opstinas in northern Backa), where citizens of Hungarian nationality constitute the majority, there is no longer a single Hungarian in any influential government post (the courts, the police, business collectives) is a dangerous weapon in the hands of Hungarian nationalists. This kind of situation gives additional strength to their demands for "a separate status of Hungarians in Vojvodina" among the local population, but realization of their project could seriously threaten the equality of the citizens of Vojvodina and open up dangerous processes of ethnic and other ("old settler-newcomer") splits. There is a similar situation with appointment "from above" of the principals of Slovak schools, principals who not only do not come from the communities where they are principals, but do not even know the Slovak language. There are many such examples.

The other level of centralism is the attitude toward Vojvodina as an entity. When you realize that in 1995 Vojvodina provided the lion's share of the budget of Serbia (some 40 percent), and only one-fourth of one pro mille of that same budget came back to meet the needs of the Vojvodina administration, we clearly see the importance that official Belgrade gives to the Vojvodina bodies of government. The Vojvodina Assembly has no legislative powers whatsoever, and all recommendations sent to the Republic Assembly are rejected without explanation, and the major ones are not even looked at. All funds (literally, all) have been moved out of Vojvodina, which means that Vojvodina authorities have no opportunity to make any specific moves in economic policy.

Mobilization

"As for the media, the situation is still worse. In Vojvodina, there is not a single electronic medium (we repeat, not one) over which any differing opinion (much less an opinion against the regime) might be carried. The Belgrade media of this kind can be followed only by the southern parts of Vojvodina (Srem and southern Banat), while the rest are left completely at the mercy of the state-run brainwashing media.' TV Novi Sad, built with the funds of Vojvodina citizens, was taken away from the Vojvodina Assembly in the Bozovic putsch and became the most shameful part of TV Serbia, designated for the dirtiest jobs of warmongering and hate-mongering. Those who did not go along were discharged, and TV Novi Sad has become Studio Novi Sad, deprived of even the opportunity to produce any (even the worst) news program. Evils and repentance concerning Slavonia seemed to Belgrade the very way to set Vojvodina at odds with all its neighbors in the most fundamental way. In the Serbian-Croatian war in 1991-92, Vojvodina supplied almost three-fourths of the soldiers for that war (mainly conscripts), and it received about 70 percent of all the refugees who came to the eastern part of the former Yugoslavia. A few days ago, there was a case in which two women were arrested by the Army and taken off to the garrison to be held there until their husbands responded to the call for mobilization.' Over the last four years, about 200,000 citizens of all nationalities have fled abroad from Vojvodina because of the mobilization and the assaults of the Serbian nationalists," Canak says.

And Dragan Veselinov told NIN: "We want a referendum for Vojvodina. Vojvodina must get its own laws, courts, police, schools, hospitals, university, television, old-age and social welfare funds, and the right to its own immigration legislation. We must never again repeat the tragedy of the twenties, the forties, and the nineties, when Vojvodina was settled with Serbs from other regions without even its citizens being asked." He says that Vojvodina is being skinned. All of the grain in Yugoslavia's state reserves came from Vojvodina, but it will be exported exclusively by Serbian enterprises. Marjanovic's Progres received one million tons to export to Russia, Radulovic's Centromarket 100,000 tons, and Simpo of Vranje another 100,000 tons. Belgrade's state monopoly of grain purchases meant that wheat was purchased at 80 German marks [DM] per ton and sold to Russia for DM320. The profit stays in Serbia. Vojvodina does the plowing, Serbia reaps the harvest. That policy has been in place since 1918.

The Dayton Punishment

"The Serbian nationalists, from the right wing of the Pasic Radicals to the present-day members of the academy, priests, and various Belgrade parties of renegades, are constantly complaining that the Vojvodina Serbs are splitting the unity of the Serbian body politic and want separation. What does it have to do with them? They should defend Sumadija from the Montenegrin and Herzegovinian managers. We do not want out of Serbia. We want equality within it. We are not going to allow the more numerous Serbs to outvote us in Belgrade, and we are not going to let 150,000 new Serbs in Kosovo have the same number of deputies in the Serbian Assembly as Vojvodina, with a population of two million. We want our own Assembly, and we want to go to Belgrade for general affairs: the army, foreign policy, and customs. All the rest is ours," Veselinov says. He also says that they do not recognize the right of the Serbs in Serbia and those in Kosovo to decide about Vojvodina. "This is our affair. We have created a Serbian autonomy, free cities, and the duchy. That is all we have. Our objective is independent economic and cultural development within the present Serbia. Politically, we want a federation, and we are typically demanding democracy. From 1918 to 1995, the Serbs have proved themselves incapable of running a large state community. All the South Slav peoples have left them. And the entire world has punished them in Dayton. Serbia extends from Vranje to the Drina."

The name Yugoslavia, he says, is even debatable for the present state. It is not the Yugoslavia in which the Vojvodina Serbs in 1918 wanted to live. The real name for this state created by Borislav Jovic, Bogdan Trifunovic, Slobodan Milosevic, Mihalj Kertes, Branko Kostic, Vojislav Seselj, and Petar Gracanin and the merchant bandits is *Srbogora*, a place where the people are fleeced and ethnic groups are set against one another. Even the name Serbia is debatable for all of Vojvodina, Serbia, and Kosovo. Some other name would be more suitable. The territory of Serbia in Vojvodina is also debatable. The Communists separated Baranja from Vojvodina, but in 1945 the Pancevo lowlands, southern Srem with Zemun, and subsequently New Belgrade were also lost. Both airports, in Surcin and Batajnica, are in Vojvodina, but they belong to Belgrade. "This has to be returned, it is ours."

Even in the 1991-95 war Vojvodina suffered more than Serbia, Veselinov says. "Petroleum and agriculture have financed the war. Vojvodina young people are more numerous in combat ranks than those from Serbia. We are awed by all the Serbian deserters from the front in Croatia, because in that they have proved unsurpassable. They were right, because people from Sumadija have no quarrel with the Croats. We are ruined in terms of personnel. The brain drain and outflow of young people has been unprecedented. And what we have received is refugee manpower, politically oriented toward revenge, inclined to fascism and national chauvinism. Vojvodina is being governed by Montenegrins, Herzegovinians, people from Banija, and others who do not understand the spirit of tolerance, individualism, and citizenship, and they do not speak the industrial language. We want them to become citizens of Vojvodina before they Bosnianize, Montenegrinize, Glamocize, and Kninize Vojvodina with their backward mentality of mountain border guards."

That is that, brother Serbs. Serbian government as it now stands will be able to set even two eyes in one head at odds. Is there not a great deal of talk that Montenegro is already packing its bags? The idea that the people of Vojvodina can be mired up to the neck in the Pannonian *chernozem*, that the Golden Tamburitza can be replaced with a competition of (Vojvodina) gusle players, is a sterile illusion. It cannot be done, but a fragile state can be totally ruined, and it is well known that this government is exceedingly capable of that.

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